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Foreword
The 27 member states of the European Union are facing, among other structural 
challenges, a new reality of demographic changes to a dramatic degree. At present, a 
much higher percentage of the population has a life expectancy exceeding 75-80 years 
than 10 to 15 years ago, which is good news to most of us. The trouble starts when one 
looks at the figures to find out that the younger population in comparison with the older 
population is stagnating, if not shrinking. The economic and social consequences are 
enormous: most of the pension systems in Europe are still built on the basis that the 
economic active population finances the retired part of the population through gigantic 
public pension funds and taxes. This system has functioned well as long as the ratio of 
working (and tax paying) population to retired people stood at a 2:1 level or close to it. 
With the aforesaid demographic changes, this ratio has changed to an unfavourable 
level, thus forcing the political systems in Europe to think about suitable measures to 
adapt the economic and social needs to the demographic reality.
One possible way out of this situation could be to explore several alternatives to provide 
incentives for the older workforce to remain economically active and to stay in employment 
as long as possible. Therefore, one has to find out first if the older workforce wishes to 
stay longer in employment rather than prioritising early retirement. At the same time, it 
is unavoidable to find an empirical proof that employers favour older employees to be 
employed as long as possible rather than making them redundant in order to provide 
openings for younger employees and rationalise labour costs. 
Empirical studies and surveys of this kind are very hard to find within the EU – and even 
harder to find in countries with a recent history of economic transition, like Slovenia and 
Croatia. Both countries have many similarities and yet provide a number of differences. 
Though being characterised by a small size with a relatively small overall population and 
being situated at the south eastern border of the EU, the case of Slovenia and Croatia 
with regard to the effects of a dramatic demographic ageing could stand as an example 
for other countries with a much larger size and a greater economic power.
In consequence, The Institute of Economics, Zagreb (EIZ) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
(FES), Regional Office Zagreb for Croatia and Slovenia, initiated in the fall 2007 a joint 
research and publication project to explore the effects of demographic changes in the 
two countries in order to influence both employers and employees to keep older workers 
in labour as long as possible.
The EIZ and FES decided not to limit the study to the description of the status quo but also 
to formulate and promote policy recommendations which would enable policy-makers to 
design necessary reforms. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to increase everyone’s 
awareness of the changing age profile of the labour force, to improve understanding of the 
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issues related to demographic certainties lying ahead and to start removing prejudices 
about the elderly as potential employees. 
In this study, a team of experts has analysed the basic demographic forces shaping future 
labour market developments, identified those elements of the pension system influencing 
retirement decisions in the two countries and scrutinised employers’ willingness to retain 
older workers. However, everyone should be well aware of the fact that there are many 
related issues that remained almost untouched by our research, but deserve a further 
investigation. Therefore, this research project could evolve in many directions, e.g. 
to include the social situation of unemployed older persons and young retirees, older 
persons’ preparedness to acquire skills and knowledge and their readiness to work 
longer, but also topics like immigration expectations and immigration policy. Hopefully, 
this book will provide an incentive for researchers to make new contributions in those 
areas.
The aforementioned intentions led us to initiate the project presented in this book 
and therefore the team was focused on the very substance of the research – data, 
methodology, literature, results and their presentation. However, this research is quite 
unique by the way how it was performed, namely in a co-operation between Croatian and 
Slovenian researchers. Collaboration between the two countries on studying economic 
phenomena is still rare, but this experience shows that it can yield many useful and 
pleasant synergies.  
Again, the book is not meant to be of interest exclusively for experts in the fields of 
economics, sociology, finance or demographics – on the contrary, it is designed and 
written with two major purposes. First, it can serve as a valuable contribution to the EU-
wide discussion about the challenges of demographic ageing, elder workforce and the 
reform of the pension systems. Second, it can be used as an inventory of proposals and 
recommendations on how to cope with the necessary changes and reforms not only in 
Croatia and Slovenia, but in the entire EU. Thus the book is written in English with the 
aim to attract the interest of politicians and policy-makers, students, experts, employers 
and employees as well as the interested public in Croatia and Slovenia, but also in the 
EU countries.
Sandra Švaljek     Mirko Hempel
Director      Director
The Institute of Economics, Zagreb (EIZ)  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)
      Regional Office Zagreb
      for Croatia and Slovenia
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Chapter 1   |   Maja Vehovec
New perspectives on extending working life:
Challenges for Croatia and Slovenia
1.1  Introduction
Technological progress, a better educated labour force and more developed institutions 
– we expect them with certainty, so there are good reasons to believe that the economic 
future will bring prosperity and well-being. However, there is almost inevitable disturbing 
factor that may hurt the growth prospects of many countries. The population is becoming 
older and demographic projections indicate that this trend will only get worse with time. 
In fact, the European Commission (2007: 53-123) points to the fact that all EU countries 
will face a decline in the working-age population in the period 2005-2050, while 13 
member states can expect a contraction of more than 20 percent. With the exception of 
Italy, all these countries belong to the group of new member states. As a result of rapid 
declines in fertility rate and an increasing life expectancy, the share of older workers 
in the age range 55-64 in the EU countries is forecast to climb to 23 percent in 2025, 
from 18 percent in 2006 (Eurostat, 2006). The labour supply will be negatively affected 
by these demographic trends. Thus governments must find ways to compensate for 
a loss in the working-age population to prevent a further decline in economic growth. 
There are basically two directions for the government strategy: one aims to improve 
labour productivity and the other aims to increase workforce participation. This research 
explores the possibilities for improvement in older workers’ participation rates, either by 
increased retention in the labour force or the reintegration of those who have left the 
labour market.
Developed countries like the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada as well as the 
“old” members of the European Union (EU-15) have already recognised this problem. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that a vast amount of literature deals with it. This literature is 
continuously growing since the theme of ageing is of interest to sociologists, psychologists, 
economists, gerontologists, just to mention the most interested scientists. In particular, 
the consequences of ageing on the labour market and transition to retirement have been 
discussed for more than a decade (Kohli et al., 1991; Johnson and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Taylor and Walker, 1994; 1998; Naegele, 1999; Maltby et al., 2004; Taylor, 2004; Leeson, 
2005; James, 2007). 
Research results indicate that older workers will become a valuable and necessary part 
of working population in ageing societies in the upcoming years (Gringart, 2003; OECD, 
2006; Davey and Davies, 2006; Feinsod and Davenport, 2006; Taylor, 2008; Vodopivec 
and Dolenc, 2008). Early exits from the labour market and the “early retirement culture” 
were widely spread in the last century as a result of political decisions based on positive 
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demographic trends following the Second World War. But with the reversal of this 
demographic trend, it will become necessary to extend the working life of older workers. 
However, research findings on labour market responses to population ageing in the new 
member states or accession countries are still insufficient (Ihara et al., 2006; World Bank, 
2007). This project attempts to contribute to filling this gap by providing a comparative 
study of new perspectives on extending working lives in Croatia and Slovenia. A review 
of studies on the consequences of ageing workforce on labour markets indicates that 
only few researchers have dealt with this topic in Croatia (Kaliterna, 1998; Cvitković 
and Šošić, 2002; Bejaković, 2007; 2008) and Slovenia (Stanovnik and Stropnik, 1999; 
Orazem, Vodopivec and Wu, 2005; Vodopivec and Dolenc, 2008; Verbič, 2008).
This book raises some important questions. Is it possible to stay on the path of economic 
growth while the elderly population is growing and the young population is shrinking? Is 
there a reservoir of labour that might lessen the problem? How strong are the constraints 
against older workers on the demand side of the labour market? Do workers have 
adequate incentives to work longer? Do employers have adequate incentives to retain 
them? How can the pension system contribute to increasing the activity rate of older 
workers? What policy measures might be helpful? Do we need a single approach to 
all countries or should policy responses to the ageing workforce differ according to the 
specific situation in each individual country? 
As implied by the title of the book, it takes the standpoint that a solution can be found 
in providing opportunities and incentives for older people to stay longer in the labour 
force. It also explores the possibility of applying this solution in two small European 
countries, Slovenia and Croatia. Thus the purpose of this book is to shed more light 
on demographic changes in both countries that will influence older workers’ decisions 
regarding when and how to exit the labour market as well as employers’ behaviour towards 
those workers. Activity rates will depend on both older workers’ willingness to remain in 
the labour force and employers’ strategies to keep them in employment. An additional 
pressure will be exerted on the government and public administration to provide a fair 
and flexible institutional framework for transition paths from work to retirement and vice 
versa. Older workers need to have a choice to either leave or remain in the labour force. 
Employers’ strategies to employ and retain older workers deserve public support and 
certain incentives. 
This project does not intend to provide specific policy guidelines and measures. The 
initiative for creating policy documents like strategic plans, national actions plans and 
recommendation guidelines should come from the government side. This edition, 
together with other similar works, provides research results indicating the importance of 
the problem and the need for urgent government actions.  
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The research has been constrained by time and budget. Consequently, there are many 
topics that have not been explored within this publication. They refer to the implications 
of ageing population for the fiscal sustainability, age distribution of taxes and benefits, 
productivity impacts, migration effects, workers’ perception of extending working life, 
effects on consumption and investment patterns, changes in aggregate saving, etc. The 
whole area of economics of ageing includes a wide scope of macro and micro topics. 
However, macroeconomic results have roots in the microeconomic behaviour of economic 
agents and this is why this research is more microeconomic. Although many questions 
have been left unanswered, we still hope that this edition will offer enough challenging 
material to motivate researchers to undertake further projects. 
The chapters in this book provide new perspectives on a longer working life. They offer 
data on institutional constraints affecting labour force participation rates and discuss 
labour market challenges. This should allow for the better understanding of future activities 
of individuals, firms and governments. This book is organised into three parts. The first 
part introduces the problem of ageing in the European Union as well as in Croatia and 
Slovenia. The second part explores two different but important and interrelated issues: 
the problem of workers leaving the labour market due to retirement and the problem of 
employment of older workers. The third part is devoted to the demand side of the labour 
market and employers’ attitudes and practices towards older workers.
1.2  The institutional settings in Croatia and Slovenia
The problem of the ageing population has been increasing in Slovenia and Croatia for 
some time. In both countries, the share of older people in the total population is expected 
to strongly increase by 2050 (Eurostat, 2006). Although the ageing problem has not yet 
reached its peak, the policy-makers in the two countries have already expressed their 
concern over mitigating its consequences. We expect similar problems to induce similar 
policies for combating the negative impacts of labour force reduction. 
There is a number of reasons for comparing Croatia and Slovenia while exploring the 
consequences of ageing on the labour force. These two countries have a common pre-
transition history and consequently similar socio-economic characteristics. They have 
both passed through the transition period of reforms intended to replace central planning 
with market-based economies. However, the transition in Slovenia was faster and more 
profound while Croatia had the additional burden of the war for independence, which has 
impeded the economic development. Currently, the largest difference between the two 
countries is attributed to their EU status. Slovenia is a full member of the European Union 
since 2004 while Croatia has the status of a candidate country.
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Before the dissolution of the former Yugoslav federation in 1991, Slovenia was its most 
developed republic, followed by Croatia. In terms of development level, these two 
countries still differ. Slovenia is a high-income economy with EUR 16,600 GDP per capita 
while Croatia is an upper middle-income country with EUR 8,600 GDP per capita in 2007 
(Eurostat, 2008). Both countries belong to the group of the so-called small population 
countries. They are also facing a similar intensity of demographic ageing. The long-term 
expectations predict that they will become countries with the oldest population in the 
region. A recent World Bank publication (2007: Chapter 3) on the “third transition” of 
ageing population in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union reveals that most of 
these countries will face a dramatic increase in the average age.1 According to the UN 
population projections, Croatia should expect a population decline of 5 percent in the 
period of 2000-2025 and Slovenia 4 percent. However, both countries also belong to the 
group of European countries with the highest proportion of the elderly (together with the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and Poland). Therefore, these two countries 
may provide an almost natural experiment for exploring the consequences of opting for 
institutional and policy settings for the participation of older workers in the labour force.
The institutional characteristics of labour markets in both countries are similar despite 
their different development levels. Both countries share some common features which 
are worth listing:
The external shocks of privatisation and necessity of defensive restructuring in the • 
1990s induced companies to decrease their labour force (Domadenik and Vehovec, 
2003).
During the 1990s, Croatia has implemented early retirement schemes as a more • 
socially and politically correct offer to older workers to lay-offs (Guardiancich, 2004; 
2007). A large-scale flow of older workers to inactivity through early retirement 
schemes resulted in negative side-effects on the general public opinion about 
older workers’ productivity, knowledge and experience. Firms were pushing older 
workers to early retirement, paying contributions for each additional year until the 
official retirement age in order to fulfil the conditions for full pension status, even 
though a person did not achieve the retirement age. Early retirement solutions were 
subsidised by employers, but they were not preferred by employees. The reason 
why older workers were willing to accept early retirement was simply the fact it was 
the second best solution compared with a highly insecure unemployment status. 
Another reason was a relatively high replacement rate, i.e. the share of average 
pension in the average wage (Guardianchich, 2007: 103). During the turbulent times 
of a deep recession, retirement was a way for older people to maintain a socially 
acceptable status and regain control over their lives. As such, Croatia consciously 
sacrificed older working generations, pushing them into inactivity before their full 
1 The “third transition” depicts the period of demographic changes following a communist government, which is 
called “from red to grey” (World Bank, 2007: Chapter 3).
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retirement age. Slovenia, on the other hand, did not have such high unemployment 
rates. Their policy towards older workers was similar to Croatia’s, but more moderate 
during the process of company restructuring in the period 1990-2000 (Verša, 2004: 
227).
The share of inactive population in the total population for older persons between 50 • 
and 64 years in Croatia (49.8) and Slovenia (48.8) exceeds that of the EU-25 (40.8) 
for 2007. However, it should be emphasised that inactivity rates for the same cohort 
in Croatia and Slovenia gradually decreased from 60.8 percent and 55.4 percent in 
2002, respectively. Both countries also have substantially higher inactivity rates for 
older persons aged 55-64 as compared to the EU-27 (41.5) (Eurostat, 2008).
The old-age dependency ratios are predicted to show dramatic shifts by 2050. • 
Eurostat (2008) forecasts the old-age dependency ratio of 59.4 percent for Slovenia 
by 2050. Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics (DZS, 2006) predicts it to reach 46.2 
percent in Croatia by 2050.
The average exit age from the labour force was 59.9 years in Croatia and 59.8 years • 
in Slovenia in 2006. This finding is close to the average exit age of 61 years for the 
EU-25 (Eurostat, 2008).
As indicated by the employment protection legislation index, the labour market in the • 
1990s showed high rigidity levels (Riboud et al., 2002; Biondić et al., 2002). Although 
rigid employment legislation affects all cohorts, the most vulnerable segments 
are young, disabled and older persons who are always exposed to higher job 
discrimination because of adverse selection and asymmetric information problem.
Employment rates began to increase after 2000. For the working-age population, • 
they stood at 57.1 percent in Croatia and 67.8 percent in Slovenia in 2007 (Eurostat, 
2008). This indicates that Croatia is still lagging behind the EU-25 (65.8) and EU- 27 
(65.4). 
The share of older workers (55-64) in total employment in 2006 was higher in Croatia • 
(12.3 percent) than in Slovenia (8.0 percent) as a result of the ongoing pension 
reform (Eurostat, 2008). 
The employment rate of the working-age population with tertiary education between • 
25 and 64 years was 82.2 percent in Croatia in 2007, as compared to the Slovenian 
percentage of 87.7, EU-27 (85.3) and EU-25 (85.2) (Eurostat, 2008).
In contrast to Slovenia, Croatia is struggling with a high youth unemployment rate. • 
The youth unemployment rate in Croatia in 2007 was 24 percent, while the Slovenian 
rate was 10.1 percent (Eurostat, 2008). The existing elevated youth unemployment 
rates have a profound influence on political decisions supporting early retirement vs. 
prolonging retirement.
As a member of the EU, Slovenia has to follow specific employment guidelines on • 
active ageing, the so-called Stockholm and Barcelona targets.2 Countries attempting 
2 The Stockholm target from 2001 has set the objective of 50 percent of EU population employed in the age 
of 55-64 by 2010, and Barcelona target from 2002 asks for a progressive five year increase in the effective 
average age at which people stop working in the EU by 2010.
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to achieve the full membership have the same targets, but are not obliged to follow 
them as strictly.
In their pre-transition history, both countries experienced a substantial migration • 
outflow and a very low migration inflow. With the transition to the market economy, 
both countries are reconsidering their immigration policies to respond to the labour 
force shortages. These policies will have an impact on the future participation rates 
of the working-age population.
1.3  The impact of ageing population on the labour force
The problem of population ageing is a world phenomenon which the European Union has 
to take seriously since many member states show dramatic negative demographic trends. 
This will induce consequences on the labour market and those changes might create a 
drag on countries’ ability to grow. This problem is discussed in Chapter 2 which analyses 
the economic impacts of ageing in the EU and their impact on the labour market. Due to 
natural (fertility vs. mortality rates) and economic (health, life-expectancy) phenomena, 
the European population is already ageing and will start to decline in the near future. 
Thereby, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary will face 
the highest decline (more than 10 percent). 
According to these trends, many European countries will have to cope with the decline 
of the working-age population and the increase of old-age dependency ratio. Older 
workers will most probably have to take a different role on the labour market. Due to the 
importance of gaining new knowledge, the share of older workers in the life-long learning 
should increase. These changes will also put more pressure on employers who will have 
to adjust their attitudes to the new circumstances. However, not only the employers, but 
all parts of the society will have to accommodate to the oncoming burden of ageing.
 
Chapter 3 explores major labour market challenges in the presence of rapid demographic 
changes in Croatia. Croatia will face a notable population decline until 2050. The main 
causes include low fertility rate and a longer life span. In respect to these two indicators, 
the Croatian pattern of demographic changes is similar to the EU-10 countries. Projection 
would, however, be more optimistic in the case of bigger positive net migration inflows. 
However, Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics (DZS, 2006) predicts a low net migration 
flow. Consequently, Croatia will experience a decline in the working-age population and 
a rise in the share of older workers.
How to cope with the negative economic consequences of the ageing population? One 
of the solutions might be found in the increasing activity and employment rates of existing 
population. Some arguments support such expectations, while others bring warnings 
about possible side-effects. First, the overall activity rate in Croatia is still well below 
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the averages for the EU-15 and EU-10, which indicates that there is a room for better 
utilisation of the working-age population. Second, the activity rate of older workers in 
Croatia is below the EU average, although it has increased substantially following the 
latest pension system reforms designed to stop early retirement options. Regardless of an 
increase in the employment share of older workers after 2000, Croatia is still the country 
with one of the lowest employment rates for older workers compared to the EU countries. 
Third, the increase in older workers’ share in the total employment varies in respect to 
occupation. The highest share of older workers is present among the most complex 
jobs. The same is observed in Slovenia. This indicates that an increase in education and 
specific knowledge of older workers should consequently bring more job opportunities. 
Fourth, the unemployment rate of older workers is steeply increasing despite a decrease 
in the total unemployment rate, which means that employers are strongly biased towards 
the younger labour force.
Chapter 4 deals with the challenges of the ageing population in Slovenia and its influence 
on the labour market. The share of older cohort aged 65 and more will almost double in 
the next forty years as well as the total dependency ratio due to a steep increase in the 
old-age dependency ratio. Demographic changes will directly affect the labour market 
due to the increasing share of workforce aged 50 and more. Having in mind the current 
size of employment rates of older men and women, it seems that the Stockholm target of 
50 percent of employment rate for the elderly will be hard to achieve in the short period 
of time. The main reason is current, significantly lower employment rate of older workers 
(especially older women) and a lower average labour exit age in comparison with the EU-
27, EU-15 and Euro area (13) countries.
Due to a shrinking labour force and an ageing population, overall economic consequences 
are so complex that forecasting is not an easy task. But some changes, like postponing 
the retirement age and extending the working age are rather simple to envisage. Most 
probably, the immigration policy will be reconsidered and public finance will have to be 
adjusted. Serious policy recommendations seek for an efficient active ageing strategy 
which has to be the basic necessary document for future planning in achieving sustainable 
economic growth. 
1.4  The institutional framework affecting labour market
       entries and exits 
The second part of the book investigates the institutional framework affecting retirement 
decisions. How to resolve a dilemma on the most important third age decision: to continue 
working or to retire? Do workers have enough incentives for working longer and what are 
the main barriers for postponing retirement? Does pension policy stimulate or discourage 
the increase of older workforce participation? 
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Chapter 5 investigates these questions in respect to pension regulation in Croatia. The 
chapter deals with the pension system reform and legal rules that influence retirement 
decisions. The pension reform has resulted in a higher average retirement age, an 
increased dependency ratio and the higher employment of older workers, but also in 
a lower net replacement rate. The new pension system has a paradoxical effect. On 
the one hand, it creates a strong incentive for later retirement since replacement rates 
are generally low and retirement is usually linked to a substantial drop in incomes and 
welfare. On the other hand, the replacement rate for low-income workers is much higher 
than the average rate due to the minimum pension. In fact, it might be high enough 
to pull low-income workers into the early retirement. Another set of questions refers 
to regulations regarding work arrangements at older age. Croatian labour and tax 
codes provide relatively favourable and flexible conditions for work after one reaches 
the minimum statutory retirement age. In addition, the current legislation allows for the 
possibility of being simultaneously retired and in certain forms of paid employment without 
consequences on pension benefits. In order to investigate the financial incentives to 
work/retire this chapter provides several simulations of pension benefits under different 
assumptions about retirement age, insurance period and average life-time income. As 
both barriers and incentives for postponing retirement have been built into the current 
pension system, the chapter concludes that it is still insufficiently oriented towards 
providing incentives for retiring later. 
Chapter 6 explores the employment prospects of older workers in the context of 
imperfect competition on the labour market and its rigid institutional setting in Slovenia. 
The probability of switching the labour market status from inactivity or unemployment to 
employment is tested by probit model on LFS data for Slovenia in the period 1999-2002. 
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that the level of attained education does not 
affect the individual probability of switching between different labour market statuses. 
Moreover, education is even less important for the group of job-seekers older than 50 
years because older workers have certain specialisations and expert knowledge due to 
on-the-job-training, which seems to be more important to employers than the education 
certificate. In general, older workers have lower chances for switching the labour market 
status with unemployed older workers being the most discriminated by employers in that 
sense. Therefore, they need an active labour market policy. However, even in the case of 
abundant state subsidies for employing older workers, they will remain captured by the 
adverse selection and asymmetric information problem. 
1.5  Constraints on the demand side of the labour market
The retention of older workers on the labour market depends on their willingness and 
incentives to work longer after the official retirement age. The result of the recent workforce 
survey in the USA (Feinsod and Davenport, 2006: 15) suggested that motivation (the 
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energy behind employees’ workplace contribution) increases with age and is directly 
related to engagement (the degree to which employees are emotionally and intellectually 
attached to their organisations and their work). Moreover, the survey has found that 
the costs of hiring and retaining older workers can be quite modest, suggesting that 
the assumption that older workers are costly is more a myth than a fact. But even with 
the willingness of older workers to remain in the workforce, their position is strongly 
determined by labour demand. The workers’ side is always inferior compared to the 
employers’ side. Namely, evidence suggests that employers’ decisions are much more 
important in explaining the variability of older workers’ labour force participation (Taylor 
and Walker, 1994: 571).
The third part of the book is devoted to the demand side of the labour market, particularly 
to employers’ perceptions and practices towards the older workers and the policies that 
could help increase their activity rate. In order to explore the lack of demand for older 
workers, Chapter 7 analyses employers’ attitudes towards older workers. It employs 
survey-based methodology to compare employers’ perspectives towards older workers. 
The questionnaire was designed to match a similar European survey and was distributed 
to Croatian and Slovenian firms of different size. As far as the perceptions of employee 
characteristics by employers from both countries are concerned, older employers perform 
better than their younger counterparts in respect to: willingness to work hard, reliability, 
attentiveness, professionalism, decision-making competence, loyalty and honesty and 
integrity. In direct comparison, Slovenian employers grade most of the characteristics 
of both old and young cohorts better than Croatian employers. However, employers 
from Croatia perceive older workers more reliable in comparison with their Slovenian 
counterparts. In factor analyses all characteristics of older workers are extracted in four 
dimensions in both countries, but the results are slightly different. Slovenian employers 
seem to be much more specific and demanding in evaluating the characteristics of old 
and young employees.
The results of the contingency analyses indicate that employers’ practices and policies 
concerning the employment and retention of older workers are same in both countries 
regardless of the firm size, respondent age or education. The majority employ a very low 
percentage of older workers and hardly actively target older workers when searching for 
new employees. The only difference occurs in Croatian companies with a longer tradition 
which tend to actively search for older workers more often than their recently established 
counterparts. However, when it comes to the participation of older employees in education 
and training programmes, the Slovenian firms have slightly higher proportion. 
Employers in both countries have positive attitudes towards the retention of employees 
after the legal retirement age, which differs in respect to job occupations in various 
industries. They are also aware of the fact that certain incentives for keeping older 
workers in employment will be effective. Although overall employers’ attitudes towards 
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older workers in both countries do not show age or gender discrimination, this contradicts 
their practices when searching actively for new employees and/or retaining older workers. 
It seems that this is a result of prejudices, which will need to be effectively tackled in the 
coming years.
An additional effort in reviewing the growing body of literature in the field of economics 
of ageing is undertaken in Chapter 8. The research is focused on policy-options that 
stimulate the greater participation of older workers in the labour force. The chapter looks 
at institutional setting of pension policies which influence individual retirement decisions. 
Past experience has shown that early retirement was widely used to exit the labour 
market. However, reasons were different and induced by factors that pull individuals out 
of the labour force or those that push them out of labour market or by the combination 
of both. In the last couple of decades early retirement scheme used to be socially and 
politically correct policy option, convenient for all involved parties. As a result it spread 
into kind of “early retirement culture”. 
New perspectives for transition from work to retirement clearly show that formal and 
informal institutions of early retirement schemes should be changed which is not easy 
when institutions fuse into the lifestyle culture. The revision of early retirement trends 
asks for gradual approach which has already started in early 1990s in “old” EU member 
states. Gradual approach also implicitly comprises combination of various policies and 
specific measures which offer incentives for longer working lives promotion. Reforms 
of the pension system and changes of the non-pension incentives for retaining older 
workers in the labour force are two sets of policies that can move up transition boundaries 
from work to retirement. Other two pathways for keeping older workers actively in labour 
market refer to policies that tackle their employability as well as employers’ attitudes and 
their employment practices towards older workers. 
Learning from foreign experience and using best practice in enhancing employer’s 
demand for older workers is a legitimate way to develop domestic policies and practices. 
Thus the chapter gives detailed and comprehensive overview of best practices such as 
public information campaigns, age discrimination legislation etc. with the description of 
the most interesting and relevant country cases. 
1.6  Challenges ahead: policy recommendations
Many workers aim to retire on decent pension in their early age, which seems as 
an ideal solution, but can hardly be sustainable for society as a whole, especially in 
countries facing the problem of ageing workforce. Working longer and retiring later will 
not be an option but an unavoidable trend in the future. This will bring changes and new 
opportunities, but also threats and problems which should be identified and disclosed in 
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order to find appropriate policy responses. The economic consequences of ageing are 
complex and they have a different effect on different parts of the society. Therefore, there 
is a need for strong efforts and a careful coordination of policies. European Councils in 
Stockholm and Barcelona have set two key objectives with respect to the employment of 
older people and each individual member state should aim to extend the working life of 
older people under a comprehensive strategy of active ageing.
This book deals with the challenge of increasing older workers’ participation rates 
as only one part of the overall solution to the problem of ageing population. Policy 
recommendations can be summarised as follows: 
i)  The pension system should encourage workers to work longer
The pension policy in every country should ensure the long-term stability of the 
system and provision of decent pensions. It appears that such a goal could only 
be achieved by prolonging the working life. One way to achieve this goal is by 
legislative pressure, i.e. by raising the minimum statutory retirement age. The other, 
and our preferred way, is to build a system of incentives that could result in voluntary 
decisions on the exact timing of retirement. Here, we propose:
a) financial discouragement of early retirement and
b) premiums for those working longer.
Early retirement has already been discouraged in Croatia and Slovenia by the 
introduction of pension benefit decrements. The question is, however, how effective 
they are. Also, there is additional room for improving the control of disability benefit 
schemes that have been increasingly used as routes to early retirement. On the 
employees’ side, working longer should be adequately stimulated with higher pension 
benefits. As a preferred result, neither employer nor the state, but only workers should 
voluntarily decide when to retire. Pension system design based on actuary neutral 
pension benefits should be effective in the country with an ageing workforce. 
ii)  Creating incentives for workers to remain at work longer
On the employees’ side, working longer should be stimulated with higher pension 
benefits. However, in addition to that, flexibility in all aspects could significantly 
contribute to the workers’ willingness to remain longer or to re-enter labour market 
at a later age. Older workers need flexible employment contracts similar to those for 
students, flexible working time including part-time jobs as well as friendly conditions 
at the workplace. Additionally, barriers for the new employment of older workers 
should be removed and new employment should be encouraged. Older workers and 
already retired persons are clearly disadvantaged in their employment prospects 
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(especially unemployed ones) due to formal legislation and informal institutions which 
are deeply embedded in cultural roots and therefore not easy to change or remove. 
For instance, the prejudice that younger and older workers are substitutes and not 
complements does not contribute to age diversity at the workplace. Therefore, 
the employment policy and active labour market measures can contribute to the 
employment of older workers. If a retired person would like to reactivate on the labour 
market, flexible legislation and efficient administration should help in achieving that 
goal. An active labour market policy is a useful financial tool to encourage employers 
to employ older workers and to enable their access to training and improving working 
skills. However, a continuous impact assessment is needed in order to control the 
efficiency of state aid and to create better tailored measures.
iii)  Creating incentives for employers to retain older workers
Our research results indicate that despite the overall positive attitudes of employers 
towards older workers’, their practices are different. Therefore, there is a room 
for enhancing employers’ demand for older workers. The tax policy and pension 
insurance policy should motivate employers to retain older workers by keeping 
them active at lower costs for the company. Financial incentives for hiring, retaining 
and re-training older workers are also welcome in order to increase older workers’ 
capabilities to find or keep jobs. However, it is important that the retention or new 
employment of older workforce do not have discriminating implications to any other 
workforce cohort. 
iv)  The public promotion of older workers’ employment
In order to change employers’ behaviour, it is helpful to receive external inputs or 
signals through public anti-discrimination campaigns, well-developed legislation 
and institutional guidelines for preventing age discrimination. Public campaigns will 
probably not have an immediate strong impact on employers’ behaviour, but they are 
a useful tool for breaking negative social stereotypes and prejudice. In the longer-run 
they could influence employers’ decisions on employing/retaining older workers.
Another way of public promotion could be the establishment of employment agency 
for retired people to help them find (new) employment. It is important to stress that 
each measure of increasing the employment of older workers can partly contribute to 
the final result, but all measures together would have much better effects. 
v)  Providing life-long learning opportunities and developing training culture 
Investment in human capital through life-long learning opportunities and training 
courses stimulates the acquiring of new skills and accumulation of knowledge 
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necessary for longer working lives. State subsidies can be useful in that respect, 
but it is more important that employers change attitudes towards investing in the 
employability of older workers, which should not be perceived as a bad investment.
At the beginning of this chapter two questions were raised. What policy measures might 
be helpful for countries with an ageing workforce and do we need a single approach 
to all countries or a specific individual approach? In the literature one may found many 
country case studies with similar recommendations and measures. Thus, it seems that 
each country should use a combination of measures that are appropriate for a particular 
economic situation and to decide whether to undertake reforms in a gradual or radical 
manner. The history of recent reforms teaches us that comprehensive and radical reforms 
might not be the best choice, especially for developing countries. Gradual policy reforms 
set in a consistent order might gain superior results. 
From the perspective of active ageing strategy, a comparison between Croatia and 
Slovenia leads to the conclusion that Slovenia is in a more comfortable position, but 
there are some factors that might endanger it. 
A country with an overall lower unemployment rate, especially with a significantly • 
lower youth unemployment rate, is in a better situation to increase the employment 
rates of older workers. In other words, with the higher rates of youth employment. 
Slovenia has preconditions for easier implementation of reform policies.
Slovenia has already taken a path for the easier implementation of active ageing • 
strategy with a 14.8 percent share of the population in the range 25-64 being involved 
in the life-long learning (Eurostat, 2008), compared to 2.4 percent in Croatia.
The higher employment rates of the working-age population with tertiary education • 
in Slovenia indicate that older cohorts will also be better educated, and therefore 
measures to retrain and reintegrate older population will be less complex. In 2007, 
Slovenia had higher share of women with tertiary education in employment (13.2), 
as compared to Croatia (9.6) (Eurostat, 2008).
Age discrimination in the recruitment of old persons might aggravate if the employment • 
protection legislation index stays at high rigidity levels.
Although the effect of migration inflows has not been included in this research, • 
changes in this variable might significantly affect the overall participation rates of 
workers in Croatia and Slovenia.
Finally, a higher GDP per capita in Slovenia allows for the implementation of different • 
policies and measures within an active ageing strategy. It can also guarantee 
abundant state subsidies for increasing labour force participation rates and lead to 
a higher quality of the health care protection, which is an important component for a 
successful extension of working life. 
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Nowadays, there are no firm visual, physical or intellectual lines between young and old 
age. The age issue does not mean the same as in the past century. We all live longer and 
move age frontiers in many fields. Therefore, all recommendations towards increasing 
the labour force participation should be focused on fostering employability of all age 
groups rather than relying on age alone.
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Chapter 2   |   Tjaša Redek, Polona Domadenik and Irena Ograjenšek
The economic impacts of ageing in the EU
with special focus on the labour market
2.1  Introduction
Over the next few decades, the population of Europe will change significantly. The 
baby boom generation of 1940s to 1960s will gradually retire. The next generations are 
significantly smaller due to a decreasing fertility rate in almost all European states. The 
changing nature of Europe’s population is one of its most important political, economic 
and social challenges. Murray (2008) warns that the changing demographic make-
up threatens to blow a hole in government budgets, derail national economies, and 
leave European countries enfeebled in the face of competition from younger countries 
elsewhere. But, he adds that there is room for modest optimism. Dependency ratios are 
expected to stabilise within half a century. Also, pension and healthcare systems are 
being overhauled, and reforms in the European labour markets should help to mitigate 
the adverse impact of ageing on public finances and the economy.
The focus of this paper is on the changing demographic profile of the European Union 
and its impact on the economy. First, demographic trends and population projections 
(Eurostat1,2) and their impact on the labour market are presented. The macroeconomic 
challenges and opportunities for societies marked by the ageing population are discussed 
next. Finally, existing policy responses to the ageing population problem are critically 
reviewed and possible new additional EU policy responses are listed. 
2.2  Declining and ageing population in Europe 
Around 2025, the population of the EU is expected to start declining due to a natural 
decrease; most of the new member states already face population decreases (Eurostat, 
1 The article is based on population projections prepared by Eurostat. Population projections involve making 
population estimates or producing the most plausible figures for the years to come. Estimates are made using 
the latest available figures for the population on January 1. In general, key assumptions are made with respect 
to mortality, fertility and migration by sex and by age, and ageing techniques are applied to the population 
pyramid from year to year (Eurostat, 2008a). 
2 The paper does not deal with the problem of potentially erroneous projections. For example, Keilman warns 
that population forecasts are inaccurate because our understanding of demographic behaviour is imperfect. 
He warns (2005: 6) that in addition to whatever partial picture demographers obtain from behavioural sciences, 
they still rely significantly on current real trends in key processes, and they extrapolate those trends into the 
future. A problem arises when the indicators show unexpected changes in level or slope. Especially (Keilman, 
2005: 12), for many developed countries, plotting relative forecast errors against age shows large and positive 
errors for young age groups, and large negative errors for the older age groups. For intermediate age groups 
errors are small. He clams that this age effect in forecast accuracy has been established for Europe, Northern 
America, and Latin America, and for countries such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom.
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2008a). Several years before the population decline, the EU will be confronted with a 
shrinking working-age population (2007 is supposed to mark the declining point). In most 
of the EU countries, the process of rejuvenation has come to an end; old-age dependency 
ratios, on the other hand, should rise substantially throughout the whole projection period 
(overall from 39 percent to 80 percent) (Eurostat, 2006: 127). Population ageing and 
decline should lead to significant changes in the labour market and will have an important 
impact on future economic growth in the EU.
2.2.1  Population trends in Europe 
Population ageing is a phenomenon faced by almost all developed economies. In less 
developed regions, the population over 60 represents less than 10 percent; while in more 
developed regions of the world, people aged 60 or over represent 20 percent of total 
population: 23 percent in Western Europe, and 17 percent in Northern America. Europe 
is facing a process of relative population decline (Murray, 2008: 3). According to Murray 
(2008), its share of the world population has fallen from 12.5 percent in 1960 to the current 
7.5 percent and is expected to decline further to just 5 percent by 2050. UN population 
projections (United Nations, 2002) forecast that Europe (not just the EU) will in 2050 have 
603 million inhabitants, while in 2000 it had 727 million. Eurostat (2006: 127-129) shows 
that population growth in the EU has slowed down considerably in the last decades of the 
20th century. Future growth will probably stagnate around 2025 (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Population trends in Europe
Source: Eurostat.
From 2005 until 2025, the total population of the EU is expected to increase by about 12 
million to 470 million. In the period 2025-2050, the population is expected to decrease 
by 20 million. During the next two decades, the population in most countries will still 
39
increase, except for in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia, which have been recording a declining trend from the beginning of 
the projection period onwards (2005). By 2025, a continuous population decrease is 
expected in another six economies: Italy (starting in 2013), Germany (2014), Slovenia 
(2014), Portugal (2018), Greece (2020) and Spain (2022). Despite the population decline, 
by 2050, in approximately half of the EU states, the total population will still outnumber the 
population of 2005. Between 2005 and 2050, the highest increases are expected in the 
five countries that probably will not experience a population decrease: Luxembourg (41 
percent), Ireland (34 percent), Cyprus (32 percent), Malta (26 percent), and Sweden (13 
percent). The largest declines (more than 10 percent) are expected in the Baltic States, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary (Eurostat, 2006: 127).
Population growth depends on natural growth (defined as the difference between 
the fertility rate and mortality rate), and migration (defined as the difference between 
immigration and emigration) as shown in Figure 2.2. Although natural growth in the EU 
is still positive, this is not likely to continue in the future. The main reason for this is the 
“birth deficit” of the post-war (baby boom) generations. Already in the 1980s, a woman in 
the EU-25 on average gave birth to 1.79 children (in the EU-15: 1.71; in the new member 
states: 2.17). In the EU-15, the total fertility later fell to 1.46 (1990s) and by 2004 recovered 
to 1.55. In the former socialist bloc, besides the natural decline of births due to changing 
values in the society there was also a significant decline in the 1990s due to economic 
restructuring and uncertainty. The total fertility rate reached only 1.23 in 2003 (Eurostat, 
2006: 71).
Figure 2.2: Crude rate of population increase
Source: Eurostat.
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In addition to a decline in the fertility rate, which, in a short-term, is unlikely to rise 
significantly enough to overturn population trends, the generations following the baby 
boomers are smaller. Smaller cohorts will by default result in a lower number of children 
even if the fertility rate itself does not change. Consequently, the population’s age 
structure and average age will change. 
When looking at the mortality rate, it can be ascertained that in the EU it has been 
decreasing due to better health care, leaving the number of deaths relatively stable at 
around 4.5 million due to a growing population (Eurostat, 2006: 83). Eventually (with the 
continuation of present trends), the number of deaths will start to exceed the number of 
births, resulting in a natural population decrease. Population projections (Eurostat, 2006: 
127) forecast that a natural decrease is expected to start in 2010. From 2025 onwards, 
net migration might no longer outweigh the natural decrease, resulting in a population 
decline. 
Several years prior to the population decline, the EU will face a shrinking working-age 
population (the number of people aged 20- 59). After 2007, a persistent period of decline 
will begin. All countries except Luxembourg will face (at least a period of) a declining 
potential labour force. Except in Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden, the 
absolute size of the working-age population will be significantly smaller in 2050 than in 
2005. In Germany, the absolute decline will exceed 11 million people, which is equal 
to a reduction in the current potential workforce by one fourth. Relatively, the biggest 
losses (over 30 percent) are forecasted for the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovakia. Relatively modest declines are forecasted for France, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (less than 8 percent) (Eurostat, 2006: 127). Lanzieri (2007) claims that 
replacing these declining age groups and thus to sustain the growth of the labour force 
is practically impossible: the “baseline” population projection for the EU shows that even 
with positive net migration of around 40 million persons over the projection period (2004-
2050), in 2050 the working-age population of the EU would have decreased by 52 million, 
and the total population by 7 million (note that the total population in 2004 amounted to 
456 million). An ageing population - smaller younger cohorts and large older cohorts - will 
also lead to a shrinking working-age population and increased dependency ratios (Figure 
2.3). 
Young dependency ratios declined from 48.8 percent to 40 percent for EU-25 in the period 
1990-2005 (Eurostat, 2006: 62) due to effects of the ageing population and decreased 
fertility rate. Old-age dependency ratios, on the other hand, were rising steadily from just 
below 30 percent in 1960, to around 40 percent in 2005. They are expected to further rise 
in the future to about 60 percent in 2025 and 80 percent in 2050. In 2050, the old-age 
dependency ratio is expected to be the highest in Spain (98 percent), Italy (96 percent) 
and Greece (88 percent), while the lowest is expected to be found in Luxembourg (55 
percent), the Netherlands (59 percent) and Denmark (61 percent) (Eurostat, 2006: 128).
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Figure 2.3: Old-age dependency ratios*
Note: *Population aged 60+ as a percentage of population aged 20-59. 
Source: Eurostat.
2.2.2  Ageing and trends in the European labour markets
Ageing will significantly alter the structure of the labour market. Both participation and 
employment rates of older workers will have to increase, although other age groups will 
also be affected. The pattern of the labour force participation3 has changed markedly 
over the last 30 years; not only due to the changed structure of the population, but also 
due to a changed lifestyle. Since 1970, participation of women between 25 and 60 has 
risen significantly, while participation of men of all ages has declined. Participation 
has risen since the mid-1980s from just under 66 percent to 69 percent in 2000; but 
this overall picture disguises very different trends according to age and gender and 
different situations between member states and regions (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002: 4). 
In the prime age group (25-49), the participation patterns have changed significantly 
over the last thirty years; with a slight decrease in male participation, but a major rise in 
female participation, from under 40 percent to over 70 percent for this age group as a 
whole. Participation peaks in this age group, and divergences between men and women 
and between high-skilled and low-skilled workers appear. The participation rates of men, 
particularly those in low-skilled manual occupations, begin to decline rapidly from the 
age of 50 onwards, compared with the over 60 age group in 1970. Those for women start 
to decline earlier, at around 45, but decline less rapidly; and activity rates for women 
aged 50-60 are still higher than they were in 1970. The fall in participation is partly due 
to involuntary early retirement associated with economic restructuring and partly to the 
3 The participation rate is the percentage of the general population (over the age of 15) who are currently 
employed or are actively seeking employment.
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impact of early retirement schemes (Commission of the European Communities, 2002: 
5). Although the average exit age has been increasing (Figure 2.4), the ageing process, 
an increasing dependency ratio and long life expectancy (for men 75.6 and for women 
81.7 in EU-25 in 2004) will require further adjustment (Eurostat, 2006: 41). 
Figure 2.4: Average exit age
Source: Eurostat.
Apart from participation rates, the employment of older cohorts is also problematic. In 
the future, policy-makers will have to motivate them to actively seek work; but companies 
will also have to change their stance towards older workers. Together, this will result in 
higher employment of older workers. At the moment, the gap between the employment 
rates of older workers, compared to the total employment rate, is close to 20 percentage 
points. As shown in Figure 2.5, in EU-27 in 2006, the employment rate for older workers 
was 43.5 percent compared to 64.5 percent overall.
Life-long learning will become a major concern for the ageing population. Data in 
Figure 2.6 reveal that the importance of life-long learning is already increasing. But, it 
is surprisingly low in the Euro area, especially due to low participation in Greece and 
Portugal (1.9 and 4.2 percent respectively). On the other hand, in 2006, it was very high 
in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the UK (29, 23.1, 32 and 26 percent respectively; 
(Eurostat, 2008b). Participation in training declines substantially for those over 50, with 
very low levels for the low-skilled workers. Almost half of the older workers work in firms 
that provide training, but less than 15 percent take part in training activities – either 
employer-provided or private; only 7 percent of low-skilled older workers receive training 
as compared to more than one fourth of the high-skilled older workers (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2002: 4).
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Figure 2.5: Employment rates of older workers vs. overall employment rates*
Note: *The employment rate of older workers is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 55 to 64 by 
the total population of the same age group.
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 2.6: Life-long learning*
Note: *Percentage of the adult population aged 25 to 64 participating in education and training.
Source: Eurostat.
There are also differences in life-long learning among different groups when they are 
distinguished by skill. Participation in training activities for the high-skilled is significantly 
higher compared to that for the low-skilled. Sixty-eight percent of the high skilled workers 
are employed in firms that provide training, but only 34 percent of the low-skilled work in 
such firms. Training incidence is consequently around 40 percent among the high-skilled 
compared with 17 percent for the low-skilled (Commission of the European Communities, 
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2002: 4-5). These data should be a wake-up call for the EU policy-makers. As the number 
of less-skilled increases with age, every effort to promote life-long learning should be 
undertaken. 
The low employment of older workers in Europe represents a waste of individual and 
societal potential as well as opportunities. Considering the population forecasts, it would 
seem that the labour market in general, labour codes, the general public life and work 
values will have to be adjusted to accommodate the oncoming burden of ageing.
2.3  Macroeconomic challenges of ageing population 
Ageing population will impact multiple aspects of economic and social systems in Europe. 
It thus demands a thorough assessment and a careful rethinking of the European (and 
national) economic and social policy framework(s). Stable and sufficiently high economic 
growth will be a necessary condition to sustain the attained levels of social security, 
which are typical for the European models of capitalism. The European Older People’s 
Platform called AGE (2006) suggests that policy changes in many diverse areas, such as 
employment, pensions, social inclusion, health, transport, urban development, housing, 
research, education and citizenship need to be carefully coordinated. Only with an 
investigation into these areas can the meaning of the demographic change be accurately 
understood and the right policy responses supported. In this section, we closely examine 
several important macroeconomic consequences of ageing.
Impact on economic growth. Longman (2004) claims that population growth is normally 
regarded as essential for economic growth: “Capitalism has never flourished except 
when accompanied by population growth and it is now languishing in those parts of the 
world where population is stagnant’’. European economies are facing both population 
decline and an ageing population. Both trends will have important consequences on the 
macroeconomic performance due to a direct impact through the labour market and factor 
supply as well as due to numerous indirect effects, especially through the pressure of an 
increased dependency ratio. 
Demographic pressures might lower the rate of economic growth. This hypothesis was 
examined by numerous authors (e.g. Groezen, Meijdam and Verbon, 2005; Stephenson 
and Scobie, 2002; Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 2000; Prskawetz et al., 2007; Bloom and 
Canning, 2007). For example, Turner et al. (1998: 13) project that due to a demographic 
change the growth rate of the European Union will fall gradually, but will be less than 
1 percent per annum by 2020 and should on average be less than 0.5 percent per 
annum between 2030 and 2040. Prskawetz et al. (2007) forecast GDP movements for 
the EU based on Eurostat’s population projections. They claim that the GDP per capita 
decreases when the share of the working-age population declines. They also study 
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country-specific trends. The time pattern of the decline in the GDP per capita is expected 
to differ between regions. The GDP per capita is expected to decrease within a decade in 
Finland, Sweden, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Malta, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
The beginning of a decline is also expected in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Poland, 
are expected to record an increase in per capita income growth over the next decades. 
The projections for these economies and also for Latvia and Lithuania exhibit an increase 
in per capita growth, which is expected to reach a peak between 2015-2025.
Fiscal pressures and additional taxation burden. For a “stylised”, average OECD 
country (a country with a primary government budget surplus of 2.5 percent of the GDP 
and a public debt of 55 percent of the GDP), the demographic impact of population 
ageing could add another 6 percent of the GDP to the governmental primary deficit and 
lead to a 100 percent increase in its public debt over the next 50 years (Dang, Antolin and 
Oxley, 2001. The key causes of increasing public finance pressures will be public pension 
commitments and healthcare (Turner et al., 1998: 11).4 Pay-as-you-go systems will be 
particularly under pressure due to already defined benefits and increasing dependency 
ratios. A rising contribution rate as well as uncertainty about the future might threaten 
intergenerational consensus, sustainability of the system and, also, the meaning of the 
European welfare state. The European Commission (Maddaloni et al., 2006: 32) expects 
that on average in EU all additional ageing related burdens will amount to 3.4 percentage 
points of the GDP by 2050: 2.2 percentage points for pensions,  1.6 for health care and 
0.6 for long-term care. But, the projections claim that a savings of 0.3 percentage points 
of the GDP for unemployment benefits and 0.6 for education can be expected. 
Impact on savings. Masson and Tryon (1990) suggest, on the basis of a pooled-time 
series estimation across the major industrial countries, that an increase of the dependency 
ratio by 1 percentage point should lead a proportional fall in the savings ratio. Turner et al. 
(1998: 15) add that the impact of ageing on savings will be reflected in higher interest rates 
and could, in the end, also impact investment. Park and Changyong (2007) show that 
both the young age dependency ratio and old-age dependency ratio could significantly 
impact the savings rate. A rise in either of the two ratios by 1 percentage point would lead 
to a decrease in the savings rate, as projected by the authors: an increase in the young-
age dependency ratio by 0.21 percentage point and in the old-age dependency ratios by 
0.86 percentage point.
Impact on productivity. Vegard (2003) finds that individual job performance tends 
to decrease from around 50 years of age onwards, while wages usually continuously 
increase. Productivity reductions are particularly evident for work tasks including 
problem-solving, learning and tasks in which speed is required. But, older individuals 
4 For example, the ratio of expenditures on the elderly to the non-elderly is estimated for 1993 at 4¾, 4¼ and 3 
for Japan, the United States and the EU, respectively.
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maintain relatively high productivity levels in jobs in which experience and verbal abilities 
are needed. Werding (2008) confirms an inversely U-shaped relationship between the 
share of workers in different age groups and productivity, which is explained through the 
TFP channel and is in aggregate much stronger at the micro level. He also implies that 
this pattern could result from cohort effects in human-capital accumulation. Simulations 
also provide interesting macroeconomic links between productivity and growth. In the 
USA, the forecasted demographic impact on economic growth is positive almost for the 
total period; but it is true, that the labour force in this country is projected to increase 
continuously, neutralizing all negative impacts on productivity. Due to an increase in 
dependency, the per-capita growth is negatively affected by demographic trends. In 
Germany and Japan, the forecasts show that reductions in aggregate growth could be 
higher than those in per-capita growth. Namely, in these two countries, the total population 
is expected to decline, but at a smaller rate than their labour force (Werding, 2008: 30).
Fiscal pressures, taxation burden, lower savings and potential slower productivity growth 
will all be reflected in lower economic growth. In order to sustain a competitive edge 
within the global context, a timely and focused policy response is required.
2.4  The ageing population and policy formulation
As shown in previous segments of this paper, ageing is likely to have a decisive impact 
on long-term growth opportunities in many developed economies. The key challenge for 
policy-makers is thus the creation of a policy mix which will minimise the negative effect of 
ageing on growth. Studies (e.g. OECD, 1998; Tosun, 2003; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 
2008) suggest several relevant policy-mixes to deal with specific problems. The most 
important growth challenges can be addressed by fiscal policies and a reform of welfare 
and pension systems, labour market reform, and reforms to increase productivity.
2.4.1  An overview of general policy responses to ageing
Population ageing will pose a severe strain on the stability of public finances. Also, 
as already mentioned, in addition to decreased public savings, it will decrease private 
savings and put pressure on interest rates and, hence, negatively impact economic 
growth. Turner et al. (1998: 20) suggest that in such a context it would seem prudent 
to introduce policies designed to raise national saving ratios in the years immediately 
ahead. The most direct way to achieve this would be to reduce public dissaving. In fact, 
most OECD and EU countries have already started with or are preparing their pension 
and social security reforms. Turner et al. (1998: 22) list the following options: 
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1. The first option is to control the budget deficit. The EU member states are preparing 
different social security reforms, but budget deficit control is also imposed by the 
rules in the Growth and Stability Pact associated with the European Monetary Union. 
These de facto controls reduce the risk of public deficit and limit the public debt/
GDP ratios of the involved countries. Such supranational coordination or pressure 
is likely to produce better results, compared to isolated national efforts. Overall, the 
influence of public finance controls would be even more efficient if imposed by the 
member countries in a co-ordinated manner: simultaneous action to increase public 
saving on a supranational basis would probably lead to larger reductions in real 
interest rates and larger increases in output compared to the results of individual 
actions. 
2. Reductions in pension generosity and increases in welfare contributions are the most 
obvious ways of preventing excessive pressure on public finances. But, increasing 
the retirement age is another important option. Such reforms can be implemented by 
either increasing the age of eligibility for full benefits or, alternatively, by increasing 
the number of years of activity and contributions required for full-rate benefits, with 
benefits being reduced on an actuarial basis for each year of early retirement (see 
also e.g. Duggan, Singleton and Song, 2007). 
The problem of the timing of reforms might also be important (e.g. Samwick, 1998). 
Appropriate fiscal measures such as reduced pension generosity or an increased age 
of pension eligibility are not easily implemented due to their unpopularity, especially in 
countries with high unemployment rates. But, delaying might only produce the need for 
more drastic reforms in the future.
2.4.2  Guidelines for reforms in the European labour markets
In view of the ongoing ageing and the projected shrinking of their working-age population, 
the member states of the European Union have agreed on bold goals for increasing the 
employment rate and the exit age of older workers. Progress so far has been modest; and 
with enlargement, the challenge has become bigger (Nordheim, 2005). The EU agreed 
on a special employment guideline on active ageing (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002) and set two important strategic objectives to be achieved by 2010:
 
(1) an increase in the employment rate of older workers to 50 percent (Stockholm 
2001); 
(2) and a delay in the age at which older workers stop working for five years (Barcelona 
2002).5 
5 For more on Stockholm and Barcelona targets, see Commission of the European communities (2003).
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The true challenge for the EU remains how to enable and motivate the coming cohorts of 
older workers to remain in work for several years longer than the present cohort. 
Increasing labour-force participation and promoting active ageing (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2002) deals with employer attitudes towards older workers 
as one of the important barriers for their higher participation. It suggests several policy 
goals:
securing the best use of older workers’ experience;• 
maintaining the work ability and qualifications of older workers;• 
making working arrangements more flexible;• 
alerting employers to the strong business case for employing older workers;• 
ensuring the right mix of incentives and disincentives in the tax/benefit systems. • 
European countries are also expected to develop and implement comprehensive active 
ageing strategies to keep older workers in the labour force (European Employment Strategy 
and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines6). These should include the following: 
financial incentives to make sure work pays in order to discourage early retirement; • 
access to training and life-long learning; • 
good working conditions, in particular in relation to health and safety; • 
flexible working arrangements; • 
and care services. • 
Incentives for older workers to remain in the labour force must be reflected in real prospects 
for employment. Social partners will have a major role in encouraging enterprises to 
take a forward-looking approach and start facilitating better and longer working lives. 
Policy and action at the EU level supports active ageing through policy coordination, the 
exchange of experience and best practice, and through financial instruments.
2.5  Conclusion
Ageing will have important macroeconomic consequences: pressures on the public 
finances, effects on private savings behaviour, labour supply implications, a potential 
impact on capital accumulation, effects on total factor productivity, and finally an 
equilibrating role for interest rates and exchange rates and shifts in external balances 
(European Commission, 2003: 10). Comprehensive economic reforms will be required 
in many areas in order to outset the negative ageing pressures and ensure the EU’s 
6 More on European Employment Strategy and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines at: http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/employment_strategy/index_en.htm.
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competitive position within the global economy. The main reform challenge will be in the 
labour market.
To ensure a macroeconomically sustainable environment, labour market policies and 
social policies will need to promote active ageing. But, significant changes will have to 
take place both on the supply (employees) and demand side (employers). Older workers 
are often tempted into early retirement. But, with an ageing and shrinking workforce, 
these attitudes will have to change. Incentives will be needed on both sides, at least in 
a transition period. Therefore, the challenge of ageing requires cooperation between 
employees, employers and governments in order to prepare a successful reform plan to 
answer the challenges of the ageing population presented and discussed in this paper.
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Chapter 3   |   Sandra Švaljek and Danijel Nestić
The Croatian demographic reality and
labour market challenges 
3.1  Introduction
Similar to many European countries, Croatia is facing demographic changes determined 
by universal phenomena such as a decline in total fertility rates and a rise in life 
expectancy, and some country specific factors such as socio-economic transition and the 
Homeland War in the 1990s. All these factors have acted almost in the same direction, 
thus largely affecting the present size and structure of the population and determining 
future demographic trends. In the future, the labour market will surely be challenged by 
the underlying demographics, but there is a considerable potential for an increase in 
labour utilisation, particularly for older workers, so that the future labour market outcome 
would depend on the choice of policy options.
3.2  Croatian demographic reality
The total Croatian population rose steadily until the beginning of 1990s when the size 
of the population started to decline. However, it was already a decade before that the 
natural population increase started to decline (Figure 3.1). During the last ten years of the 
past century, the size of the population stabilised at the level of 4.4 million, but it is likely 
to fall below that level rather soon.
Figure 3.1: Natural population change in Croatia
Source: CBS.
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Demographic projections prepared by the Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics1 cover the 
period of time from 2004 to 2051 point to a further decrease in the number of inhabitants; 
and depending on the variant of the demographic projection, the size of the population is 
projected to decline by 10.5 – 18.8 percent by 2051 (DZS, 2006). In other words, Croatia 
could lose some 470 to 830 thousand inhabitants over the next 45 years (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Actual* and projected population of Croatia
Note: *Data before 2006 refer to mid-year estimates.
Source: CBS.
Such a sharp drop in the size of the population will be primarily caused by the continuation 
of the natural population dynamics, which is reflected in the negative balance of live 
births and deaths of close to 10 thousand persons per year.
The main force behind the unfavourable population dynamics will be a low total fertility 
rate, which, although projected to rebound in comparison with the beginning of the 
century, continues to stay at the rather low level of 1.6 in the medium fertility demographic 
projection. In spite of the fact that the projected rise in the total fertility rate is expected to 
be somewhat more dynamic than in the EU or Slovenia, the total fertility rate in Croatia 
will not reach the average EU-15 level until 2050 (Figure 3.3).
1 Although we were tempted to use projections from other sources, we present results of the official demographic 
projections prepared by the Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics since they are based on the expert knowledge 
of the leading national demographers and therefore can be considered the best available for the time being. For 
assumptions and methodology of this projections, see DZS (2006).
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Figure 3.3: Total fertility rate
Note: EU-15 and EU-10 data refer to unweighted averages.
Source: Eurostat, UN, CBS, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
In the same period, it is reasonable to project that people will live longer than before. In 
Croatia, the life expectancy at birth for men is currently similar to the EU-10, but shorter 
than in the EU-15 and Slovenia; and the life expectancy for women is lower than in 
Slovenia or both sub-groups of EU countries. The relationship between life expectancy 
in Croatia and Slovenia as well as the EU is probably going to remain almost the same, 
i.e. on average, Croatian men and women are expected to live shorter lives than their 
neighbours from EU countries. However, Croatia will also face rising longevity of its 
citizens – in 2050 men are supposed to live 7.3 years longer and women are supposed to 
live 5 years longer than at the beginning of 21st century (Figures 3.4 and 3.5).
Figure 3.4: Life expectancy at birth (men) Figure 3.5: Life expectancy at birth (women)
Note: EU-15 and EU-10 data refer to unweighted averages.
Source: Eurostat, UN, CBS, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
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It is worth mentioning that in the past ten years the decline of the population size that 
would otherwise result from the natural population change was somewhat moderated 
by the migration flows to Croatia. The net migration balance was positive throughout 
that period. In 1993 and 1998, it reached almost 1 percent of the total population, and 
declined afterwards to approximately 0.2 percent of the total population. In the projection 
period, it is expected that the net migration would remain positive, but low; i.e. without any 
significant influence on population dynamics (Figure 3.6).2
Figure 3.6: Actual and projected net migration in Croatia
Source: CBS.
As consequence of the demographic projections’ basic assumptions of longer lives and a 
total fertility rate quite below the reproduction rate, the population structure will also change 
compared to the current situation – the share of elderly will rise, and the share of the 
working-age population will shrink. It is estimated that, in a medium fertility demographic 
projection, the number of persons aged 65 years will rise not only in relative, but also in 
absolute terms reaching 27.6 percent of the total population in 2050. At the same time, 
the working-age population will decrease by 27 percent compared with 2006; and its 
share in the total population will be reduced by 8 percentage points (Figure 3.7). Such a 
declining share of the working-age group in the total population indicates the severity of 
the situation the Croatian labour market could confront over the next 45 years. 
2 Projections on net migration flows are probably the most debatable part of the long-term demographic 
projections for Croatia. The demographic projections published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (DZS, 2006) 
entail small, but positive net migration balance in all variants (low, medium and high) whereas e.g. demographic 
projections for Croatia prepared by the UN envisage zero net migration balance. Having in mind future accession 
to the EU and relatively attractive wages in Croatia, we consider the migration projections prepared by the 
national statistical office to be more realistic, but still rather conservative.
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A look at the development of the share of elderly in the total population in the past 30-
35 years shows that the trends were quite different before 2005. The labour supply was 
abundant during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s since the “baby-boom generation” was just 
at its prime age, while the share of elderly was low. Reaching their retirement age, “baby-
boomers” started to inflate the old-age, dependent-person class creating numerous 
challenges for the present and in years to come. Fiscal and labour market implications, 
but also the consequences on the living standards of older persons, could be quite 
harmful; consequently it is expected that pressures will rise for the elderly to extend their 
working lives until the age of 65 or older. 
Figure 3.7: Total and dependent population in medium fertility / medium migration
  projection
Source: CBS.
A rising share of elderly and of all dependent persons is not a Croatian specificity – it 
can be observed in almost all European economies. With a somewhat higher expected 
fertility rate, the share of elderly, i.e. dependent persons, will increase less abruptly than 
in Slovenia or the 10 new EU members; so that it will reach approximately the same share 
in the total population as in the EU-15 on average (Figures 3.8 and 3.9).
The size and composition of the working-age population will also change. The number 
of persons belonging to the younger workers group and prime working-age group will 
expectedly fall quite rapidly (Figure 3.10). However, the number of older workers is 
projected to rise in the next decade (until 2016); while in the second part of the projection 
period, the number of older workers could mildly decline due to the overall trend of 
population shrinkage. As the result, the share of older workers in the total working-age 
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population will rise by almost 6 percentage points; i.e. from 16.7 in 2004 to 23.5 percent 
in 2050.
Figure 3.8: Population aged 65 and over
in total population
Figure 3.9: Population aged 65 and over 
plus population aged below 15 in 
total population
Note: EU-15 and EU-10 data refer to unweighted averages.
Source: Eurostat, UN, CBS, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
Figure 3.10: Size and composition of the working-age population in medium fertility / 
medium migration projection
Source: CBS.
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3.3  Labour market trends for older workers
In addition to unfavourable demographic trends and its reflection in the labour market, 
Croatia is faced with a relatively low utilisation of the existing working-age population. Out 
of the entire working-age population (15-64), around 63 percent participate in the labour 
market by working or by looking for a job (activity rate); while 56 percent of the working-
age population was actually employed in 2006 (employment rate) (Eurostat, 2008). 
Both indicators are well below the averages for the EU-15 and the EU-10. This situation 
coupled with a shrinking labour force indicates a possible large loss in the productive 
potential of the economy in the future. One way of keeping up with the challenges ahead 
is a better use of the productive capabilities of older workers.3 The following overview of 
recent labour market trends for older workers in Croatia indicates that there is a large 
possibility for such a change. 
The activity rate for older workers (55-64) in Croatia was 36.5 percent in 2006 -  one of 
the lowest rates in Europe (Figure 3.11). However, a marked change has been observed 
in recent years. The activity rate of older workers increased by 12 percentage points 
in the 4-year period between 2002 and 2006. In the EU, such dynamic changes can 
only be compared with changes in Germany. Changes is the Croatian pension system 
after the reform in 1999 have worked in the direction of extending the working life, and 
this can be seen as the major factor behind the increase in the activity rate for older 
workers.4 Demographic factors also contributed to the increasing participation of older 
people in the labour market. A cohort of the population aged 55-64 has recently become 
increasingly filled with baby-boomers. In addition, a number of inactive persons that were 
retired in the early 1990s within early retirement schemes fell out from the population 
subgroup aged 55-64 years by reaching 65 years, which mechanically lowered the size 
of the inactive older population. 
In spite of increasing older workers’ activity rates, Croatia is still characterised by the 
relatively low age of 60 years old, on average, at which workers usually leave the labour 
market (Figure 3.11). Early exit from the labour market could explain a part of the relatively 
low employment rates in Croatia, both for the entire working-age population (15-64 years) 
of 55.6 percent in 2006 and the older workers (55-64 years) of 34.5 percent (Eurostat, 
2008). As suggested by Figure 3.12, countries with a higher exit age from the labour force 
experience the higher older population employment rate.
3 The other way could be immigration, but the discussion on it is outside the scope of this publication.
4 See Chapter 5 on the Croatian pension system and its influence on the decisions of older workers whether to 
stay in or exit the labour force.
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Figure 3.11: Activity rates for older workers (55-64 years) in Europe
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 3.12: Average exit age from the labour force and employment rates for older 
workers (55-64) in Europe, 2006
Source: Eurostat.
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In parallel with the changing age profile of the population, the existing pool of employed 
is changing its age profile. In the last 20 years, from 1986 to 2006, the share of young 
workers in paid employment has declined from 13.1 to below 6.7 percent; while the share 
of older workers has increased from 5.3 to 9.3 percent (Table 3.1). The increasing share 
of older workers has been more pronounced recently. Between 2002 and 2006, the 
employment share of older workers had increased by 2.3 percentage points. Although 
that was a substantial change registered by the Establishment Surveys, the Labour Force 
Surveys data suggest an even higher proportion of older workers in employment as well 
as a more rapid pace of ageing in the workforce.
Table 3.1: Age profile of paid employment in Croatia, 1986-2006, in percent 
Age group 1986 1996 2002 2006
Young workers (15-24) 13.1 6.9 6.8 6.7
Prime-age workers (25-54) 81.6 87.6 86.2 84.0
Older workers (55+) 5.3 5.5 7.0 9.3
Note: Figures refer to persons in paid employment in business entities with over 10 employees. Self-employed 
persons are not considered.
Source: CBS.
According to the comparable LFS data, the proportion of older workers of 12.3 percent in 
Croatia was slightly higher than it was on average in EU-15 countries, and substantially 
above the average for EU-10 countries and Slovenia (Table 3.2, first line). Croatia has 
undergone a substantial change in the early 2000s. An increase in the employment 
share of older workers in Croatia in the period 2002-2006 has been particularly high. It 
has been higher than the average of old and new EU countries.5 
The dimension of change in age structure calculated from the Labour Force Survey data 
differs from that calculated on the basis of the Establishment Survey due to a different 
coverage of employment in these surveys in Croatia. The Establishment Survey does not 
cover self-employed, subsistence agriculture workers, family and occasional workers, as 
well as workers in the informal sector, which might convey that the largest changes in the 
age structure have happened in these segments of the labour market. 
5 In fact, the increase in employment share of older workers in Croatia in the period 2002-2006 was higher 
than in any particular EU country, where the highest increases are found in Finland (by 4 percentage points), 
Slovakia (3.1 percentage points), the Netherlands (3.1 percentage points), Hungary (3.0 percentage points) and 
the Czech Republic (3.0 percentage points) (Eurostat, 2008).
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Table 3.2: Share of older workers (55-64) in the total employment (15-64) by occupation
2006 Change 2002-2006
EU-15 EU-10 Slovenia Croatia EU-15 EU-10 Slovenia Croatia
In percent Change in percentage points
Total 12.1 9.7 8.0 12.3 1.5 1.8 1.8 4.9
Legislators, senior 
officials and managers
16.8 14.5 12.5 15.7 1.8 3.7 2.0 8.2
Professionals 14.2 10.5 9.4 20.5 2.1 0.6 1.9 8.7
Technicians and 
associate professionals
10.6 9.5 6.4 12.9 1.7 2.8 1.6 5.4
Clerks 10.8 7.1 5.2 8.7 2.2 1.5 2.6 4.5
Service workers and 
shop and market sales 
workers
9.0 6.5 2.2 4.9 0.6 1.8 0.0 2.5
Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers
20.7 14.3 29.7 32.2 -0.2 0.3 1.1 7.2
Craft and related trades 
workers
10.7 8.4 7.1 9.1 1.1 2.2 2.8 4.5
Plant and machine 
operators and 
assemblers
11.8 8.3 4.9 6.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.7
Elementary occupations 14.0 12.3 10.0 9.4 1.4 2.7 4.4 5.9
Source: Eurostat.
The employment share of older workers varies substantially by occupation. Agricultural 
workers are the occupational category with a higher proportion of older workers (55-64) 
in the EU (Table 3.2). White-collar workers in the most complex jobs (senior officials, 
managers, professionals) make up a substantial proportion of the older workers. The trend 
of the rising employment share of older workers seems to be Europe-wide. In Croatia, 
an increase in the share of older workers between 2002 and 2006 was occupation-wide 
suggesting that only a systemic change such as a pension reform could have caused 
such dynamics. However, the increase has been the weakest for middle-demanding jobs 
in industry and services (service workers, clerks, machine-operators, craft and trade 
workers). This finding can be linked to the relatively poor demand for workers with such 
qualifications in the transition period with the possible consequence of their earlier exit 
from the labour force to retirement, or even their exit to the pool of unemployed.
For older workers, their increasing share in employment is just one side of the coin, 
while the other side is their increasing unemployment. In 1997, there were around 10,000 
unemployed older workers (55 years of age or more), or around 3.5 percent of the total 
number of unemployed (Figure 3.13). A relatively steep increase in the absolute and the 
relative number of unemployed older workers has been observed thereafter. At the end 
2007, there were around 31,500 unemployed persons at the age of 55 years or more, or 
12.8 percent of the total number of unemployed. For the observed trend, two tentative 
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explanations could be given. First, this is a result of more stringent criteria for early 
retirement and an increase in the official retirement age brought by the 1999 pension 
reform. Second, labour demand is strongly biased towards the younger labour force. 
Rising unemployment for older workers is, in fact, observed amid declining unemployment 
for the general population - which is a wake-up call for a decisive policy reaction.
Figure 3.13: Older workers in unemployment
Note: The proportion of older workers in unemployment is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed 
persons aged 55 years or more by the total number of unemployed as of December 31.
Source: Croatian Employment Service.
3.4  Conclusions
This brief overview of demographic and labour market changes in Croatia presented 
several findings that call for further elaboration and demand a proper policy reaction. It 
emphasised that the sharp drop in the size of the population, the most striking feature of 
the future demographic developments, will be only partly moderated by the positive net 
migration. There is also good news – people will live longer on average than today. And, 
that is going to cause for another concern – the share of elderly will rise, and the share of 
the working-age population will shrink thereby challenging future economic growth and 
the sustainability of public finances.
As a consequence of demographic changes, the composition of the working-age 
population will also change. The number of persons belonging to the younger workers 
group and prime working-age group will fall quite rapidly, while the number of older 
workers is projected to rise in the next decade. It seems that the labour market situation, 
public finance sustainability but also the growth potential of the Croatian economy could, 
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therefore, be influenced by the labour market performance and the productivity of workers 
aged 55 or more.
It can be argued that Croatia, having low overall activity and employment rates, especially 
low older workers’ activity, has a promising reservoir for increased labour market 
participation of the older population. Until a decade ago, labour market participation at 
older age was low - workers used to retire early, most often in their 50s since there were 
neither legal nor economic or cultural obstacles to act differently. Recently, however, the 
activity rate for older workers and their share in the workforce have increased substantially. 
A quite reasonable explanation for such change is the pension reform from 1999 that 
gradually raised the official retirement age. However, rising older persons’ activity did 
not go hand in hand with their improved employment perspective since the number of 
unemployed persons aged 55 to 64 has increased quite significantly. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the severe economic consequences of demographic 
changes could be at least partly mitigated by enhancing employment among older 
workers. However, it seems that delaying the official retirement age is not a sufficient 
measure in that direction, and that it should necessarily be accompanied by other 
carefully designed policy actions and measures.
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Chapter 4   |   Tjaša Redek, Polona Domadenik and Irena Ograjenšek
Slovenia and the challenge
of the ageing population
4.1  Population ageing in Slovenia
Over the next few decades, Slovenia’s population will, similarly to the population of the 
EU, significantly change in both size and age structure. Ageing, the trend that has marked 
population development across Europe, will also affect Slovenia. Demographic change, 
caused by a declining fertility rate, a rise in life expectancy and low immigration, along 
with the ageing of the baby boomers (the generations between 1940s to 1960s), already 
presents a serious challenge for Slovenian policy-makers, firms and people; bringing 
forth important economic, social and also political challenges. In 2005, the share of the 
population aged 65 or more represented 15.2 percent of the total population. By 2050, it 
is expected to rise to approximately 31 percent of the total population1 (Eurostat, 2008a; 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2008).
4.1.1  Demographic trends in Slovenia
With its roughly 2 million inhabitants, Slovenia is one of the smallest European economies. 
In 2006, it represented 0.2 percent of the total EU-25 population, which placed it at 
the very bottom by population size. Only Cyprus (0.2 percent), Estonia (0.3 percent), 
Luxembourg (0.1 percent) and Malta (0.1 percent) were smaller (Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 2007b: 4-5). 
Slovenia’s population steadily increased between 1954 and 1988; the period in which 
it reached a temporary peak with 1,999,988 inhabitants. During transition, due to less 
favourable economic conditions, the population started to decline (Figure 4.1). In 1999, 
it reached a minimum and only slowly recovered to 2,001,114 inhabitants in 2005 (thus 
almost reaching the 1991 level). The fertility rate, and consequently also the number 
of live births, declined dramatically. With a relatively stable number of deaths, the 
natural increase of the population plummeted and remained negative throughout the 
period 1997-2005 (Figure 4.2). Immigration and emigration fluctuated, but net migration 
remained positive throughout transition, with the exception of 1998 (Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Slovenia, 2007a: 57).2  
1 Population projections are baseline projections prepared by Eurostat in cooperation with Statistical office 
of the Republic of Slovenia. Detailed information on projections can be found at http://www.stat.si/pxweb/
Database/Dem_soc/05_prebivalstvo/07_05197_projekcije.
2 Immigration is in literature a source of faster population increase. But at least currently, we do not believe that 
encouraging immigration is an important policy option. Namely, Slovenia has a relatively high unemployment 
rate among young people. Therefore, general encouragement of immigration is not sensible. But, given the 
lack of workers in certain professions (especially professions requiring unskilled and semi-skilled workers), the 
government has been increasing the number of work permits for these groups.
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Figure 4.1: Total mid-year population of Slovenia
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
Figure 4.2: Population in Slovenia: number of live births and deaths
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Demographic projections (Eurostat, 2008) show that the population of Slovenia is 
expected to reach its maximum in 2015 with 2.018.808 inhabitants; henceforth, it 
is projected to decline (Figure 4.3). In 2051, it is expected that there will be as few as 
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1,893,443 inhabitants, which is close to the 1979-1980 level. The causes of the decline 
will be similar to those characteristic for other EU economies: 
1. The most important factor behind a long-term population decline is a lower fertility 
rate. Women tend to postpone the decision to have children and, consequently, 
give birth to less children during their reproductive age (between 1995-1999 women 
on average had their first child at 25.6 years of age; in 2006 at 28 years of age). 
The fertility rate declined from an average of 2.11 children per woman in 1980 to its 
lowest level of 1.20 in 2003. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, it reached 1.25, 1.26 and 1.31 
respectively (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2007c). But, the positive 
trend cannot be expected to continue. The current increased fertility rate seems to 
be the result of the reproduction cycle of baby-boomers’ children. 
2. Better health care contributed to the stabilisation of death rates despite the ageing 
population. Death rates have been relatively stable at around 9.4-9.7 deaths per 
1000 persons since 1994 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2007c). 
Figure 4.3: Total population of Slovenia according to population projections
Source: Eurostat.
Declining population will be, like in the majority of other European economies, 
accompanied with the ageing of the population.
4.1.2  The phenomenon of ageing
Over the past decades, a declining fertility rate and relatively stable mortality rate have 
been contributing to population ageing in Slovenia. In 2005, the share of people aged 65 
or more in the total population was 15.3 percent. By 2010, it is supposed to rise to 16.5 
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percent. By 2050, almost a third of the total population will be 65 or older (Figure 4.4) 
(Eurostat, 2008b).  
Figure 4.4: Population of Slovenia aged 65 or more compared to the total population
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
Ageing index is another important indicator of future demographic developments. It 
is calculated as the number of persons aged 60 years or older per hundred persons 
under the age of 15 (United Nations, 2002). In Slovenia (Figure 4.5), the ageing index is 
currently 148, but it is expected to peak in about four decades at the level of around 300. 
This implies that the number of people aged 60 years or more will be three times larger 
than the number of people below 15.
Ageing will also affect the dependency ratios. The total number of the young people is 
expected to slowly increase until the 2020s and then start decreasing slowly. The number 
of people aged 65 or more will steadily increase. The total number of the dependent 
population, comprising of those under 15 years of age and those aged 65 or older, will 
steadily increase, because the increased share of the elderly will outweigh the decline 
of the young, dependent population. By 2050, the number of persons between 15 and 
64 will be larger than the number of dependent persons by a mere 230 thousand (Figure 
4.6). 
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Figure 4.5: Number of people under 15, number of those aged 60 or more and
  ageing index for Slovenia
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.6: Changing structure of the dependent population in Slovenia
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
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Dependency ratios will continue to worsen. Figure 4.7 (dependency ratios as defined by 
the UN3) reveals that the youth dependency ratio will remain relatively stable at around 
0.2. The old-age dependency ratio will increase steadily and by 2050 reach 0.56. In 
practice, this means that each person of working-age might be expected to support 
more than a half of an elderly person and, in total, each person of working-age might be 
expected to support almost 0.8 of a person (total dependency ratio) by 2050.
Figure 4.7: Dependency ratios for Slovenia
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
The picture gets even worse when taking into account the fact that most of the young 
continue their education at least through the secondary school and, consequently, do not 
actually enter the labour market until they reach the age of 20 (Figure 4.8). In 2005, the 
dependency ratio for the young was larger than that for the old, while the total dependency 
reached 0.56. By 2050, on average each person between 20 and 64 will have to support 
one whole person. These trends in both types of dependency ratios could have serious 
economic implications and pose a real challenge to policy-makers.
3 The total dependency ratio is the number of persons under the age of 15 plus persons aged 65 or older per one 
hundred persons between 15 and 64. It is the sum of the youth dependency ratio and the old-age dependency 
ratio. The youth dependency ratio is the number of persons of 0 to 14 years per one hundred persons of 15 to 64 
years. The old-age dependency ratio is the number of persons of 65 years and over per one hundred persons 
of 15 to 64 years (United Nations, 2002).
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Figure 4.8: Dependency ratios for Slovenia including young up to 20 into supported
 population
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
4.2  Ageing and the labour market in Slovenia
Economic changes, especially in the labour market, will be highly affected by ageing. 
However, labour market changes will mainly depend on the rising share of those aged 
50 or more in the total population. In 2005, the share of those aged 50 or more in the 
total population was 34.1 percent. By 2010, this share will rise to 37.2 percent; and by 
2035, it will reach 49.5 percent of the total population and then stabilise around half of 
the total population (Figure 4.9). At the moment, the baby boom generation is ageing, 
and this contributes to a faster increase of those aged 50 or more in the total population 
compared to those aged 65 or more (Eurostat, 2008b).
As a consequence of these trends, the structure of the working-age population will 
also change (Figure 4.10). In 2005, the share of those over 50 in the total working-age 
population (15-64) was 26.7 percent. Taking into account the fact that the education 
process holds the majority of the population off the labour market at least until the age 
of 20, the share of those aged 50 or more in the total working-age population (this time 
20-64) rises to 29.4 percent. The share of the older workers in the total working-age 
population will continue to rise over the next three decades, when the current young 
cohorts, which are significantly smaller than the baby boom cohorts, reach older age. 
This will cause the trend to turn around slightly.
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Figure 4.9: Population aged 50 or more compared to the total population in Slovenia
Source: Eurostat.
Given that currently the fertility rate in Slovenia is slightly rising, the cohorts aged 50 or 
more will strengthen again after 2050. Yet, taking into account the fact that the fertility 
rate probably will not keep rising, the ratio can be expected to stabilise; probably below 
its peak of 0.41 (0.37).
An overview of current statistics shows that several significant problems in the labour 
market already exist and could gain in importance with ageing. First, the employment rate 
of older workers in Slovenia has been significantly below the European levels, especially 
for women (Table 4.1). 
European Union member countries agreed on a special employment guideline concerning 
active ageing (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). Two important strategic 
objectives, which should be achieved by 2010, are: (1) an increase in the employment 
rate of older workers to 50 percent (Stockholm 2001); and (2) a 5-year delay of the age at 
which older workers stop working (Barcelona 2002).4 In Slovenia, the employment rates 
for older men are not far below the target, whereas the older female population faces 
serious employment-related challenges. The generally low employment of the older 
population is a consequence of transition in Slovenia due to the fact that early retirement 
was one of the mild approaches to reducing the number of employees in companies, 
which resulted in a large number of relatively young retired people. 
4 For more on the Stockholm and Barcelona targets see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_
analysis/age_en.htm. The targets are also analysed in more detail in the paper on demographic trends in the 
EU in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 4.10: Age structure of the working-age population in Slovenia
Source: Eurostat.
Table 4.1: Employment rates for older workers: a comparison*
Employment rates for older workers - total
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU-27 36.9 37.7 38.5 40.0 40.7 42.4 43.5 44.7
EU-15 37.8 38.8 40.2 41.7 42.5 44.2 45.3 46.6
Euro area (13) 34.3 35.1 36.4 37.8 38.6 40.5 41.8 43.3
Slovenia 22.7 25.5 24.5 23.5 29.0 30.7 32.6 33.5
Employment rates for older workers - female
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU-27 27.4 28.2 29.1 30.7 31.6 33.6 34.9 36.0
EU-15 28.0 29.1 30.7 32.2 33.2 35.5 36.9 38.1
Euro area (13) 24.3 25.1 26.6 28.0 29.0 31.6 33.1 34.7
Slovenia 13.8 15.8 14.2 14.6 17.8 18.5 21.0 22.2
Employment rates for older workers - male
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU-27 47.1 47.7 48.4 49.9 50.4 51.6 52.7 53.9
EU-15 48.0 48.9 50.1 51.6 52.2 53.3 54.1 55.3
Euro area (13) 44.8 45.5 46.7 48.0 48.6 49.8 50.9 52.3
Slovenia 32.3 35.9 35.4 33.2 40.9 43.1 44.5 45.3
Note: *The employment rate of older workers is calculated by dividing the number of workers aged 55 to 64 in 
employment by the total worker population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour 
Force Survey.
Source: Eurostat.
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It also should be pointed out that the average exit age in Slovenia is lower than in the 
EU. On average, a Slovenian worker exits the labour market at 59.8 years as opposed to 
the EU-27 (61.2 years), EU-15 (61.4 years) and the Euro area of 13 countries (60.9 years) 
(Eurostat, 2008a). All these results are well behind the desired goal of 65 years of age. 
To keep the older workers employed and to ensure a sustainable growth environment, 
more than a simple legislative change like a rise in the mandatory retirement age is 
required. All potential consequences of ageing as well as the interactions among potential 
reforms should be carefully considered.
4.3  Economic challenges of ageing in Slovenia
In order to create an economic environment allowing for economic growth,5 policy 
makers will have to deal with the following main characteristics of the labour market and 
consequences of ageing in Slovenia:
(1) decreasing population and decreasing number of working-age population, which 
can have a negative impact on economic growth;
(2) increasing share of older workers within the working-age population, which will 
require significant changes in the attitudes of workers, companies, and the state 
towards their employment and life-long learning;
(3) currently low employment rates of older workers and low average exit age;
(4) very high and increasing old-age dependency ratios, which - without a general 
economic adjustment to the new economic situation caused by the aforementioned 
demographic shifts - will become a too heavy of a tax burden.
Sustainable economic growth will only be possible in a macroeconomic environment, 
which will be sufficiently competitive in the ever more competitive global context. This 
will also require a different labour market. Additionally, the problem of ageing will have 
to be solved. AGE (2006) suggests that policy developments in many areas such as 
employment, pensions, social inclusion, health, transport, urban development, housing, 
research, education and citizenship need to be carefully coordinated. Only by considering 
5 One could speculate that a productivity increase could cover for the increase of the dependency ratio and 
its economic burden. Should productivity grow faster than the dependency ratio, the increasing dependency 
ratio would not pose a threat to economic growth. But data from Trichet (2005) show that in the euro area, 
average productivity growth (measured in terms of output per hour worked), after growing on average by about 
2.5 percent from 1980 to 1995, declined to just above 1.5 percent in the period 1995-2000 and further to just 
above 1.0 percent on average in the period 2000-2004. The dependency ratio is expected to increase from 0.42 
(2005) in 0.78 (in 2050), growing on average by 1.38 percent a year. Even if we assume that such sustained 
productivity growth is possible, there are always a few more problems that arise: (1) can the tax burden be 
increased additionally by total productivity growth, (2) can wages remain unchanged or rise only by such an 
amount to sustain the younger dependent population, (3) profit is a residual category, but its trends are crucial 
for investment and future growth, etc. Numerous issues should be considered, but this is well beyond the 
purpose of this chapter.
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these areas can, the meaning of the demographic change be accurately understood and 
the right policy responses developed. 
The challenges of the future economic consequences of ageing are very complex, 
therefore, detailed analyses of interrelations among different reforms and economic 
impacts of ageing are hard to perform (Kraigher, 2003). But, forecasted values for 
retirement expenses, disability expenses and medical care already indicate the 
importance of the problem. Kraigher (2003) forecasts that by 2050 as much as 30.8 
percent of the GDP could be required for pensions in the case of very unfavourable 
developments in the future (a high life expectancy, low migration, a low employment rate, 
a similar rate of retirement and similar social rights – e.g. pensions - as today). In the case 
of high immigration, high employment, a decline in the retirement rates and significantly 
lower benefits, the GDP burden of pensions would be around 14 percent (see Kraigher, 
2003, for details on the projection). Health insurance costs are also expected to rise 
dramatically already by 2040: from around 7 percent of the GDP today to 11.6 percent 
in the case of unfavourable developments or to at least 9.2 percent in the best case 
scenario. 
The ageing population in Slovenia (as well as in other ageing economies) will affect 
growth through several other main channels: expenditure pressures on public finances, 
which was already mentioned, “life cycle” effects on private savings behaviour, as well 
as Ricardian equivalence6 effects operating through the deterioration in public savings, 
labour supply implications, a potential impact on capital accumulation, effects on the total 
factor productivity, and, finally, the equilibrating role for interest rates, exchange rates, 
and shifts in external balances (for the EU-15 these consequences were mentioned by 
the European Commission, 2003: 10). 
All in all, the key challenge seems to be the labour market reform. Should the labour 
market successfully adapt to the new reality, all ageing-related problems can be solved. 
Unfortunately, Slovenia currently has no specific strategy concerning the “ageing problem” 
in the labour market; although the problem of the ageing population is mentioned or dealt 
with briefly in several documents (e.g. Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve 
2006a, 2006b and 2006c). 
6 Ricardian equivalence (or Ricardo-Barro equivalence) deals with inter-temporal exchange between private 
and government consumption. It suggests that when the government stimulates demand by increasing debt-
financed government spending and, therefore, leaving private incomes unchanged, people act rationally and 
are aware of the future tax burden and, therefore, private demand remains unchanged. The future tax burden is 
already calculated into the total life-cycle income of individuals. The public will save its excess “current” money to 
pay for future tax increases that will be needed to pay off the additional debt. The key idea of Ricardo's theorem 
is that it does not matter how a government chooses to increase spending, whether with debt financing or tax 
financing, the outcome will be the same and private demand will remain unchanged. People are rational.
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Thus, an active ageing strategy is still in preparation. Apart from other problems, it will 
primarily need to address the issues connected with the older labour force. According to 
Pušnik et al. (2007: 16), these issues are the following:
(1) Employment legislation is not appropriately protecting the older workforce from 
dismissal in the cases of company reorganisation. Consequently, older workers 
are dismissed more frequently than younger workers.
(2) The consulting service for the older unemployed is not efficient due to overburdened 
consultants.
(3) Employment policies and human resource management in companies often 
discriminate older employees. Unions are often not vigilant enough when 
defending the rights of the older employment seekers, or of the older employees. 
(4) Disabled, older unemployed workers, which represent the majority of disabled 
workers, because of their disability face additional problems. 
(5) Older unemployed workers are also reported to have psychological problems 
(lower self-esteem, lack of socialisation, loss of skills, attrition of work habits, 
etc.).
An efficient active ageing strategy should also identify the demand side problems in 
labour markets and the attitudes of companies towards older workers. However, it seems 
clear even without looking at the empirical results that an appropriate labour market 
solution of the ageing problem will require close cooperation among the demand side 
(companies), the supply side (workers), and the state.
4.4  Conclusion
Slovenia is facing the problem of an ageing population. In the next four to five decades, 
its population is expected to decline and significantly age. The share of those aged 65 
or more is expected to rise from the current 15 percent to 31 percent by 2050. The 
total dependency ratio will rise from 0.42 (2005) to 0.78 (2050) resulting from a dramatic 
increase in the old-age dependency ratio, which is expected to rise in the same period 
from 0.42 to 0.56; while the young-age dependency ratio will remain relatively stable (0.2 
in 2005 and 0.23 in 2050). 
Population changes will be reflected in the labour market. People aged 50 or more 
represented just over a third of the population in 2005. But, their share is expected 
to rise to one half by 2035 and to stabilise. With a shrinking and ageing population, 
the labour market and the economy as a whole will have to sustain deep changes to 
ensure sustainable growth conditions. Measures such as active age prolongation and 
the increased employment of older workers will need to be carried out to ensure a large 
enough labour force for the functioning of the economy and for lowering the fiscal burden 
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of ageing. To achieve these goals, the needs and attitudes of companies and workers will 
have to be carefully examined and a suitable reform strategy will have to be prepared and 
implemented by the government.
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Chapter 5   |   Danijel Nestić and Ivana Rašić Bakarić
From work to retirement: Pension system 
incentives to continued labour market 
participation in Croatia
5.1  Introduction
The Croatian population is ageing at a rapid pace, with wide-ranging implications for 
economic and social life. According to demographic projections, Croatia will experience 
a significant change in the population structure - the share of the elderly will strongly 
increase, while the share of the working-age population will decline substantially. For 
example, the working-age population (15-64 years of age) is projected to shrink from 
around 3.0 million today to 2.2 million by 2050, and its share in the population will decline 
from 67 percent to 59 percent (DZS, 2006). In addition, the labour force will comprise a 
large proportion of older workers.
Policy challenges posed by population ageing are enormous, not only in Croatia but all 
over Europe and industrialised world. Economists are worried how to keep the economy 
growing at a pace that facilitates improvements in the living standards of the overall 
population and how to ensure the sustainability of public finances, especially public 
pension schemes. The critical point in this respect is the labour market. The challenges 
ahead call for policy initiatives for increasing the participation rates of older people by 
creating a friendly institutional and cultural environment for longer working lives of older 
workers. Accordingly, the EU has taken a new approach by promoting active ageing. This 
is reflected in two strategic objectives to be achieved by 2010: to increase the employment 
rates of older workers to 50 percent (Stockholm target); and to delay by five years the age 
at which older workers stop working (Barcelona target). 
The pension system design is one of the key factors influencing work and retirement 
decisions. This paper focuses on the Croatian pension system and incentives it provides 
to continued labour market participation. It analyses the pension system effects on the 
average retirement age, public pension expenditures and the replacement rate. Finally, it 
considers policies towards rewarding people for working longer. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the development of the 
Croatian pension system since 1990 by focusing on changes in the eligibility criteria for 
retirement. Incentives and barriers to continued work after reaching the official retirement 
age are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 gives policy recommendations, while 
Section 5.5 concludes.
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5.2  Retirement policy in Croatia
The Croatian pension system has gone through three broad phases in the post-socialist 
period, each providing specific incentives for the work/retirement decisions of older 
workers. These are:
a) prior to the pension reform (1990-1998);
b) transition period of the pension reform (1999-2007);
c) advanced phase of the reform (2008 on).
The crucial point in examining the Croatian pension system is the Pension Insurance Act 
(enacted in July 1998, while its implementation started in January 1999) (NN, 102/98), 
the first and the most important act in setting the new system. 
5.2.1  Prior to the pension reform
Up to 1999, the Croatian pension system retained the basic features of the socialist era. 
There was only one public PAYG pension scheme of a defined-benefit type. The official 
retirement age was low and the penalties for early retirement were weak. A person was 
eligible for the old-age pension:
a) at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women, with at least 20 years of service;
b) at the age of 65 for men and 60 for women, with a minimum of 15 years of 
service;
c) at any age, with 40 years of service for men and 35 for women.
 
It was possible to opt for an early retirement at the age of 55 for men (with at least 35 
years of service) and 50 for women (and 30 years of service). The penalties for early 
retirements were relatively weak. The annual decrement in pension benefit was 1.33 
percent. For unemployed persons who had lost their jobs due to enterprise bankruptcy 
and had chosen to retire earlier, it was even lower - 0.5 percent per year. It is important 
to note that the decrement was not permanent, but valid until the official retirement age. 
When a person reached that age, his/her pension benefit was recalculated at a regular 
rate for old-age pension. In all cases, the pension benefit valorisation was based on the 
10 best years of earnings in one’s career.
A new set of measures was introduced in 1990 aimed at helping redundant workers and 
unemployed older persons to retire earlier. In order to meet the requirement c) listed 
above, one could “purchase” up to five years of service (i.e. five years of contribution 
to the pension fund) by making a one-time contribution payment. Such a possibility 
was widely used by privatised firms and the Croatian Employment Service for older 
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unemployed persons who had lost their jobs due to the bankruptcy of their former 
employer.1 Even more often, it was used simply to reduce employment at a reasonable 
cost for companies. This particular measure was abolished in 1995. Around 57 thousand 
people entered retirement in this manner, mostly blue-collar workers who had started 
working in their teens.
Various forms of early retirement were extensively used during the early 1990s, especially 
in the period from 1991 to 1993. At that time, Croatia experienced a considerable decline 
in economic activity, massive loss of jobs and high unemployment. Furthermore, the 
social protection system faced the problem of internally displaced persons and refugees. 
In that situation, the policy of (early) retirement, even with a relatively low pension benefit, 
provided a minimum of social security to older people, so it was seen as a reasonable 
choice at that time. However, it caused serious financial problems to the pension system. 
Total expenditures on pensions increased from 7.7 percent of GDP in 1992 to over 12 
percent of GDP in 1997 and 1998. The pension system dependency ratio (the number 
of contributors over the number of pensioners) declined from 3.0 in 1990 to 1.5 in 1998. 
The pension reform was necessary in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the 
pension system.
5.2.2  Transition period (1999-2007)
A comprehensive reform of the pension system in Croatia started in 1999 with the 
implementation of the Pension Insurance Act. The pure PAYG system has been modified 
into a “three-pillar” system. The first pillar remains to function as the PAYG defined-
benefit scheme, but with a reduced size. The new second pillar is a mandatory fully 
funded scheme of defined-contribution type and the third pillar is a voluntary fully-funded 
scheme of defined-contribution type. The pension reform has involved substantial 
changes in the PAYG system starting from 1999. The introduction of the second and third 
pillar was postponed until 2002.2
The changes in the PAYG system included: 
a) an increase in the official retirement age to 65 years for men and 60 years for 
women (the minimum of 15 years of contribution is required);
1 As stated by the experts from the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, years of contribution were “purchased” 
by 20-25 percent of persons who had lost their jobs. The average age of such pensioners was 51 year. 
2 At present, pensions are paid from the PAYG scheme and the same practice will continue in the mid-term 
period. Apart from the small number of individual cases, the first cohort of combined pensioners, i.e. those 
receiving pension from the first (the PAYG scheme) and the second pillar (mandatory fully funded scheme), will 
emerge in 2010, but even then it will be relatively small compared to those insured in the PAYG scheme alone. 
The first pillar design, therefore, remains crucial for the current work-retirement decisions of older workers. The 
effects of the second pillar on pensions are not yet visible to older workers and, currently, they do not influence 
their decisions. Therefore, we focus on the effects of the first pillar.
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b) an increase in the minimum age for early retirement to 60 for men and 55 for 
women (the minimum of 35 years of contribution for men and 30 for women is 
required);
c) an increase in the annual decrement for early retirement from 1.33 percent to 3.6 
percent per year3;
d) a gradual widening of the benefit calculation period from the 10 best earning years 
to the life-time average earnings (more precisely, from 1970 on);
e) changes in the pension benefit valorisation formula and the post-retirement benefit 
indexation (switch to the Swiss-type formula with a 50-percent price up-rating and 
a 50-percent wage up-rating).4
The changes in retirement age and pension benefit calculations were gradual, although 
they can be considered quite radical by international standards. A 5-year increase 
in the official retirement age was effectuated within 10 years in a way that 6 months 
were added in each year. The same transition period (1999-2007) was necessary to 
increase the official retirement age. Transition lasted a bit longer in the case of pension 
benefit calculations. Starting from the best 10 years in 1999, the calculation period has 
been raised by 3 years in each subsequent year, and it will reach the 40 best years of 
earnings in 2009 and thereafter all earnings in the period from 1970 on will be used for 
calculations.5
Also, the minimum age for early retirement has been gradually increased by six months 
per year to reach 60 for men and 55 for women by 2008. However, a minimum of 35 years 
of contribution for men and 30 for women was required for the early retirement.
In the transition period (1999-2007), there was an exceptional opportunity to take a 
regular old-age retirement based on the “full” contribution period, i.e. at least 40 years 
of contribution for men and 35 years for women. In that case, the stipulated minimum 
retirement age was the same as for the early retirement scheme, i.e. five years lower than 
the regular retirement age. For example, in 2004, an insured person was entitled to an 
old-age pension after reaching 40 years of contribution (35 for women) and 58 years of 
age (53 for women). That opportunity was ceased in 2008. 
3 In 2002, the decrement was further raised to 4.08 percent per year (0.34 percent per month), but then 
substantially lowered to 1.8 percent per year (0.15 percent per month) in 2008.
4 Indexation for both the initial pension valorisation and post-retirement benefit adjustment by 50 percent on 
price and 50 percent on wage inflation is commonly labelled in Croatia as a “Swiss-formula”, although the actual 
Swiss practice is somewhat different (to valorise at wages and have post-retirement adjustment 50 percent 
at prices and 50 percent at wages). It could be more appropriate to label the practice of both valorising and 
indexing benefits at the same rate (50 percent-50 percent at prices and wages) as a “Croatian formula” (Anušić, 
O’Keefe, and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003: 28). However, we would use the term Swiss-type formula. 
5 In 2008, the pension benefit is calculated on the basis of the 37 best earning years.
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The changes in the PAYG system effectuated up to 2007 resulted in mixed incentives to 
retire or to continue working. Generally, the transition period is considered to be a period 
of favourable retirement conditions, as compared to the situation expected in the future. 
5.2.3  Retirement policy in 2008
Pension entitlements regulated by the Pension Insurance Act became fully operative in 
2008. Only in the case of benefit calculation period, the targeted level of 40 years will be 
reached in 2010. In 2008, the minimum statutory retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for 
women with at least 15 years of contribution. Early retirement is possible at the age of 60 
for men (with 35 years of contribution) and 55 for women (with 30 years of contribution).
The pension benefit for early retirement is lower than in the case of retiring at the 
official retirement age. The last changes in the Pension Insurance Act enacted in 2007 
bring a much milder decrement in 2008, as compared to the earlier period. In 2008, a 
decrement for each month of retirement prior to the regular retirement age amounted to 
0.15 percent (1.8 percent per year, and 9 percent for the maximum of five years). It seems 
that such a mild penalty for early retirement could only motivate older workers with the 
minimum years of contributions to retire earlier. The same decrement will be applied to 
all pensioners who retired earlier, i.e. to those who joined the early retirement scheme 
in the previous years with much more stringent criteria, so their pension benefits will be 
increased accordingly. 
An important modification in the pension system, or more precisely in the amount of 
pension benefits, has been brought by the 2007 Law on Supplement on Pension Benefits 
Accrued According to the Pension Insurance Act. It will introduce a hike in benefits 
for pensioners retired in 1999 and later. The “new” pensioners have been receiving a 
supplement to their regular pension benefits starting from October 1, 2007. The amount 
of the pension supplement increases with the year of retirement, from 4 percent of the 
pension benefit for those retired in 1999 to 27 percent for those who will retire in 2010 
and later. For those retired in 2003, the supplement is 19 percent of their pension benefit 
and 25.9 percent for those retired in 2008. This supplement helps us to measure the 
difference in pension benefits between a person retired in the reform period and a person 
retired before the reform. It also aims to bring equity into the pension system, so the 
total pension (the regular pension benefit plus the supplement) is roughly the same, 
regardless of the year of retirement. 
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5.2.4  Immediate effects of the pension reform?
The pension reform has brought substantial changes in the functioning of the PAYG 
scheme. Its financial position has improved, inflows into the system have decelerated 
and the link between contributions and pensions has strengthened. The pension reform 
results include, in particular:6
a) an increase in the average age of new pensioners; 
b) a decline in expenditures on pensions (measured in percent of GDP); 
c) an improvement in the pension system dependency ratio;
d) a decrease in the replacement rate.
The average age of new pensioners has increased by three to five years in the period 
covered by the pension reform, depending on sex and the type of retirement. In the 
case of old-age retirement, the average age increased from 59 years for men and 57 for 
women in 2000 to 64 years for men and 60 for women in 2007 (HZMO, 2008b). As for 
early retirement, the average age increased from 57 to 61 year for men and from 51 to 
55 years for women between 2000 and 2007. The pension reform is likely to have had a 
major impact on current higher employment rates among the elderly. 
The change in the average age of new pensioners is primarily a result of legislative 
pressure that also helped to stabilise the inflow into retirement. Figure 5.1 shows inflows 
into old-age and disability retirement from a longer perspective, covering the period 
1988-2007. In the early 1990s, the inflow of old-age pensioners and early retirees 
increased heavily, but thereafter it was stabilised. In the second half of the 1990s, the 
inflow into retirement was growing again. However, the 1999 reform prevented a further 
increase in the number of pensioners. Disability retirement often serves as a pathway to 
early retirement, if conditions for old-age retirement are more stringent. In that respect, 
it is interesting to look at trends in the number of new disability pensioners in Croatia 
since 1999. The hike in 1999 was caused by administrative reasons, since various 
social benefits for persons with disabilities were converted to disability pension. But the 
pension reform introduced a more restrictive definition of disability, and consequently 
more stringent criteria for disability pensions. Therefore, the number of new disability 
pensioners declined in 2000. However, there has been a rising trend in the number 
of new disability pensioners since 2000, which can be explained by the rising health 
problems associated with a longer working life. Also, the exploitation of disability rules in 
order to retire earlier might have taken place.
6 Economic and development effects of the 1999 reform are wide-reaching, but they are not in the focus of 
this paper. For example, the introduction of a fully-funded defined-contribution private pension scheme in the 
second (mandatory) and the third (voluntary) pillar of the pension system is expected to bring a long-term 
stability in the overall pension system, improve total domestic savings and help to develop the domestic capital 
market. 
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Figure 5.1: Inflows into retirement
Source: HZMO (2008b).
One of the goals of the pension reform was to lower the burden of a relatively high 
pension share in GDP. In 1999, overall pension expenditures stood at 13.5 percent of 
GDP, and they were expected to decline gradually. With the exception of 2001, when the 
pension hike increased it to 13.9 percent of GDP, the pension share steadily declined to 
11.1 percent in 2007 (HZMO, 2008a). It can be noted that around 60 percent of overall 
expenditures is covered by contributions, while the remaining 40 percent comes from the 
state budget. The pension supplement for post-reform pensioners requires additional 
HRK 720 millions from the budget in 2008, or around 0.25 percent of GDP. 
The pension reform helped to increase the pension system dependency ratio, i.e. the 
ratio between contributors and pensioners by increasing the average retirement age 
(Table 5.2). However, it must be noted that an increase in the dependency ratio from 
1.36 in 2000 to 1.41 in 2007 was also driven by an improved economic situation, where 
strong economic growth induced employment growth, as opposed to the early 1990s 
characterised by the overall economic decline or the late 1990s characterised by jobless 
growth. The long-term trend of worsening dependency ratio is quite obvious, which again 
stresses the importance of policies aimed at increasing activity and employment rates for 
the population in general, and for older workers in particular.
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Table 5.1: Pension system dependency ratio and net replacement rate
Year Pensioners Contributors Dependency ratio
Net replacement
rate (in %)
1952 84,543 493,090 5.83 66.4*
1962 206,490 975,019 4.72 60.8**
1980 449,080 1,816,191 4.04 59.7
1985 524,154 1,931,254 3.68 55.4
1990 655,788 1,968,737 3.00 75.3
1995 865,769 1,567,981 1.81 45.9
1998 955,352 1,471,509 1.54 46.3
1999 1,017,801 1,406,091 1.38 38.4
2000 1,018,504 1,380,510 1.36 37.6
2001 1,032,120 1,402,102 1.36 41.4
2002 1,042,192 1,421,981 1.36 40.7
2003 1,054,549 1,443,995 1.37 40.0
2004 1,065,655 1,460,105 1.37 42.1
2005 1,080,571 1,498,877 1.39 41.8
2006 1,100,086 1,538,170 1.40 40.5
2007 1,121,540 1,579,463 1.41 39.4
Note: Pension system dependency ratio is a ratio between contributors and pensioners. Net replacement rate 
is the net average pension (including old-age, disability and family pensions) expressed as a percentage of the 
net average wage. *1953; **1960.
Source: Puljiz (2007), HZMO (2008a).
The net replacement rate, calculated as the ratio of the average pension and the average 
wage, has continued to decline with the implementation of new parameters of the PAYG 
system. Table 5.1 shows a long-term declining tendency in the net replacement rate and 
a decrease in the pension system dependency ratio. The net replacement rate fell from 
46.3 percent in 1998 to 37.6 percent in 2000. However, by 2005 it slightly rose to 41.8 
percent, but as a result of ad hoc policy measures rather than the pension reform. In 
2001, it grew for the first time due to an increase in pensions for those retired by 1998, 
which was aimed to alleviate the problem of variations in pension benefits based on the 
years of retirement. In 2002 and 2003, the net dependency rate declined, followed by 
another rise in 2004 due to the inclusion of certain pension supplements in a regular 
pension benefit. Again, without interventions, the net replacement rate in the period 
2005-2007 declined. However, the pension hike in 2008 induced by the 2007 Law on 
Supplement on Pension Benefits may increase the net replacement rate again. In March 
2008, it stood at 40.5 percent. 
The replacement rate in the current setting of the PAYG system is actually designed 
to decline with years, or more precisely, as long as there is a rise in the average real 
wage. For those in retirement, a decline in pension benefits relative to the average 
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wage is a result of the Swiss-type indexation formula, where the post-retirement benefit 
adjustment is done by 50 percent at inflation rate and 50 percent at wage growth. Usually, 
the average wage hike is higher than the price hike, meaning that pension benefits are 
adjusted by a factor that is below the average wage growth. A decline in the replacement 
rate for new pensioners is the result of applying the same adjustment formula to the initial 
benefit valorisation, i.e. to adjustment in the actual pension value, one of the key parts in 
determining the pension benefit for new pensioners. This is aimed to counterbalance the 
problem of ageing population, including increased longevity. Currently, life expectancy for 
a man at 65 is 13.2 years and for a woman at age 60 it is 20.9 years (DZS, 2006), and that 
is the expected time span of receiving the pension benefit in the case of getting retired 
at the official retirement age. Demographic projections show that in 2020 life expectancy 
will be 14.6 years for men (aged 65) and 22.1 years for women (aged 60), which is an 
increase of 1.5 years for men and 1.2 years for women (DZS, 2006).
A sharp increase in the participation and employment rate of older workers in Croatia 
at the beginning of the 2000s was another consequence of a rapid pace in the pension 
reform.7 Tightened retirement conditions became fully operational in a relatively short 
period of time within 10-12 years after the start of the reform. It led to an increase in 
the participation rate for older workers (55-64 years) from 24.5 percent in 2002 to 36.5 
percent in 2006, i.e. by 12 percentage points in four years, which was the most dynamic 
change in Europe. Similarly, the employment rate for older workers increased from 22.7 
percent in 2002 to 34.3 percent in 2006 (Eurostat, 2008).
5.3  Incentives and barriers to work after reaching the 
       minimum retirement age 
In Croatia, workers entitled to old-age retirement mostly retire at the earliest possible 
time. In 2007, the average age for new pensioners in the case of old-age retirement was 
64 years for men and 60 years for women while the official age for retirement was 64 
years and 6 months for men and 59 years and 6 months for women. This difference in the 
average and official retirement age can be explained by the possibility to combine “full” 
service years (40 for men) with lower age, as explained earlier. Workers used to retire at 
around the statutory retirement age despite a reasonable flexibility with the actual time of 
retirement provided in the current legislation.
The Labour Act allows for the possibility of prolonging working life. The standard 
employment contract in Croatia should be terminated when a worker reaches 65 years of 
age and 20 years of employment service, unless otherwise is agreed by the employer and 
the employee. Namely, the employee can continue working without any legal obstacle 
7 For more information on the recent labour market trends for older workers in Croatia see Chapter 3.
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after reaching retirement age. On the other hand, the employee can retire earlier if he/she 
is entitled to such a pension. 
In the public sector, there are some exemptions from these general rules. For civil servants 
(employees of central and local government), the employment contract terminates at the 
end of calendar year in which a worker reaches 65 years of age and a minimum of 20 
years of service, as stated in the Law on Civil Servants. In principle, such a worker can be 
employed in other sectors of the economy, but this is rarely the case. The same applies 
to teachers in primary and secondary schools. According to the legislation, teachers can 
continue to work in their schools after retirement on the basis of a service contract, which 
can be combined with a pension benefit. Namely, teachers are willing to work because 
their pension benefits are relatively low compared to salaries. Furthermore, schools are 
short of teachers, so they are willing to extend cooperation with older teachers, and this 
seems to be a win-win situation. For teaching and research staff employed in science 
and higher education, the employment contract terminates at the end of calendar year in 
which a worker reaches 65 years. However, if an employer is interested in a full professor 
with tenure to continue working, he/she can be employed on a fixed-term contract at 
most for 5 years. This possibility is often used in Croatia, showing that employers and 
employees in science and higher education are interested in extending working life after 
the legal age of retirement. However, it seems that such a mutual interest is missing in 
most other sectors.8
5.3.1  Combining work and retirement 
Pensioners still have the option to enter the labour force without losing their pension 
benefit. For example, they are allowed to work on a service contract for third parties, to be 
employed in handicraft trades and secondary occupations. Ministry of Economy, Labour 
and Entrepreneurship strictly defines such jobs as those done on their own, without 
employing other persons, while total revenue from it is limited to ten average monthly 
gross wages for a calendar year. The income received from such work is treated as an 
additional income, and it is subject to standard income taxation.
Pensioners have a preferential treatment in income taxation; their personal allowance is 
almost twice as high as of other tax payers. Therefore, pension benefits are hardly ever 
taxed. According to the distribution of pension benefits, around 85 percent of pension 
benefits are below the personal allowance. The same personal allowance is applied to 
all other income sources of pensioners, not only pension benefits. Therefore, additional 
work combined with retirement could be an attractive option for those who are healthy 
and have an opportunity to work, but now in a more flexible work arrangement.
8 In the education sector, in 2006, around 1 percent of workers were of age 65 or older, while in manufacturing 
and construction the comparable number was 0.1 percent (CBS, 2007). 
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In addition, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence on the unregistered work of pension 
beneficiaries.9 In some cases, workers’ willingness to retire as early as possible may be 
a smart way to combine i) income security by receiving pension benefits and ii) earning 
opportunities by taking casual jobs while there is enough mental and physical ability. 
Relatively low pension benefits and relatively small differences in pension benefits between 
early, regular and later retirement, especially for those with relatively low earnings, mean 
that the combination of work and retirement might be attractive. Unfortunately, we do not 
have enough hard evidence on the prevalence of this phenomenon.
Some forms of paid work cannot be combined with retirement. If a person in retirement 
starts working on the basis of employment contract his/her pension benefit will be 
automatically abolished, as well as their retiree status. So, it is possible to stop receiving 
pension and start working on a regular basis again. In that case, retirement request 
can be renewed no sooner than a year after the first retirement, provided that pension 
insurance contributions are paid in the meantime. The new calculation of pension benefit 
will be done on the basis of total contribution years, in the same manner as in the first 
retirement. The new pension benefit cannot be lower than in the case of first retirement 
because one can always choose a more favourable pension benefit.
Employers in unincorporated sector (crafts, trade and free-lances) are stimulated to 
regularly employ a person who cancel receiving pension benefit and choose to start 
working again. Such employers, which pay personal income tax on income stemmed 
from their business can deduct taxable income by full amount of earnings and social 
security contributions paid to such a new worker. The group of employers eligible for 
this kind of subsidy is estimated to employ less than 10 percent of the total employees in 
Croatia. Unfortunately, we are not aware of official information on how often this kind of 
employment subsidy is actually used, but the effects are surely worth studying.
5.3.2  The pension benefit calculation 
Financial rewards could be the most important incentives for older workers to stay in 
employment once the minimum retirement age is reached. This section will present the 
pension benefit calculation for several typical cases to get an insight on how current 
regulation treats longer work in terms of accrued pension benefit. 
9 Croatia has a substantial number of pensioners below 60 years of age. At the end of 2007, they comprised 
around 20 percent of  total number of retirees (including beneficiaries of disability and family pensions, but 
without military personal and war veterans) (HZMO, 2008a).
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Calculations are done for persons insured in the first pillar who chose to retire at the 
beginning of 2008.10 The pension benefit calculation is prepared separately for male 
and female workers in three cases regarding pension eligibility and four cases regarding 
previous earnings. As for eligibility, we calculate the pension benefit for i) a person who 
retires after satisfying minimum conditions for early retirement, ii) a person with 5 more 
years of age and 5 more years of service when retiring (i.e. a person choosing to retire at 
the statutory minimum age) and iii) a person with 10 more years of age and 10 more years 
of service than in the case of early retirement. In this way, we can get a rough idea of 
benefit implications of continued employment. In some sense, it can illustrate the choice 
whether to retire early, to work until eligible to the statutory old-age pension or to continue 
working five more years after becoming eligible to the statutory old-age pension. We 
are aware of shortcomings in the static dimension of comparison, but think it can lead 
to some useful conclusions. As for earnings, we assume that a person is paid the same 
wage relative to the national average in the course of entire service period. Four cases 
are considered; life-time earnings in the amount of 60, 90, 100 and 200 percent of the 
national average. 
The pension benefit in the Croatian PAYG scheme is calculated as:
Benefit = PF * APV * PP,
where
PP = AVP*Years of service*IF.
The PF stands for the pension factor, APV is the actual pension value and PP is the 
personal point. The pension factor depends on the type of pension; in the case of old-age 
pension, early retirement and disability pension it equals 1.00.11 The actual pension value 
(APV) is a coefficient determined by the pension fund administration. In fact, it is the 
amount of pension for each personal point (PP). The APV is updated every six months 
in line with the indexation formula of Swiss-type (50 percent at price increase and 50 
percent at wage increase). Personal points relate a worker’s contribution to the pension 
fund with his/her pension benefit. They are calculated by multiplying average value points 
(AVP) by the period of service and by the initial factor (IF). The average value points are 
determined on the basis of wages earned. A person’s wage in each calendar year is 
divided by the average wage in Croatia for the same calendar year and then averaged 
over the whole period used for the calculation of benefits (the best 37 years of earnings, 
as applied in 2008). The initial factor (IF) depends on the age of the insured person on the 
10 Majority of current older workers in Croatia are insured only in the first PAYG pillar. In 2002, when the 
mandatory second pillar was introduced, workers below 40 years of age had to enter that scheme, while for 
those between 40 and 50 it was optional.
11 The pension factors for various types of disability and family pensions take values from 0.33 to 1.00. 
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day of acquisition of entitlement to a pension. The initial factor takes the value 1.0 for the 
old-age pension, disability pensions and family pensions, but it takes lower values in the 
case of early retirement. The initial factor is decreased by certain percentage (currently 
by 0.15 percent) for each calendar month of taking retirement before reaching the official 
retirement age (65 years for men and 60 for women).  
The benefit calculation formula in the Croatian PAYG scheme is the same for men and 
women. However, we separate results for men and women to stress the difference in 
pension benefit that stems from different age at which men and women are eligible for 
early and statutory old-age retirement. Women can retire 5 years earlier than men, but 
in that case they have fewer years of service and consequently lower pension benefit. 
Results are shown in Table 5.2 for men and Table 5.3 for women.
Another element of the pension system may be important for assessing benefits – the 
minimum pension. The minimum pension is calculated as the product of service years 
and the minimum benefit factor, which is defined for a year of service. In this way, the 
minimum pension is proportionally related to the years of service. The minimum pension 
is relatively low for those with a short career, but its influence is very important for those 
with a longer career. For example, for workers with 40 years of experience and life-time 
wage in the amount of 97 percent of the national average, the pension benefit will be 
approximately equal to the minimum pension. 
Table 5.2 shows the absolute amounts of pension benefits and net replacement rates 
for men retired in 2008 in twelve various cases depending on age/years of career and 
life-time earnings. Pension benefit increases with age/career length and earnings. The 
net replacement rate increases with age/career length but decreases with earnings. The 
pension benefit relative to pre-retirement earnings is the highest for those with the lowest 
earnings. For example, a man with the life-time earnings in the amount of 60 percent 
of the national average should receive a pension benefit in the amount of 61 percent of 
his pre-retirement earnings in the case of statutory old-age retirement with 40 years of 
service. In a similar situation, a pension benefit of a person with earnings in the amount 
of 200 percent of the average earnings would be below 37 percent of pre-retirement 
earnings. Such a difference in the net replacement rate reflects a degree of solidarity in 
the Croatian pension system and it is mostly caused by the minimum pension regulation. 
It also indicates that retirement means a greater relative loss of income to high-wage 
workers than to low-wage workers. Therefore, early retirement is more attractive to low-
wage workers.
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Table 5.2: Calculation of pension benefits in Croatia for men as of January 2008 
Life-time earnings (in % 
of average earnings
Pension benefit 
Early retirement
(60 years of age and 35 
years of contribution)
Statutory old-age
(65 years of age and 40 
years of contribution)
Later retirement
(70 years of age and 45 
years of contribution)
Absolute amount (in HRK)
60% of average
1,836 
(1,034 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,098
(1,299 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,361
(1,461 but receives 
minimum pension) 
90% of average 
1,836 
(1,551 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,098
(1,948 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,361
(2,191 but receives 
minimum pension)
100% of average
1,836 
(1,723 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,164 2,435
200% of average 3,380 4,129 4,589
In percent of pre-retirement earnings
60% of average 61.0 69.7 78.4
90% of average 40.6 46.4 52.3
100% of average 36.6 43.1 48.5
200% of average 33.7 41.1 45.7
Note: Pension benefit after taxation (assuming a person without dependent family members). Taxation affects 
only pension benefits above 3000 HRK.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 5.3: Calculation of pension benefits in Croatia for women as of January 2008
Life-time earnings (in % 
of average earnings
Pension benefit
Early retirement 
(55 years of age and 30 
years of contribution)
Statutory old-age
(60 years of age and 35 
years of contribution)
Later retirement
(65 years of age and 40 
years of contribution)
Absolute amount (in HRK)
60% of average
1,574
(886 but receives 
minimum pension)
1,836 
(1,136 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,098
(1,299 but receives 
minimum pension) 
90% of average 
1,574
(1,329 but receives 
minimum pension)
1,836 
(1,704 but receives 
minimum pension)
2,098
(1,948 but receives 
minimum pension) 
100% of average
1,574
 (1,477 but receives 
minimum pension)
1,894 2,164 
200% of average 2,954 3,670 4,129
In percent of pre-retirement earnings
60% of average 52.3 61.0 69.7
90% of average 34.8 40.6 46.4
100% of average 31.4 37.7 43.1
200% of average 29.4 36.6 41.1
Note: Pension benefit after taxation (assuming a person without dependent family members). Taxation affects 
only pension benefits above 3000 HRK.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The calculations of pension benefits shown in Table 5.2 are less clear in assessing 
financial incentives to retire later. Benefits in the case of early retirement are lower than in 
the case of retirement at the minimum statutory age. However, a penalty is a bit higher for 
a high-wage worker than for a low-wage worker. For a worker with pre-retirement earnings 
at the level of 60 percent of the average earning, the pension benefit in the case of early 
retirement amounted to 87.5 percent of the benefit in the case of statutory old-age, i.e. in 
the case of additional five years of working. The pension benefit for early retirement for 
a worker with pre-retirement earnings at the level of 200 percent of the average earning 
is 81.8 percent of the benefit in the case of “regular” retirement (HRK 4,129/3,380). The 
minimum pension means a higher replacement rate to low-wage workers. Although high-
wage workers receive a higher pension benefit, it is taxed by the personal income tax 
and therefore they face a lower net replacement ratio.
Incentives to work beyond the minimum statutory retirement age seem unclear. Later 
retirement would bring a higher pension benefit, as shown in Table 5.2. However, 
another factor should also be taken into account beyond all the assumptions already 
made in our exercise. The Croatian pension system incorporates the Swiss-type formula 
for the valorisation of pension benefit (50 percent price up-rating and 50 percent wage 
up-rating). In a situation where wage increase could be substantially higher than price 
inflation, the net replacement rate in the moment of retirement will be lower in the future 
than today, other things being equal. Maybe such a situation could discourage one from 
later retirement.
Table 5.3 presents benefit calculations for women. Typically, women accumulate five 
years less of service than men and consequently receive a lower pension benefit. A 
female worker with life-time earnings at the level of the national average earnings retired 
at the minimum statutory retirement age could expect to receive around a 12 percent 
lower pension than her male counterpart (but, she will have five years of age and service 
less than men).12 Conclusions regarding the incentives for women to retire earlier are 
practically the same as for men.  
Net replacement rates expected for all those with earnings above the national average 
are rather low, below 50 percent even in the case of later retirement. Replacement rates 
for women are even lower, for about 5 percentage points. Such situation points to a 
substantial drop in welfare if one chooses to retire, as compared to the option of continued 
work. And this seems crucial – generally low replacement rates in Croatia could motivate 
many workers to work longer. This is surely not a kind of motivation that one would 
wish for in the pension system, but it is one of the most important factors explaining the 
increased participation of older workers in Croatia in the 2000s. 
12 It could be added that women in Croatia earn around 12 percent less than men on average (Nestić, 2007), 
which additionally contributes to their lower pension benefits.  
96
It should be stressed that the benefit calculations from Table 5.2 and 5.3 do not include 
permanent pension supplements that are given to all pensioners retired after 1998. For 
example, for those retired in 2008, the supplement reaches 25.9 percent of the regular 
pension benefit. Although enacted in 2007, the full implementation of the pension 
supplement is expected during 2008. However, the supplement is not included in our 
calculations as to better illustrate the situation in the last several years.13
However, it is questionable whether workers are aware of the results presented in such 
calculations. Usually, they are not familiar with detailed results, but with some general 
facts – such as the currently low net replacement rate and its declining trend over the last 
15 years as well as the possible continuation of such a trend.
To conclude, we see that a low replacement rate in Croatia could be an important factor 
for keeping older population in work longer than before, or alternatively, for choosing 
some combination of work and retirement, sometimes unregistered.
5.4  Policy recommendations
In spite of unfavourable demographic trends and problems with the sustainability of 
the public pension system in Croatia, we do not see that policy-makers recognise the 
importance of increased labour market participation of older workers as a part of solution 
to such challenges ahead. Although some initial steps in that direction are taken within the 
National Action Plan for Employment (NAPE), the proposed actions aimed at promoting 
active ageing and longer working lives are not yet enacted or implemented. The pension 
system is not entirely oriented towards motivating older workers to stay longer at work 
since it currently creates incentives to retire late in parallel with incentives to retire early. 
Strategic decision should be made to integrate incentives for later retirement in the 
pension system, but also in the overall welfare system. 
Policy incentives for extending working life related to the design of the pension system 
should be introduced on both the employers (labour demand) and employees (labour 
supply) side.
Measures addressing employers include the creation and introduction of incentives for 
employers to retain senior workers above the regular retirement age, possibly in the form 
of decreased pension insurance contributions. However, in designing such measures, 
13 The supplement could substantially influence individual position of those retired after 1998. For example, in 
2008, the individual net replacement rate in the case of the old-age retirement for a person with 40 years of 
service and life-time earnings equal to the national average earnings will reach 54.3 percent, instead of 43.1 
percent, as calculated in Table 5.2. Those with earnings well below the average will continue to receive pensions 
at the level of the minimum pension, because the minimum wage remained unchanged by the introduction of 
the pension supplement. Although pension supplement will increase replacement rates for those with higher 
wages, it will not substantially change our major findings.
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one should be careful that other cohorts are not squeezed out by the retention or 
reemployment of older workers, which might be important in the current situation of a 
relatively high unemployment rate. Currently, employers in the unincorporated sector 
enjoy tax relieves for reemploying pensioners. A careful study of the effects of this 
measure could provide some answers regarding the costs and effectiveness of the 
measure in Croatia. The other caveat is related to the public sector employers, where 
the decision on retaining older workers is often motivated by factors other than gains in 
productivity and output. The creation of appropriate incentives for employers in the public 
sector is important in order to prevent an unfair preference towards insiders in the case 
of their poor productivity. 
Several measures addressing older workers could be proposed to increase their 
willingness to work longer under the general principle that the decision to stay at work 
or retire should be taken solely by workers. The system should encourage rather than 
enforce workers to prolong their working life.
The financial premium for longer employment could be effectively coupled by an 
adequate penalisation for early retirement. It seems that a higher retirement age can 
be attained through higher benefits for those who put off their retirement and through 
a higher decrement, as illustrated in the case of Belgium by Maes (2008). The recent 
decline in annual decrement for early retirement in Croatia is a step in the wrong direction 
and it did not contribute to increasing the participation of older workers.
In Croatia, one could also think of additional rewards for delayed retirement for those 
with smaller salaries since their current motivation for working longer is the weakest, 
as shown in our calculations for the current benefits. One option could be to introduce 
some sort of means-tested income supports for workers in pre-retirement age aimed 
at increasing the income of the poorest older workers, which could then weaken their 
incentives for early retirement. Narazani and Shima (2008) present simulations showing 
the possible positive labour supply effect of such a measure in Austria. 
Finally, it is worth to consider changes in the pension system that should result in 
actuarially neutral pension benefits, where the present value of all future pension benefits 
is invariant on the choice of the retirement age. Such a system produces an adequate 
pension premium for those who opt to work longer. 
Another option is to promote a gradual retirement or a gradual decrease of work intensity 
for older workers. Gradual retirement takes place when a person reduces his or her 
working hours at the later stage of the working career and at the same time receives 
both earnings and pension (either partial or full pension). However, such options might 
become a pathway to early retirement if incentives for postponing retirement are not 
carefully designed.  
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5.5  Conclusions
This chapter addressed the relationship between the pension system in Croatia and the 
incentives it provides to older workers for staying in employment. We argued that the 1999 
pension reform, with its tightened retirement conditions, resulted in an increased age of 
new pensioners and strongly contributed to the recent rise in employment rates for older 
workers. We provided an analysis of the pension system reform, reviewed labour and tax 
regulations related to retirement and performed the simulations of pension benefits in 
various cases to support the argument.
The pension system reform has had a substantial effect on the major parameters of 
the pension system – retirement age, pension expenditures, system dependency ratio 
and the net replacement rate. An increased official minimum retirement age and more 
strict retirement conditions lead to retirement at a later age. The Croatian labour and tax 
legislation provides relatively favourable conditions for continued employment, at least 
in the private sector. There is a substantial flexibility regarding the retirement age and an 
open possibility to work in parallel with receiving the pension benefit. Although this option 
is related only to certain forms of work, conditions are not too restrictive. The favourable 
tax treatment of pensioners might encourage people to combine work and retirement. It 
also might encourage their early retirement. The calculation of current pension benefits 
shows that the years of service contribute most to the amount of pension benefit. Since 
women retire earlier than men, they receive lower pensions. Net replacement rates in 
Croatia are relatively low and they decline with earnings because the application of 
minimum pension results in proportionally higher replacement rates for low-income 
workers than to higher income ones. As for incentives the benefit structure provides to 
older workers, the results are mixed. On the one hand, there is an incentive to retire late 
since replacement rates are low and highly dependent on the years of service. On the 
other hand, there is an incentive to retire early for low-income workers who benefit from 
the minimum wage. Also, those who plan to work after retirement, often unregistered, 
could find their pension benefit too low in all possible cases of retirement (early, regular, 
later). Consequently, they may not be motivated to stay in regular employment after 
becoming entitled to early retirement.
At the policy level, we propose that incentives for later retirement should be consistently 
integrated in the pension system, but also in the overall welfare system. The higher 
labour participation of older workers could be beneficial for their welfare position and 
self-esteem, as well as for the economy as a whole. In any case, we believe that work/
retirement decisions should be made by workers themselves. Their decision when to 
retire should be based on transparent and reliable rules set by authorities, where workers 
bear the welfare consequence of such a decision.
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Chapter 6   |   Polona Domadenik, Tjaša Redek and Irena Ograjenšek
The employment prospects of the ageing 
population: Evidence from Slovenia
6.1  Introduction
Throughout the past decades, and recently at an accelerating pace, the declining 
fertility of baby-boom cohorts has significantly transformed the composition of European 
societies. Demographic change, associated with a pronounced decline in fertility rate and 
a simultaneous rise in life expectancy, induces long-term challenges for policy makers 
regarding social and employment policies.1 The most direct and easily observable 
impact of population ageing is on national pension systems and their financing. The 
prevailing pay-as-you-go system of social security has come under pressure due to 
defined benefits and a rising old-age dependency ratio. Furthermore, it is clear that the 
whole spectrum of social security systems (not only old-age security, but also the public 
health care system) has been affected by these developments.2 
The discussion of population ageing usually overlooks a series of important consequences 
on the labour demand and supply. After all, an ageing society tends to imply a decline in 
the relative labour supply of younger population that enters the labour market later due 
to prolonged education, but with significantly higher educational attainment. Moreover, 
since school-leaving age and the age of retirement are not fixed anymore, ageing might 
affect the level and composition of the labour force in a much more intricate way than it 
is often recognised. In European countries, these issues need to be discussed within the 
framework of imperfectly competitive labour markets, shifting the attention from wages 
to employment and unemployment rates. Furthermore, underdeveloped labour market 
institutions might significantly slow down the firms’ adjustment to new demographic 
conditions and therefore influence the wealth and long-term growth of the whole 
economy (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001).3 Numerous 
negative effects of a rigid labour market regulation, which is characterised by difficulties 
in the hiring and firing of workers, as well as the working time regulation and high costs 
1 However, there is some heterogeneity regarding the precise timing within the EU countries. According to the 
World Bank projections, Germany will soon have the highest share of older people among all industrialised 
countries (the proportion of the elderly relative to the labour force is projected to rise from 21 percent in 1995 to 
36 percent in 2035). Italy, Spain and Greece follow this path (Fertig and Schmidt, 2003). 
2 Medical expenditures usually increase significantly with age. An increasing proportion of elderly will tend to 
generate a disproportionately strong cost push to health care. In the absence of fundamental reforms, most 
European countries finance the bulk of these expenditures through worker's wage-related contributions. 
3 Countries with more established political and economic institutions developed faster in the past and are 
richer compared to the countries whose institutions are not so well developed (Djankov, McLeish and Ramalho, 
2006).
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associated with these factors have led to intense debates over the labour market reform 
in numerous European economies.4 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debates about direct and indirect implications 
of the rigid labour market legislation on employment probabilities of older workers. It 
studies the magnitude of flows between different labour market statuses (unemployment 
to employment, inactivity to employment) and flows within the group of employed job-
seekers, linking them to the development of labour market institutions in Slovenia. The 
paper presents a model of adverse selection, in which hiring and firing costs (as the 
implicit value of a rigid labour market legislation) reduce the hiring of both unemployed and 
employed job-seekers, but where the hiring of the former is more sensitive to increases 
in turnover costs than that of the latter. The model provides a theoretical foundation for 
testing whether an implicit discrimination against the particular population cohort exists.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 6.2 presents a theoretical framework and the 
estimating equation. Section 6.3 discusses the evolution of labour market institutions in 
Slovenia during transition. Section 6.4 gives a data description and definitions of variables 
while Section 6.5 discusses the results, followed by some concluding remarks.
6.2  Population ageing and labour markets 
In the economic literature, population ageing is first and foremost related to (i) a decline 
of the labour supply of younger relative to that of the older workers and (ii) an increase 
of the old-age dependency ratio. While the first effect exerts important implications for 
the social security system, there are also consequences related to different behavioural 
responses of individuals regarding human capital acquisition, organisation of work, wage 
structure and the level of employment. The alteration of the population shares of workers 
and retirees also holds direct and sizeable implications for aggregate labour productivity, 
depending on capital accumulation (Börsch-Supan, 2003).5 
Population and labour force ageing are usually highly correlated. If we assume that each 
birth cohort is a different factor of production, we can model its decisions on human 
capital acquisitions and the labour market entry during the natural life cycle. Younger 
4 Inflexible labour markets thus stifle new job creation but even more importantly, they also push workers into the 
informal sector. According to World Bank surveys, three quarters of informal workers are women. They receive 
no social security benefits, no sick leave or pensions. If abused by their employer, they have no recourse to 
courts. Far from protecting the vulnerable, a rigid employment regulation excludes them from the market (World 
Bank, 2006).
5 When relatively few workers contribute to the economic activity of a large, mature population, per capita 
income will be relatively low, if higher capital accumulation does not compensate for labour scarcity. Since the 
number of active workers is low, the level of wages will tend to be high (see, for example, Wright, 1991, for the 
UK and Dahlberg and Nahum, 2003, for Sweden). Consequently, ageing is a phenomenon driving a wedge 
between the wage and per capita income. 
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cohorts tend to invest in human capital and enter the labour market later compared to 
the situation 20 years ago, while medium-age cohorts focus on household and labour 
market production. At some point, they leave the labour market. Smaller birth cohorts 
will tend to experience generational crowding throughout their lives, unless a high-fertility 
rate period or the large-scale immigration of a subsequent birth cohort counteracts 
these implications6 (Fertig and Schmidt, 2003). Therefore, we can distinguish workers of 
different age as different factors of production, where age and a relative size are the most 
important characteristics. Workers at different ages are obviously imperfect substitutes 
in production. Changes in a relative cohort size of an age group directly translate in the 
shifts of relative labour supply of these different factors of production. Large birth cohorts 
lead to a relatively abundant labour supply when they enter any age cohort. Currently, the 
production factor “medium-aged workers” is relatively abundant all across Europe, due to 
the widely experienced post-war baby boom.
6.2.1  Labour market regulation
Employment regulations are motivated by an assumption that free labour markets are 
imperfect and might cause a creation of rents in the employment relationship. In order to 
extract these rents, employers are motivated to abuse workers, leading to both unfairness 
and inefficiency in the labour market (Stigler, 1971; Becker and Mulligan, 2003). In 
response to the perceived unfairness and inefficiency of the free market employment 
relationship, nearly every state intervenes to protect workers. The regulations dealing 
with the issues that range from a mandatory minimum wage to premiums for overtime 
work and from grounds for dismissal to severance pay have been introduced to remedy 
at least the most apparent market failures. These range from the inability to diversify the 
risk of unemployment to discrimination based on gender, race or age. Social security 
regulation was created to protect against the risk of unemployment or sickness and, 
through pensions, against the risk of poverty in old age, while a regulatory framework 
was created to protect against discrimination. 
But despite the obvious benefits of such an intervention of the state in the labour market, 
there are also several drawbacks to it; and the intervention itself, although aimed well, 
might actually cause the exact opposite effect of that desired. Several negative side 
effects of a well-intentioned labour regulation have been identified, from less intense 
job creation to even more obvious discrimination. First, with a rigid regulation employers 
choose conservatively. Some groups of workers benefit from a rigid regulation; data 
show that it is mostly men with several years of working experience (Botero et al., 
2004). Young workers, female workers and low-skilled workers, on the other hand, often 
6 The relatively small subsequent baby bust generation is now around their thirties. Due to distinct and well-
researched life-cycle patterns of labour market activity and success, the focus of empirical labour studies has 
been on age relating heterogeneity of relevant outcomes. 
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lose out, being denied job opportunities. Rigid employment regulations often end up 
protecting the existing jobs at the expense of workers in general and do not help in 
the process of job creation or toward reducing unemployment. Second, high severance 
payments are usually adopted with a view to reducing the risk of unemployment but, 
again, the beneficiaries are people who already have jobs. Meanwhile, the high cost 
forces employers to cut back on new hiring. As a result, very few new jobs are created. 
Far from diversifying risks and being beneficial to the economy at large, such policies 
reduce the odds of finding a job and decrease the dynamics in the economy.7 
6.2.2  Theoretical framework
The model we present in this paper is based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and 
upgraded by Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) and Domadenik (2007) where, on the one 
hand, the latter have simplified some aspects to preserve the analytical tractability and, 
on the other hand, they have introduced dismissal costs and imperfect observability 
of worker quality in order to capture the underdeveloped institutional structure and 
imperfect competition in the labour market discussed in the previous section. In the 
asymmetric information model, firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, 
low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Therefore, 
the proportion of low quality workers is greater among the unemployed than among the 
employed, and prospective employers know it.
The total labour force is normalised to one and split between two types of workers: 
“good” and “bad”. The proportion of workers who are “good” is denoted by z. Prior to 
hiring, firms do not observe the quality of applicants, nor do they observe their labour 
history. The only thing they observe is whether the applicant is currently employed or 
not. Immediately after hiring, however, firms observe the productivity of a worker as either 
“high” or “low”. Workers are matched to firms and together they produce output. This 
matching process takes time. A job-seeker meets a vacant job with some probability 
while a position meets a worker with a given probability. Firms freely enter the market 
by creating vacant positions. There is a fixed setup cost of creating a position equal to 
C. Because of free entry, the value of an empty position must always be equal to C in 
equilibrium. Once a position is filled, production takes place. Production takes place until 
either the firm decides to close the position or the worker quits voluntarily. When hit by a 
shock, firms may decide to fire the worker, in which case they have to pay a tax F. This tax 
is dissipated, i.e. paid to a third party. When a firm decides to fire, the position is closed 
7 This is especially problematic in the globalisation era. This is stated by Bolaky and Freund (2004) who report 
that a flexible employment regulation also increases the benefits of trade liberalisation. As the economy opens, 
competition from the now cheaper imports drives jobs away from less productive to more productive ones, 
expanding the economy. But this happens only if workers have the ability to move. Where barriers to hiring and 
firing are high, labour stays in unproductive sectors. This results in less jobs and a loss of competitiveness.
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and the firm’s value drops to zero. Moreover, production may also end when workers 
quit voluntarily. A fraction π of workers is constantly looking for another job. The day they 
leave to take another job, the position becomes vacant and its value falls back to C. In 
addition, in case of voluntary quits firms do not have to pay the tax F. 
Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) showed that bad workers are fired more often than good 
workers. Thus the pool of the unemployed is composed of a disproportionate number 
of “lemons”. For this reason, at the time of hiring firms use the employment status as a 
signal of quality and are more reluctant to hire unemployed than employed job-seekers. 
Moreover, they showed that increases in hiring and firing costs exacerbate discrimination 
against the unemployed, while large enough reductions of hiring and firing costs might 
eliminate discrimination against unemployed workers completely.8 In contrast, when 
hiring and firing costs are high, firms are reluctant to hire unemployed workers who are 
more likely to turn out to be “lemons” and, consequently, might have to be fired when a 
firm is hit by a shock. However, the impact of hiring and firing costs on the discrimination 
of the unemployed clashes with the impact of wages on discrimination.
In order to operationalise the model, a reduced form specification is presented. In the 
discrete choice model, the dependent variable y takes the value of 1 if the person was 
successful in finding a job within a given time interval and the value of 0 otherwise. 
Generally, success in finding a job depends on the contract rate, offer rate and 
acceptance rate (which is simply equal to 1 in the model9). According to the model, what 
generates differences in job finding rates between the two groups is the difference in 
offer probabilities between the two groups. If we take J(m, η) to be the value to the firm 
of a job with worker-specific productivity η and firm-specific productivity m, we might 
assume that firms extend a job offer if the expected profits (J) of hiring an applicant are 
greater than or equal to the hiring cost, and they do not make a job offer if the expected 
profits fall below the hiring cost, or:
y=1 if                  (1)
or 0 otherwise.
Letting EJs − C be a continuous random variable, it can be expressed as a linear function 
of a vector of explanatory variables, X, and an indicator of whether the job applicant is 
unemployed, U, and a random term, ε:
8 The reason for this lies in the fact that if hiring and firing costs are nil, firms can always hire workers to sample 
their quality and fire them at no cost.
9 If a person applies for a job, he/she is always accepted. In reality there are also differences in the contract and 
acceptance rates between unemployed workers and employed job-seekers that must be taken into account. 
In an empirical analysis, these differences are partly controlled by a number of variables that control for the 
contract and acceptance rate.
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                (2)
From (1) and (2) we can derive the following:
y = 1 if                 (3)
or 0 if  
Thus, if g is assumed to be normally distributed, the probability of finding a job is:
 
                        (4)
The vector of X includes individual characteristics affecting the contract rate, the offer 
rate and the acceptance rate of workers, including age, education, occupation, industry, 
union status, tenure, gender, race, marital status, number of children, wage (the wage in 
the current job for employed job-seekers and the wage in the last job for the unemployed) 
and other income of the household. In addition, the local unemployment rate and gross 
domestic product are both included because they should affect the contract rate.
The unemployment dummy is included because the model above tells us that employment 
status should affect the expected profits out of a new hire and, thus, the offer rate. In 
addition, employment status may also affect the contract rate if the unemployed can search 
more intensively for jobs than employed job-seekers and it may affect the acceptance rate 
if the unemployed have different reservation wages from employed workers. However, as 
we are interested in employment probabilities of older workers we divided the sample into 
three broad groups: younger than 29 years, prime-age population (30-49) and older than 
50 years. We control for gender, labour market status prior to the current employment, 
education and personal status (single vs. married). Due to the fact that official labour 
force surveys in Slovenia do not include regions, wages or the number of children of 
individuals in the survey, we were not able to control for the number of children, wages 
or several acceptance and contract rate characteristics (local unemployment rate, gross 
domestic product in the region, industry, and union status membership.
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6.3  Labour market transition in Slovenia 
Slovenia’s economy proved itself capable of a fast output turnaround10 in the first phase 
of transition, but this has not led to a significant employment growth. The labour force 
declined 2 percent during the first 6 years of transition (1992-1997), while employment 
declined 5 percent although real output increased 21 percent. For the 1992-2002 decade 
as a whole, employment and the labour force remained practically flat, while real output 
increased 48 percent, reflecting significant productivity gains (Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 2008).
The unemployment rate remained relatively low and on a declining trend during transition 
mostly due to the choice of Slovenia’s privatisation model, which maintained the status quo 
and avoided massive layoffs. Thanks to substantial state subsidies to loss-making firms 
in the textile, leather and many other industries policy-makers avoided social tensions. 
From 1993 to 2002, the ILO unemployment rate fell by about one-third to 6.3 percent. 
Such unemployment levels are low in comparison with other transition economies and 
lower than those in a number of EU member states (Riboud, Sanchez-Paramo and Silva-
Jauregui, 2002). The low overall unemployment rate hides large regional disparities, 
with unemployment remaining highly concentrated among unskilled and older workers. 
Moreover, the average duration of unemployment has increased, suggesting that the 
bulk of unemployment is structural. As Slovenia became a full member of the EU, many 
firms in loss-making industries (generally, labour intensive industries) face big problems 
how to survive without state subsidies. 
The bulk of adjustment occurred in the early 1990s and by 2001, when transition was 
almost over, the picture was relatively favourable. Both employment and wages started 
to rise, unemployment was on a steady decline, with a turnaround occurring in 1993-
1995. In 2001, total employment and the labour force exceeded the 1991 levels. But the 
structure of employment changed significantly. First, the employment shares of young 
and older workers declined. The share of employed workers under 30 decreased from 
more than 32 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 2001, and the share of employed workers 
over 50 decreased from more than 12 percent to below 10 percent in the same period 
(Vodopivec, 2004). Many older workers retired in the early 1990s, some under pressure 
and with the encouragement of government-sponsored early retirement programmes. A 
trend of the falling share of older workers was reversed in 1998 by the pension reform, 
which introduced a gradual increase in the retirement age, and several programmes of 
10 Since 1993, Slovenia has maintained a robust growth rate of about 4 percent a year on average, substantially 
narrowing the income gap with the European Union in 2006 (GDP per capita amounted to almost 82 percent of 
the average EU-26 GDP per capita). Much of this economic performance has come through gains in productivity 
as employment remained more or less constant during this period. Slovenia also managed to gradually bring 
inflation down to 8.6 percent already by the end of 1995. Inflation continued to ease and declined significantly 
(to 2.8 percent in 2006) in order to accomplish the Maastricht criteria and enter the euro-zone in 2007 as the 
first among all transition economies.
108
active labour market policies.11 If we look at unemployment by educational attainment in 
all age cohorts, we can observe a downward trend for those without elementary school 
education who were probably included in the non-active cohort. More than 25 percent 
of the registered jobless in 2003 had some sort of secondary education and their share 
increased slightly during the transition period. In the case of the youth cohort, the share 
of the jobless with secondary education prevails and already in 2003 it represented more 
than 35 percent (Employment Service of Slovenia).
The number of workers in the labour force fell in the early 1990s and again in the late 
1990s. Because of strong growth in the interval, however, in 2001 the labour force 
exceeded its 1991 level by 2.7 percent. Despite this growth, the labour force participation 
rate declined, reflecting strong flows of the working-age population into non-participation. 
In 2001, the labour force participation rate stood at 58 percent, which is relatively low by 
international standards (2.6 percentage points below that of a group of six industrialised 
Western European countries (Eurostat, 2008)).
6.4  Description of data and variables 
The data used in the analysis originate from the Labour Force Surveys conducted 
in Slovenia by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. These surveys are 
representative of the underlying population and follow similar ILO definitions to detect the 
labour market status. The data are elicited quarterly on a sample of over 60,000 individuals. 
The sub-sample consists of individuals who either changed their labour market status 
(switching from inactivity to employment or from unemployment to employment) or their 
employers (switching from employment to employment). Due to a specific organisation of 
labour market survey we are able to trace individuals – switchers – only on the basis of 
consecutive years. Therefore, we have 1199 switchers in 1999, 767 in 2000, 803 in 2001 
and 815 in 2002.
The estimates are based on the fourth quarter of annual data in the period of 1999-
2002. These years are interesting as the earliest year spots transitional labour markets 
in the middle of the decade when transition was still under way, while the latest year is 
representative of advanced phase of economic transition. In 1998, Slovenia introduced 
a special incentive scheme to increase employment of older workers as part of its active 
labour market policy (ALMP). Therefore we will be able to see whether there are any 
results from the ALMP.
11 Measures included educational and training programmes, programmes of personal growth, public works, 
encouraging self-employment and the measure of reimbursing the employer's contribution in the case of 
employing persons older than 50 who are receiving unemployment or social benefits. 
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Table 6.1 provides a basic descriptive statistics for individuals included in the Slovene 
Labour Force study for the year 2002.12 In the four surveys carried out in Slovenia in 
2002, 66,143 individuals were interviewed, of whom 52.2 percent were women. Almost 
56 percent of individuals in the whole sample were participating in the labour market, 
while almost 14 percent were in education. Some 1.3 percent of the sampled population 
were self-employed, 8.3 percent were unemployed, while the rest were employed on a 
permanent (40.6) or temporary (4.8) basis. Women had a higher non-participation rate 
than men, with fewer women permanently employed or self-employed. 
Table 6.1: Sample population (15-64) by gender, citizenship and labour market status,
 2002, in percent
Men Women Total
Students 13.91 13.68 13.79
Other inactive 25.74 36.25 31.22
Unemployed 8.68 7.94 8.29
Permanently employed 44.81 36.74 40.6
Temporarily employed 4.82 4.75 4.78
Self-employed 2.05 0.65 1.32
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS data.
About 10 percent of the employees (when comparing the relative share of permanently 
and temporarily employed workers in Table 6.1) are employed on a temporary basis, which 
is quite high compared to the EU average. Comparing labour market statuses by level of 
education attained we see that the highest non-participation rate is that of individuals with 
no education (without any or with incomplete compulsory education) or with compulsory 
education only. Similarly, the unemployment rate is the highest for those two groups and 
it falls when moving to groups of individuals with higher education.13 A much lower than 
average unemployment rate is found among persons holding a bachelor’s or university 
degree, suggesting that education is an important variable in predicting the probability of 
being active or employed in the labour market. 
Research on the labour market participation of people follows the assumption that 
their labour market status is mutually exclusive. According to their answers to similar 
12 Summary statistics are very similar from a year to year. Other tables can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.
13 Interestingly, the only exemption is the group with a four-year bachelor’s degree, where unemployment is 
higher than in the group with a three-year bachelor’s degree. One possible reason lies in the fact that this 
academic qualification has been introduced in the education system recently (the first graduates entered the 
labour market in 2000) and hence, the group consists mostly of first-time job-seekers.
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questions in the surveys, respondents have been grouped into one of three homogeneous 
statuses: 
Inactivity• , including those still undergoing compulsory schooling, vocational 
schooling, apprenticeship, academic or university education as well as those 
holding domestic unpaid jobs, being on maternity leave, undergoing military service 
or involved in other activities;
Unemployment• , including those who are jobless, but actively seeking a job; 
Employment• , including those holding permanent or temporary paid jobs or the self-
employed.
The switchers are identified as the individuals who successfully or unsuccessfully switched 
between different labour market statuses in a given year (inactivity to employment, 
unemployment to employment) or moved successfully from one employer to another. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to detect the individuals who had the intention to move 
but failed to do so for various reasons. From the sample of individuals older than 15 but 
younger than 65, we eliminated students and workers employed in agriculture.  
Table 6.2: Proportion of particular groups in switchers and sample population, 2002,
 in percent
Variables Switchers Full sample
Individuals with primary education 9.44 25.27
Individuals with secondary education 69.44 56.93
Individuals with tertiary  education 20.36 12.89
Individuals older than 15 but younger than 29 59.87 27.47
Individuals older than 30 but younger than 49 19.50 14.05
Individuals older than 50 5.76 38.61
Unemployed receiving unemployment benefits among all unemployed 33.92 27.26
Unemployed 38.40 51.11
Married 36.81 60.21
Male 52.88 48.78
Number of observations 815 17833
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS data.
If we compare the sub-sample of switchers to the complete labour force survey sample 
for the year 200214, we can observe some differences. Among all switchers, 69 percent 
had secondary and 20 percent tertiary education while the representation of individuals 
with such an education level in all sample is 21 percentage points lower. Obviously, 
14 Differences are very similar from a year to year. Other tables can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.
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prime age single men (15-29) are more likely to belong to the group of actual or potential 
switchers.
6.5  Results
Based on Equation 4 we run probit in order to predict the probability that an individual 
would switch his/her labour market status based on individual characteristics. The 
summary statistics of those characteristics are presented in Table 6.2. Unfortunately, due 
to data limitations, we cannot check for firm level characteristics. The control group of 
people is represented by single inactive prime-age women (30-49) who attained primary 
education. 
Based on annual estimations presented in Table 6.3, we can see that the level of attained 
education did not affect the individual probability of switching different labour market 
statuses (inactivity or unemployment) to employment or from one type of employment to 
another. However, in 2002, individuals with a higher education level were more likely to 
switch into employment, indicating that education gained a signalling effect and people 
with higher education were more likely to be employed than people with lower educational 
attainment. Interestingly, among the group of job-seekers older than 50 years, education 
played even a smaller role. However, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of education 
from the size of sub-population. The results in this age cohort might be driven by the fact 
that there are only few older people with higher education seeking for a new job.
 
People younger than 30 years were more likely to switch their labour market status 
compared with their older counterparts. There is no significant difference in switching 
among individuals regarding gender or marital status. The results also show that the least 
motivated group of switchers might be that of unemployed people. Significantly lower 
probabilities to switch from inactivity to employment, or from one employment to other, 
were reported in 2000 and 2002. These results are probably driven by relatively generous 
unemployment benefits that de-stimulated the unemployed to search for employment. 
Obviously, the government’s social benefit system acts in a rather perverted fashion. 
Instead of helping people in their difficulties over a short period of unemployment, state 
unemployment benefits motivate them to remain unemployed as long as possible.15 
15 As described by Vodopivec (2004), Slovenia had one of the most generous passive labour market policies 
among all transition countries in that period. Although the system has been reformed to a degree, it is very 
comparable to the system adopted by developed EU countries. Unemployed workers in Slovenia may apply for 
unemployment benefits that range from a 3-month pay for workers with few years of service to a 24-month pay 
for workers with longer service and older workers. The replacement rate in the period under study (1997-2002) 
was 70 percent in the first three months and dropped to 60 percent thereafter. In most other transition countries, 
the potential duration of eligibility is between 6 and 12 months. In the 1990s, the generosity of unemployment 
benefits index (defined as a product of the replacement rate and the share of compensated unemployed among 
all unemployed) standing at 21.8 in Slovenia was the highest among all transition countries, or well above the 
CEEC average of 12.7. (Vodopivec, 2004).
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Older workers exhibit lower probability to switch from inactivity to employment or from one 
employment to another. In 2000, individuals older than 50 years exhibited significantly 
lower probability to switch. The negative trend was evident also later. We might assume 
that the governmental ALMP programmes targeting higher employability of older people 
were not successful.16 This conclusion might also be confirmed by the result that older 
job-seekers who are unemployed are even more discriminated by potential employers 
than the average individual in this age cohort.
Table 6.3: Probability of switching labour market statuses to employment
Independent variables 1999 2000 2001 2002
Secondary education
-0.127
(0.127)
0.094
(0.258)
0.162
(0.159)
0.219
(0.174)
University education
0.138
(0.165)
0.204
(0.352)
0.159
(0.194)
0.672**
(0.219)
Age: 15-29
0.600***
(0.106)
-0.514*
(0.264)
0.434***
(0.128)
0.307**
(0.139)
Age: 50 and more
-0.048
(0.595)
-1.041**
(0.334)
-0.067
(0.534)
-0.425
(0.663)
Unemployed
0.362
(0.242)
-0.919***
(0.178)
0.257*
(0.135)
-0.878***
(0.195)
Male
0.054
(0.088)
0.165
(0.184)
0.138
(0.104)
0.154
(0.113)
Married
-0.132
(0.105)
0.029
(0.231)
0.072
(0.129)
-0.114
(0.137)
Men, older than 50 years
0.383
(0.519)
–
-0.159
(0.442)
0.033
(0.475)
Secondary education & older than 50 years
0.006
(0.482)
–
0.517
(0.555)
0.692
(0.612)
University  education & older than 50 years
-0.545
(0.562)
–
-0.029
(0.584)
0.637
(0.808)
Unemployed & older than 50 years
-0.805**
(0.652)
–
-0.494
(0.546)
-0.719
(0.633)
Number of observations 1199 767 803 815
Pseudo-R2 0.059 0.148 0.030 0.070
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In 2000 we were not able to control for individual 
characteristics of older cohort due to disproportions in sub-samples. *, ** and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
6.6  Conclusion
Employment policies are usually used when labour market institutions are not completely 
developed and are often targeted at some specific demographic groups, particularly those 
facing more difficulties in finding jobs (youth, female, long–term unemployed, older). In 
the case of older workers, we have to disentangle between two groups: those who are not 
16 For assessing the impact of ALMP on the employment probability of older workers, one would also need to 
run the same regression on data prior the ALMP was implemented.
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yet entitled to pension benefits and those who are already retired. It is important to place 
such an incentive system which would stimulate an active participation of both groups of 
older people in the labour market. Our paper studies the active participation of the first 
group. However, we have to be aware that especially the second group of older cohort 
faces a range of work disincentives and barriers to employment. One of the important 
issues is related to the penalties in the pension system and social policies for carrying 
on working in old-age pensions. Those penalties arise from the assumption that younger 
and older workers are substitutes, so by retiring older employees the employment rate of 
younger cohort would be higher. However, empirical studies show that older employees 
are rather complements than substitutes to younger employees and the effect created 
by early retirement schemes and other incentives for older people to become inactive 
was completely the opposite. On the other hand, employers are often reluctant to hire 
older workers and retain them in their jobs for variety of reasons. The challenging task of 
lowering these barriers and disincentives to work in order to attract older workers for (at 
least part-time) jobs is the issue for the next decade. 
The paper finds out that high dismissal costs, created mostly by the adverse selection 
model and rigid legislation, introduce certain distortions on the labour market that are 
not similar for all the groups of potential or current employees. The highest probability 
of switching from unemployment or inactivity to employment, or from one employer to 
another, is detected among the young age population (15-29 years old), while in 2002, the 
probability of switching increases substantially for individuals with tertiary education. Older 
people, especially those unemployed, are evidently discriminated against by potential 
employers. These results may indicate that state subsidies and other governmental 
programs introduced within the ALMP programmes were not able to reduce the effect of 
suboptimal institutional structure on the labour market. However, we need to incorporate 
a longer data set to confirm it.
The second important conclusion is that there is also evidence of self-discrimination by 
the unemployed who are entitled to participate in unemployment benefits schemes. Such 
people are obviously not motivated to actively look for a job. Slovenia will have to remodel 
financial incentives to get the unemployed back to work (Boone and van Ours, 2006). 
Several studies show that a deterioration of the embodied human capital is positively 
linked with the spell of unemployment. An inefficient benefits system ruins the human 
capital implicitly and reduces the probability of finding employment for such people in 
the long-run.
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Chapter 7   |   Irena Ograjenšek, Maja Vehovec, Polona Domadenik and Tjaša Redek
Employer attitudes towards older workers: 
A comparative study of Croatia and Slovenia
7.1  Introduction
The interdisciplinary body of literature on labour force ageing and on the process of 
transition from working life to retirement is abundant and still growing rapidly. However, 
most studies on the specific issue of employer attitudes towards, and demand for, older 
workers cannot be found before the 1990s; and most of them deal with problems in 
developed countries, such as in the countries of Scandinavia, the USA, Australia, Great 
Britain, and Germany. For the former transition countries, this issue has only become 
important very recently. Thus, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing 
body of literature by adding empirical evidence from transition countries, which can form 
the basis for relevant policy recommendations.
Employer attitudes towards older workers are usually accounted for using survey 
methodology. In the middle of the 1990s, Taylor and Walker (1994) were among the first 
to do a complex analysis of employer attitudes and policies concerning the employment 
of older workers in Great Britain. They built on Atkinson’s (1989) work on employer 
adjustment to the demographic downturn and upgraded it using in-depth interviews with 
British employers using a mail survey. They found out that although employers expressed 
positive attitudes towards older workers, these attitudes were not translated into positive 
action: only a very small minority of employers encouraged the employment of older 
people. This was partly due to a recession marking the period under study as well as 
the age discrimination inherent to the recruitment process. The most important among 
the factors discouraging employers from recruiting older workers was the perceived lack 
of appropriate skills. In terms of industry, one interesting finding of Taylor and Walker’s 
study was that the service sector was more likely to be positively oriented towards older 
workers than manufacturing industries. 
Loretto and White (2006) followed the path of Taylor and Walker’s addressing similar 
issues in the framework of focus groups consisting of Scottish employers. Although most 
of them had a favourable perception of older workers, their practices hardly differed from 
those established by Taylor and Walker a decade ago. Recruitment decisions were still 
based on general stereotypes and prejudice. The age mix within individual organisations 
seemed to be the result of chance rather than policy. The researchers found out that in 
terms of training and return on investment, an age mix personnel policy could only gain 
in relevance if longer-career and flexible retirement schemes were an option.
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A global ageing survey was the basis for Harper et al.’s (2006) comparative research 
exploring how widespread negative attitudes towards, and stereotypes of older 
workers among employers are; and whether or not they influence employer behaviour 
towards older employees. The study indicated that attitudes towards older workers are 
significantly influenced by the firm size. Smaller firms tend to have higher levels of negative 
stereotypes while larger firms are flexible about older workers both in the workplace 
and even at the time of recruitment. Additionally, the researchers also noted differences 
stemming from different levels of country development. Less developed countries have a 
stable supply of younger workers which makes their actual and perceived need for older 
workers obsolete. However, the European countries which are facing the consequences 
of general population ageing need to retain older workers, yet paradoxically seem to 
encourage early retirement practices as well as have a lower level of recruitment of older 
people.
The size of the firm as a factor influencing employer attitudes towards older workers was 
also confirmed by Metcalf and Meadows (2006), who investigated employer policies, 
practices and preferences related to age before the implementation of the Employment 
Equality Regulations in the UK. In 2004 and 2005, they carried out a survey involving 
more than 2,000 British establishments. Another important factor Metcalf and Meadows 
established was the difference between practices in the public and private sectors; the 
public sector being more prone to recruiting and retaining older employees.
To obtain a better understanding of the employment prospects of older workers, Munnell, 
Sass and Soto (2006) conducted a survey among private sector employers in the USA. 
Employers were asked to compare the productivity of older workers with that of the younger 
ones (both groups being predominantly white collar). Perception of the productivity of 
older workers varied with the respondent age and firm size. Younger respondents in 
small, start-up organisations were more likely to view the productivity of older workers 
in a negative light. Additionally, very large firms were also less enthusiastic about older 
workers’ productivity. The researchers listed two characteristics of older workers which 
increase their productivity: “knowledge of the procedures and other job aspects” as well 
as “ability to interact with customers”. Although employers see older workers as “more 
expensive”, their overall evaluation of older workers’ relative attractiveness is equal to 
that of the younger workers. Researchers concluded that older workers, if willing, have 
reasonably good prospects for prolonging their working life.
Another recent survey study from McNair, Flynn and Dutton (2007) demonstrated how 
employers in the UK are managing an ageing workforce particularly in response to the 
introduction of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations. This qualitative study, carried 
out during a period of economic growth among seventy firms, explored in more depth 
some of the issues identified in previous research conducted by Metcalf and Meadows 
(2006). The researchers confirmed that most differences in employer practices could be 
121
attributed to firm size and ownership (private or public). Large and public firms generally 
had more equal-opportunity policies and formal processes which allowed them to more 
easily implement changes demanded by the new legislation. In general, this study found 
more positive views of older workers in comparison with the previous one. However, 
it was established that the respondent age is a major factor determining the nature of 
the employer’s attitude towards older workers. Awareness of the general population and 
labour market trends among the respondents was generally low; they seemed to be 
very much focused on catering to their short-term business needs. It was established 
that the positive practice of employee retention was much more common than the active 
recruitment of older workers. 
To summarise: given the findings from the literature review covering the last decade, 
several factors seem to determine employer preferences, practices and policies 
concerning the older workforce: firm size, ownership (public or private), period in the 
economic cycle (growth or decline), as well as sector (service or manufacturing). As it 
would seem that more positive attitudes stem from older respondents, this respondent 
bias needs to be accounted for in any subsequent research of these issues. 
In this chapter, we aim to identify employer attitudes and practices targeting the older 
workforce in Croatia and Slovenia. Specifically, our research aims to (1) explore and 
compare the attitudes of Croatian and Slovenian employers towards ageing workers, (2) 
detect major factors explaining the employment of elderly workers, (3) identify factors 
affecting employer willingness to retain older workers even after they reach their official 
retirement age, and (4) identify barriers to the continued labour market participation of 
older workers in both countries.
7.2  Project methodology
Lack of motivation to work on the part of older workers can be caused by the lack of 
demand for older workers. In order to assess employer perspectives on older workers’ 
employment, a survey on the attitudes of employers towards ageing workers was 
conducted on a sample of 216 Croatian and 200 Slovenian firms in the spring of 2008. 
The questionnaire was designed to match similar European surveys. 
In Croatia, the survey was carried out partly as a mail survey and partly as a web survey, 
performed by the external market research agency which acquired the job in the process 
of public procurement. In Slovenia, the survey was carried out partly as a mail survey and 
partly as a phone survey via a centralised facility located at the University of Ljubljana’s 
Faculty of Economics.
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In Croatia, the target population consisted of 16,894 small (excluding micro), medium 
and large firms (FINA, 2007). The targeted stratified sample of 200 units was supposed 
to include 100 small firms (with less than 50 employees), 60 medium-sized firms (from 
50 to 249 employees) and 40 large firms (with 250 employees or more). Table 7.1 shows 
the actual sample structure by firm size. The sample reflects the relative proportion of 
firms in terms of firm and employee numbers. The average Croatian respondent was 
female aged 44.5 years with a finished college or bachelor’s degree. Her average total 
length of employment was almost 21 years; the last 13.5 years were spent in the present 
employment. The average length of the sample company existence is 29.9 years.
Out of the whole population of 53,189 business entities which existed in Slovenia 
on December 31, 2007 (AJPES, 2007), we excluded all those employing less than 3 
employees. From the rest we randomly chose 1,615 units making sure to match the 
population structure by firm size in our sample. Thus, 60 percent of our targeted sample 
units were classified as small, 30 percent as medium-sized and the remaining 10 percent 
as large firms. In the small firms, the questionnaires were mainly filled in by the CEOs; in 
medium-sized and large firms the respondents were predominantly heads of the human 
resources management departments. The average Slovenian respondent was female, 
aged 42.4 years with a bachelor’s degree. Her average total length of employment was 
slightly more than 19 years; slightly more than the last 11 years were spent in the present 
employment. The average length of the sample company existence is 25.5 years.
Table 7.1: Absolute and relative frequency of sample units by firm size
Firm size
Croatia Slovenia
Frequency % Frequency %
Small (4-49 employees) 110 50.9 91 45.5
Medium (50-249 employees) 66 30.6 87 43.5
Large (250+ employees) 40 18.5 22 11.0
Total 216 100.0 200 100.0
Following from Table 7.1, approximately one half of the Croatian sample units are 
small firms. The Croatian share of large companies in the sample is also larger than 
in case of Slovenia. On average, Croatian companies included in the sample have 
been incorporated for a longer time than the Slovenian ones; the same goes for the 
average age of the respondents and the average length of their affiliation with the present 
employer – both are longer in Croatia. Additionally, in Croatia the respondent education 
structure is slightly weaker than in Slovenia (Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2: Absolute and relative frequency of sample units by respondent education
Respondent education
Croatia Slovenia
Frequency % Frequency %
Finished secondary school 82 38.0 40 20.0
Finished college 42 19.4 45 22.5
Bachelor’s degree 82 38.0 106 53.0
Master’s degree 8 3.7 8 4.0
PhD 0 0.0 1 0.5
Unknown 2 0.9 0 0.0
Total 216 100.0 200 100.0
Approximately 85 percent of the firms in both countries report that they currently employ 
at least one worker older than 50 years of age (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Absolute and relative frequency of sample units by whether or not they 
currently employ at least one person over 50 years of age
Employment of at least one 
person over 50 years of age
Croatia Slovenia
Frequency % Frequency %
No 33 15.3 28 14.0
Yes 183 84.7 170 85.0
Unknown 0 0.0 2 1.0
Total 216 100.0 200 100.0
The average proportion of employees over 50 years of age in Croatian companies is 
23.5 percent and the average proportion of employees over 50 years of age hired last 
year amounts to 3.4 percent. In Slovenia, these two proportions are even smaller: 21.5 
percent and 1.8 percent respectively.
7.3  Comparison of older and younger employee
characteristics
In Croatian and Slovenian firms, older and younger employee characteristics were 
evaluated on the following 5-point scale: 1 – significantly less than company average, 
2 – slightly less than company average, 3 – company average, 4 – slightly more than 
company average, and 5 – significantly more than company average.
The results of a direct comparison of older and younger employee characteristics as 
perceived by the Croatian and Slovenian employers are shown in Table 7.4 and reveal 
some interesting similarities and differences.
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Table 7.4: Comparison of mean values for perceived characteristics of older and younger 
employees in Croatia and Slovenia
Variable
Croatia Slovenia
Old Young Gap Old Young Gap
Initiative 3.00 3.51 -0.51 3.07 3.54 -0.47
Honesty and integrity 3.89 3.22 0.67 3.90 3.13 0.77
Motivation 3.07 3.53 -0.46 2.98 3.63 -0.65
Ambition 2.72 3.86 -1.14 2.64 4.18 -1.54
Loyalty 3.95 3.06 0.89 4.14 2.79 1.35
Willingness to cooperate 3.58 3.36 0.22 3.42 3.52 -0.10
Decision-making competence 3.56 3.00 0.56 3.55 3.10 0.45
Good health 2.76 3.82 -1.06 2.56 4.07 -1.51
Creativity 2.90 3.59 -0.69 2.92 3.79 -0.87
Professionalism 3.55 3.26 0.29 3.70 3.28 0.42
Propensity to have accidents 2.74 3.03 -0.29 2.99 3.13 -0.14
Adaptability to change 2.52 3.87 -1.35 2.52 4.07 -1.55
Physical strength 2.66 4.12 -1.46 2.54 4.04 -1.50
Attentiveness 3.89 2.94 0.95 3.99 2.81 1.18
Reliability 4.02 3.10 0.92 3.68 3.04 0.64
Adaptability to new technologies 2.49 4.07 -1.58 2.43 4.30 -1.87
Productivity 3.25 3.60 -0.35 3.05 3.61 -0.56
Willingness to work hard 3.63 3.28 0.35 3.74 3.20 0.54
Readiness to learn 2.44 3.82 -1.38 2.55 4.04 -1.49
Ability to acquire new skills and knowledge 2.40 3.96 -1.56 2.34 4.19 -1.85
As far as perceptions of employee characteristics by Croatian and Slovenian employers 
are concerned, older employees perform better than their younger counterparts (in 
comparison to the company average) when it comes to willingness to work hard, reliability, 
attentiveness, professionalism, decision-making competence, loyalty as well as honesty 
and integrity. Interestingly, propensity to have accidents is larger than the average in the 
case of younger employees, although they seem to be in much better health than older 
employees (see also Figures 7.1 and 7.2). Apart from propensity to have accidents and 
willingness to cooperate in the case of Slovenia, all other differences in mean scores for 
older and younger employees in each country are statistically significant.1 
1 Results of paired samples t-test are statistically significant at p≤0.05.
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of older and younger employee characteristics as perceived by 
Croatian employers
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of older and younger employee characteristics as perceived by 
Slovenian employers
In direct comparison, Slovenian employers seem to evaluate most characteristics of 
older employees and younger employees higher than their Croatian counterparts when 
benchmarking them against the company average (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). In the case of 
older workers, the variables motivation, ambition, willingness to cooperate, good health, 
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physical strengths, adaptability to new technologies, productivity as well as ability to 
acquire new skills and knowledge are an exception.
Figure 7.3: Comparison of older employee characteristics as perceived by Croatian and 
Slovenian employers
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of younger employee characteristics as perceived by Croatian and 
Slovenian employers
129
In the case of older workers, the differences between the two countries are especially 
prominent when it comes to loyalty, professionalism, but also propensity to have accidents 
– Slovenian employers assigned these characteristics a higher average value. The only 
prominently higher value assigned the older workers by Croatian employers is that for 
reliability – it would seem that Croatian employers perceive older workers as much 
more reliable than their Slovenian counterparts.2 Attentiveness and reliability seem to 
be the characteristics which create a comparative advantage of older versus younger 
employees in Croatia, while Slovenian employers pointed to attentiveness and loyalty. 
The largest disadvantages of older versus younger workers in both countries stem from 
a poorer evaluation of their readiness to learn, ability to acquire new skills and knowledge 
and adaptability to new technologies.
In the case of younger employees, the mean values of the following variables are distinctly 
different: honesty and integrity, loyalty, attentiveness, physical strength, reliability as 
well as willingness to work hard.3 In general, it would seem that when it comes to the 
comparison of younger and older employee characteristics to the company average, the 
perceptions of Slovenian employers are more stereotypically distinctive than those of 
their Croatian counterparts.
A direct comparison of mean scores is one possible way to analyse the differences in 
employer perceptions of older and younger workers’ characteristics. Another way is the 
use of factor analysis, which helps us to summarise information contained in a larger 
given set of variables with a smaller number of extracted components (factors). 
In our case, factor analysis was carried out as the principal components extraction 
(accounting for as much of the common variance as possible) with varimax rotation (a 
form of rotation which maximises the variance of the factor loadings and thus enables 
easier factor interpretation). 
Finally, the reliability of the resulting factors was verified by calculating Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for each extracted factor. All but one of the reliability coefficients were 
satisfactory (larger than 0.700), which means that in all but one case the correlations 
among variables defining a single factor were high as well. 
The results of factor analysis are shown in Tables 7.5 to 7.9.
2 However, in the case of older employees, it should be noted that only the differences in the mean scores for 
the  variables productivity, reliability, propensity to have accidents and good health are statistically significant at 
p≤0.05 (independent samples t-test). Additionally, the difference in the mean scores for the variable willingness 
to cooperate is statistically significant at p≤0.07.
3 When comparing characteristics of the younger employees in both countries, it should be noted that only 
the differences in the mean scores for the variables ability to acquire new skills and knowledge, readiness to 
learn, adaptability to new technologies, adaptability to change, creativity, loyalty and ambition are statistically 
significant at p≤0.05 (independent samples t-test). Additionally, the difference in the mean scores for the 
variable willingness to cooperate is statistically significant at p≤0.08.
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Table 7.5: Summary of factor analysis results
Country Employees Number of extracted factors % of explained variance
Croatia
Older 4 62.71
Younger 3 55.14
Slovenia
Older 4 60.18
Younger 5 61.22
Table 7.6: Rotated component matrix for older Croatian employees
 
Variable
 
Factor
Physical and 
mental
capabilities
1
Professional 
and moral 
qualities
2
Self-
sufficiency
3
Propensity to 
have
accidents
4
Old_Ability to acquire new skills 
and knowledge
0.704 0.119 0.187 -0.266
Old_Readiness to learn 0.685 0.192 0.198 -0.112
Old_Productivity 0.489 0.443 0.274 -0.035
Old_Adaptability to new 
technologies
0.768 0.113 0.190 0.039
Old_Physical strength 0.763 0.086 -0.044 -0.012
Old_Adaptability to change 0.783 0.188 0.192 0.003
Old_Good health 0.752 0.059 -0.085 -0.207
Old_Ambition 0.677 0.103 0.392 0.137
Old_Motivation 0.557 0.346 0.378 0.143
Old_Initiative 0.524 0.277 0.475 -0.048
Old_Willingness to work hard 0.280 0.660 0.153 -0.128
Old_Reliability 0.163 0.787 0.166 0.078
Old_Attentiveness -0.012 0.739 0.209 0.177
Old_Willingness to cooperate 0.385 0.601 0.131 -0.106
Old_Loyalty 0.029 0.759 0.161 0.034
Old_Honesty and integrity 0.136 0.795 0.026 -0.082
Old_Professionalism 0.002 0.321 0.766 -0.069
Old_Creativity 0.453 0.016 0.687 0.034
Old_Decision-making competence 0.199 0.418 0.618 -0.142
Old_Propensity to have accidents -0.129 0.029 -0.076 0.914
Reliability coefficient 0.906 0.848 0.708 -
Factor 1 in Table 7.6 could be labelled physical and mental capabilities of older workers, 
whereas factor 2 encompasses their professional and moral qualities. Factor 3 is about 
the self-sufficiency of older workers (their ability to make creative and professional 
decisions), and factor 4 (determined by a single variable) is about their propensity to 
have accidents.
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Table 7.7: Rotated component matrix for older Slovenian employees
Variable
 
Factor
Professional 
and moral
qualities
1
Physical 
capabilities 
and mental 
drive
2
Learning 
capabilities
3
Propensity to 
have
accidents
4
Old_Willingness to work hard 0.679 0.025 0.188 -0.131
Old_Reliability 0.678 0.084 -0.059 0.027
Old_Attentiveness 0.736 -0.054 0.029 0.077
Old_Professionalism 0.628 0.282 -0.095 0.167
Old_Decision-making competence 0.666 0.186 -0.094 -0.163
Old_Willingness to cooperate 0.649 0.231 0.343 0.055
Old_Loyalty 0.848 -0.057 -0.048 0.145
Old_Motivation 0.589 0.409 0.376 0.167
Old_Honesty and integrity 0.695 0.011 0.142 0.233
Old_Productivity 0.468 0.470 0.103 -0.272
Old_Physical strength -0.082 0.710 0.245 -0.109
Old_Adaptability to change -0.037 0.602 0.482 0.017
Old_Creativity 0.278 0.688 -0.030 0.195
Old_Good health -0.006 0.749 0.128 -0.195
Old_Ambition 0.175 0.617 0.307 0.255
Old_Initiative 0.412 0.627 0.010 0.319
Old_Ability to acquire new skills 
and knowledge
0.029 0.172 0.795 0.084
Old_Readiness to learn 0.076 0.189 0.847 -0.112
Old_Adaptability to new 
technologies
0.060 0.536 0.488 0.244
Old_Propensity to have accidents 0.101 0.061 0.041 0.839
Reliability coefficient 0.870 0.823 0.748 -
Although we also get a four-factor structure for older Slovenian employees, the factors are 
slightly different. The first one is a cross between professional and moral qualities as well 
as older workers’ self-sufficiency. It would seem that to Slovenian employers their older 
employees’ leadership qualities (reflected in their professional and moral qualities as well 
as their ability to make creative and professional decisions) are much more important 
than to their Croatian counterparts. 
The second factor for older Slovenian employees can be labelled physical capabilities 
and mental drive. The third one is very distinctly about learning capabilities – a dimension 
which, in the case of Croatia, is not a distinct one; it is, however, included in factor 1. Factor 
4 is again determined by a single variable and encompasses older worker’s propensity 
to have accidents (Table 7.7).
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At this point, it is impossible to say whether these differences in structure for older 
Croatian and Slovenian employees stem from differences in the process of transition, 
from differences in the industry and/or size structure, or may be the result of company-
internal factors - this is clearly an issue that needs further research.
Apart from the “standard” last factor defined by a single variable (propensity to have 
accidents), two other factors can be identified for the younger employees of Croatian 
companies: moral and leadership qualities as factor 1, and capabilities and mental drive 
as factor 2 (Table 7.8).
Table 7.8: Rotated component matrix for younger Croatian employees
Variable
 
Factor
Moral and 
leadership qualities
1
Capabilities and 
mental drive
2
Propensity to have 
accidents
3
Young_Willingness to work hard 0.615 0.332 0.039
Young_Productivity 0.483 0.481 0.054
Young_Reliability 0.715 0.210 -0.075
Young_Attentiveness 0.789 0.029 0.005
Young_Professionalism 0.572 0.213 -0.088
Young_Creativity 0.589 0.422 0.194
Young_Decision-making 
competence
0.722 0.156 0.064
Young_Willingness to cooperate 0.699 0.170 -0.070
Young_Loyalty 0.778 0.073 -0.171
Young_Motivation 0.557 0.440 0.103
Young_Honesty and integrity 0.734 0.159 0.050
Young_Ability to acquire new skills 
and knowledge
0.149 0.732 0.173
Young_Readiness to learn 0.147 0.743 0.013
Young_Adaptability to new 
technologies
0.078 0.755 -0.009
Young_Physical strength 0.236 0.556 0.113
Young_Adaptability to change 0.136 0.717 -0.133
Young_Good health 0.136 0.679 -0.149
Young_Ambition 0.308 0.645 0.149
Young_Initiative 0.493 0.550 0.092
Young_Propensity to have 
accidents
-0.094 0.056 0.940
Reliability coefficient 0.902 0.851 -
Finally, the following factors were extracted for the younger employees of Slovenian 
companies: moral and leadership qualities, physical strength and mental flexibility, 
mental drive, robustness and team qualities, and, last but not least, the propensity to 
have accidents (Table 7.9).
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Table 7.9: Rotated component matrix for younger Slovenian employees
Variable
Factor
Moral and 
leadership 
qualities
1
Physical 
strength 
and mental 
flexibility
2
Mental drive
3
Robustness 
and team 
qualities
4
Propensity 
to have 
accidents
5
Young_Attentiveness 0.672 0.199 -0.033 0.259 -0.011
Young_Professionalism 0.664 0.157 0.275 0.062 0.226
Young_Decision-making 
competence
0.395 0.039 0.114 0.500 -0.137
Young_Loyalty 0.729 -0.027 0.093 0.106 -0.019
Young_Honesty and 
integrity
0.746 0.055 0.237 0.060 -0.163
Young_Ability to acquire 
new skills and knowledge
0.110 0.820 0.127 -0.026 -0.004
Young_Readiness to learn 0.232 0.479 0.475 0.075 0.320
Young_Adaptability to new 
technologies
0.131 0.760 0.103 0.244 -0.187
Young_Physical strength 0.056 0.634 0.165 0.234 0.171
Young_Adaptability to 
change
0.003 0.559 0.294 0.413 0.098
Young_Creativity 0.084 0.378 0.667 0.213 0.049
Young_Ambition -0.062 0.388 0.678 0.003 -0.288
Young_Motivation 0.333 0.067 0.638 0.385 -0.033
Young_Initiative 0.315 0.069 0.712 0.180 -0.012
Young_Willingness to work 
hard
0.522 0.072 0.196 0.527 0.149
Young_Productivity 0.232 0.371 0.173 0.591 -0.071
Young_Reliability 0.398 0.132 0.023 0.573 0.011
Young_Good health -0.235 0.331 0.188 0.588 0.025
Young_Willingness to 
cooperate
0.259 0.069 0.437 0.572 0.159
Young_Propensity to have 
accidents
-0.044 0.028 -0.066 0.006 0.905
Reliability coefficient 0.757 0.785 0.759 0.342* -
Note: *With the exclusion of the variable good health the value of the reliability coefficient goes up to 0.765.
As far as moral and leadership qualities as well as the propensity to have accidents of 
younger employees are concerned, we were very pleased to establish some similarities 
in extracted factors. However, the structure between the first and the last extracted factor 
is much more detailed in the case of Slovenian companies, again probably stemming 
from differences in the current development level of both countries.
Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that propensity to have accidents seems to be 
the least important factor and, at the same time, also the least important of all twenty 
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employee characteristics that our respondents were presented with when benchmarking 
older and younger employees against the company average. 
When comparing the extracted factors for older and younger employees in both countries, 
we can conclude that Slovenian employers seem to be much more specific and demanding 
in their evaluations of employee characteristics than their Croatian counterparts. This 
might be a result of the slightly higher Slovenian respondent education level and/or the 
more developed post-transitional industry and industrial relations in Slovenia, which 
would be interesting to monitor and compare in a longitudinal study.
7.4  Employment and retention of older workers
At the beginning of this chapter, we listed factors which seem to determine employer 
preferences, practices and policies concerning the older workforce: firm size, ownership 
(public or private), phase in the economic cycle (growth or decline), as well as sector 
(service or manufacturing). It was also established in the literature review that more 
positive attitudes towards older employees stem from older respondents.
In our empirical research, we attempted to account for the firm size (measured by the 
number of employees), respondent age, respondent education and length of firm’s 
existence. Using contingency analysis,4 we strived to verify the following hypotheses:
H1:  Present proportion of employees aged 50 to 64 is related to the firm size.
H2:  Active search for new employees aged 50 to 64 is related to the firm size.
H3:  Active search for new employees aged 50 to 64 is related to the age of responsible 
person (CEO or HR manager – in our case the respondent).
H4:  Active search for new employees aged 50 to 64 is related to the education of the 
responsible person (CEO or HR manager – in our case the respondent).
H5:  Active search for new employees aged 50 to 64 is related to the length of the firm’s 
existence in years.
In the first four cases, our p-values were far above the 0.05 level which means that our 
zero hypothesis that there is no relationship between the given pairs of variables could not 
be safely rejected. In other words, as far as the present employment of older employees 
and the active search for new employees aged 50 to 64 are concerned, both Croatian 
and Slovenian companies behave in approximately the same manner regardless of the 
4 Contingency analysis is the analysis of (in)dependence between two qualitative variables (at least one of 
them has more than two values). It is carried out by calculating the χ2 statistics with the relevant statistical 
significance value (commonly known as the probability or p-value). If the p-value is above the 0.05 level, this 
means that the zero hypothesis about there being no relationship between the given pair of variables cannot 
be safely rejected – the probability that there is no relationship between the given pair of variables is larger 
than 5 percent.
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firm size, respondent age and respondent education: the majority employ a very low 
percentage of older employees and hardly actively target new employees aged 50 to 
64.
However, in the fifth case, it was possible to reject the zero hypothesis for Croatian 
firms at p = 0.10. It seems that Croatian companies with a longer tradition do tend to 
actively search for older employees more often than their more recently established 
counterparts.
In our next step, we attempted to find out to what extent the Croatian and Slovenian 
employers hired older employees and invested in them (in terms of their participation in 
education and training programmes) in the year 2007 (Table 7.10).
Table 7.10: Proportion of older employees
Variable
Mean value for Croatian 
companies
Mean value for Slovenian 
companies
Proportion of older employees in the 
company
23.5 21.5
Proportion of older employees among all 
the newly hired employees in 2007
3.4 1.8
Proportion of older employees among 
employees who participated in education 
and training programmes in 2007
11.1 13.3
Following from Table 7.10, we can conclude that Croatian companies have a slightly 
higher proportion of older employees and did hire more of them in 2007. However, when 
it comes to the participation of older employees in education and training programmes in 
2007, the Slovenian proportion is slightly higher than the Croatian one.5
Apart from factors which seem to determine employer preferences, practices and policies 
concerning the older workforce, we also investigated employer attitudes towards the 
retention of offically retired workers. Around half of the companies from both countries 
expressed their willingness to keep their male and female employees over the legal 
retirement age under a regular job contract if legally possible (Table 7.11).
5 Please note that the mean score differences are only statistically significant in case of the second variable 
(proportion of older employees among all the newly hired employees in 2007) and that only at the p≤0.07 level 
(independent samples t-test).
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Table 7.11: Willingness of employers to retain their employees after the 
legal retirement age under a regular job contract if legally possible
Response 
category
Croatia Slovenia
Male employees Female employees Male employees Female employees
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Not willing to 
retain
65 30.1 66 30.6 51 25.5 59 29.5
Willing to 
retain
114 52.8 110 50.9 117 58.5 109 54.5
Unknown 37 17.1 40 18.5 32 16.0 32 16.0
Total 216 100.0 216 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0
For Croatia, the results in Table 7.11 are directly contradicted by the responses given 
to the question whether or not the current legal retirement age is the best age to retire 
(Table 7.12). In Slovenia, almost 60 percent of respondents do not perceive the current 
legal retirement age as the best age to retire. Interestingly, the perceived, average best 
age to retire for men is in Slovenia slightly lower than in Croatia; the opposite is the case 
for women (Table 7.13).
Table 7.12: Perception of the current legal retirement age as the best age to retire
Response 
category
Croatia Slovenia
Male employees Female employees Male employees Female employees
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Not best 91 42.1 95 44.0 119 59.5 114 57.0
Best 120 55.6 117 54.2 76 38.0 81 40.5
Unknown 5 2.3 4 1.9 5 2.5 5 2.5
Total 216 100.0 216 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0
Table 7.13: Perceived average best age to retire
Best age to 
retire
Croatia Slovenia
Min. Max. Average Standarddeviation Min. Max. Average
Standard
deviation
For men 50 70 59.8 2.9 50 63 59.3 2.3
For women 50 70 55.3 3.3 50 65 56.0 2.7
It would seem that the personal preferences of respondents played a major role when 
answering the questions about the best age to retire. It is probably not too far-fetched to 
assume that they would personally prefer to retire as early as possible and enjoy life while 
still in good health. However, many respondents used the possibility of further elaborating 
on their response choices by adding comments such as “the best age to retire depends 
on the individual in question – some individuals are much fitter than the others” and “the 
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best age to retire depends on the job in question – there are some jobs which cannot be 
effectively performed by older employees”.
Furthermore, it seems that the period of economic depression is still very present in 
the memory of our respondents. In economic history, there is a lot of evidence on the 
encouragement of older people to remain active in periods of economic growth only to 
be the first to be let go in times of recession (Taylor and Walker, 1998: 570; Henkens and 
Schippers, 2008: 141). To this day, some companies rely heavily on the practice which 
marked both Croatian and Slovenian economies in the period of transition: defensive 
restructuring was implemented by the active encouragement of older workers to take early 
retirement (Bejaković, 1992; Domadenik and Vehovec, 2003; Guardiancich, 2007). The 
firms were literally pushing older workers to early retirement by the advance payment of 
pension contributions for each additional working year up until the official retirement age. 
This kind of subsidised early retirement was widely used by employers but not voluntarily 
preferred by employees,6 although for the time-being it helped to maintain the social and 
political stability. Only after a decade can it be firmly established that this large-scale flow 
of older workers to inactivity through early retirement brought not only poor economic 
consequences (Guardiancich, 2007: 101-108) but also negative side effects manifested 
in the general, negative public opinion about older workers productivity, knowledge and 
experience. With the imminent threat of a shrinking workforce, these prejudices will need 
to be effectively tackled as they represent the major obstacle both to the retention and 
fresh employment of the older workers.
What about other barriers to the continued labour market participation of older workers? 
As shown in previous chapters of this book, both Croatia and Slovenia have been facing 
negative rates of natural increase. As a result, a substantial shift in the age distribution 
of the working-age population can be observed in both countries. Consequently, in both 
countries, these changes already induced the need for reforming the first pension pillar 
(the mandatory public pension scheme) and for the active promotion of the voluntary 
second and third pillars. 
Our research indicates that a strong majority of companies would be willing to pay 
additional retirement insurance for employees if it were considered to be a tax benefit 
(Table 7.14).
6 In the period from 1990 to 1995, more than 57,000 Croatian workers exited their working lives in this manner 
before reaching the statutory retirement age (HZMO, 2008). 
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Table 7.14: Willingness to pay additional retirement insurance for employees if it were 
considered to be a tax benefit
Response category
Croatia Slovenia
Frequency % Frequency %
Not willing to pay 42 19.4 29 14.5
Willing to pay 164 75.9 166 83.0
Unknown 10 4.6 5 2.5
Total 216 100.0 216 100.0
In addition to the need for pension pillars reform, a gradual increase of the full retirement 
age is necessary. In Slovenia, this increase has been in progress since the year 2000 
and in Croatia since 1999. However, in the long-run, a broader policy revision is required 
in both countries to facilitate macroeconomic stability and growth. In Slovenia in 2007, 
the average pension benefit is at the estimated level of 61.3 percent of the net average 
wage (67.7 percent for old-age benefit). In Croatia in 2007, the average pension benefit 
was 40 percent and 44 percent for old-age benefit. But, the demographic pressures will 
either require a significant pension system reform or will lead to a dramatic cut in pension 
benefit.
Given that the ageing problem has not been perceived as acute in Croatia and Slovenia 
(almost 50 percent of respondents in both countries still view the retirement process 
more as a creation of opportunities for younger people as opposed to the perception 
of it as being more a loss of valuable skills and experience), the topic of older workers’ 
employment prospects still has not entered the public mind. However, with the rapidly 
approaching official retirement age of the baby boom generation, both public discussions 
of and implementation of government actions towards working life extension remain only 
a question of time.
7.5  Conclusion
General population ageing in Croatia and Slovenia is not only a fiscal sustainability 
question, but also a growth challenge. In the long-run in order to facilitate growth, Croatian 
and Slovenian governments will have to develop and implement strategies to keep older 
workers in the labour force. These will have to be oriented towards two major goals: 
the introduction of incentives for older workers to remain in the labour force, and• 
the encouragement of enterprises to take a forward-looking approach and start • 
facilitating better and longer working lives.
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Should governments continue on their present “interception” path, this will end with 
a severe labour shortage after the baby boom generation starts retiring at the official 
retirement age in the next 5 to 10 years. However, should the baby boomers be 
provided with enough incentives to continue working beyond their official (statutory and 
mandatory) retirement age on one hand, and their employers be induced to retain and 
additionally employ older workers on the other hand, the “adjustment” path will enable 
the Croatian and Slovenian economy to at least remain stable if not continue to grow in 
the long-run. Following from our research, we can conclude that, at present, companies 
in both countries employ a very low percentage of older employees and hardly target new 
employees aged 50-64. However, employers in both countries do not show age or gender 
discrimination attitudes that could become a severe obstacle to the implementation of the 
“adjustment” path, if selected. 
Taking into account the general demographic and labour market trends presented and 
discussed in this book, we believe that the establishment of employment agencies for 
retired people who would like to continue to work part-time should become the priority of 
policy-makers. Such employment agencies should bring a favourable tax treatment and 
introduce flexible employment contracts similar to student work. In this way, employing 
older people would become more attractive from firms’ perspective while retired people 
would be able to mitigate the problems of maintaining the lifestyle they were used to 
when on salary with their low pensions.
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Chapter 8   |   Sandra Švaljek
Enhancing employers’ demand for older workers: 
Policies, practices and recommendations
8.1  Introduction
After the baby boom in the decades following the Second World War at the end of the 
20th century, it became evident that demographic trends were reversing due to declining 
fertility rates and rising life expectancy. As a result, most nations worldwide began to 
face a significant increase in the proportion of elderly in the total population, and the 
population projections indicate that the same trends will persist in the future. 
It was soon recognised that so-called demographic ageing might affect virtually all aspects 
of social, economic and even political life. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a 
large and rapidly growing body of literature encompassing both theoretical contributions 
and empirical studies on the social and economic implications of population ageing, as 
well as policy papers providing recommendations on how to mitigate the unpleasant 
consequences of demographic changes. 
In this chapter, we will concentrate mainly on the implications of population ageing 
on the labour force shrinkage; which could have detrimental effects on the long-term 
sustainability of pension systems and on the sustainability of public finance in general, 
and could also impair the potential for further economic growth of ageing nations (see 
e.g. Maddaloni et al., 2006; Leibfritz and Roeger, 2008). However, there are many other 
concerns raised by demographic changes that are also important but will not be tackled 
here, such as the implications of ageing on savings and investments, capital markets, 
housing markets, international economic relations, poverty and consumption patterns 
(Börsch-Supan, 2001; 2004; Maddaloni et al., 2006; United Nations, 2007). Demographic 
ageing might even aggravate regional disparities for countries with different regional 
profiles of demographic development, such as Germany (Meier, 2008). The fact that 
the ageing of the median voter could also influence political outcomes should not be 
neglected, which stresses the importance of reaching political decisions on structural 
reforms in pension and health systems before the median voter gets too old (Jackson, 
2003). 
The rising share of the older population itself should not be perceived as a threat to 
economic development and prosperity, but it should also not be ignored. It is important 
to be aware of the challenges which population ageing brings and to prepare acceptable 
policy options to avoid unwanted outcomes. One such policy option was developed with 
the intention to raise older workers’ participation in the labour market, and particularly, 
142
to affect employers’ willingness to employ this part of the workforce and to keep them 
employed. This policy option will be particularly elaborated here.
This chapter addresses the issues related to the timing of retirement, which has an 
important impact on the labour market participation of older workers and, therefore, on 
the size of the workforce. The role of effective retirement age becomes more and more 
important with the growing share of an older workforce, since early retirement could mean 
a significant loss in labour utilisation (Leibfritz and Roeger, 2008). It is worth mentioning 
that although the demographic trends are quite similar across the European Union, i.e. 
in “old” member states and in the transition economies becoming new members of the 
Union, the issue of early retirement attracted different levels of attention in those two 
groups of countries. There are at least two plausible explanations for the little concern 
of transition economies for the early retirement phenomenon. The first one is that the 
economic restructuring in transition economies and the resulting use of early retirement 
as an easy solution for the necessary downsizing of the number of employees started 
at least a decade later than in the “old” member states. The second reason could be 
that restructuring brought by the transition was so far-reaching and so distressing for 
the entire workforce that the activity of older workers was simply not perceived as a 
priority. However, once the economies started to recover after the transitional downturn, 
it became evident that the participation of older age groups in the workforce has the least 
potential to be restored.
This chapter consists of five sections. After the introductory section, we focus on the 
factors that influence individual retirement decisions and identify three main reasons 
for the postponement of retirement. In Section 8.3, we discuss the main policies that 
could reverse the early retirement trend. In addition to the policies aimed at changing 
the institutional settings, we stress the importance of changing the employers’ attitudes 
towards older workers and elaborate the ways that the demand for older workers could 
be influenced. In Section 8.4, we give a few examples of policies employed in some EU 
countries that contain the aim of enhancing the demand for older people. Based on those 
countries’ practices and empirical evidence, we draw recommendations for the design 
of policy measures directed towards raising demand for older workers in Croatia and 
Slovenia.
8.2  Determinants of individual retirement decisions
As the search for a solution has to start with an inquiry into the causes of the problem, it 
is necessary to find out why people choose to retire before the statutory retirement age 
and why they opt not to work beyond the statutory retirement age even if their physical 
and mental abilities would allow them to remain employed. 
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Contemporary literature dealing with the causes of the withdrawal from the labour force 
before the official pensionable age recognises two major forces causing early retirement. 
There are factors that pull the individuals out of the labour force and those that push them 
out of the labour market. 
Pull factors
Pull factors are mainly financial incentives which make retirement more desirable than 
employment, and which are primarily linked to (i) provisions of the public pension systems 
and (ii) private pension arrangements, but also to other (iii) formal or (iv) informal early 
retirement schemes. 
Pension system.•  Elements of the pension system that influence retirement 
decisions are (i) the age at which early retirement benefits could first be accessed, 
(ii) the replacement rates and (iii) the implicit tax on continuing to work in terms of 
changes in the present value of net pension wealth from working an additional year1 
(Gruber and Wise, 2005).
Private retirement schemes.•  Access to the private, i.e. occupational retirement 
schemes, which are available in many countries, also facilitates the decisions of 
individuals to retire before the statutory retirement age if they have accumulated 
considerable pension wealth in such schemes (OECD, 2006).
Formal early retirement schemes.•  In the periods of rising overall unemployment 
such as in 1970s and 1980s, “old” EU member governments of several European 
countries officially promoted early retirement by subsidizing retirement before the 
standard retirement age. It has even been claimed that there was a kind of collusion 
between the government, trade unions and employers to resolve the political 
and economic problem of high unemployment in such a socially acceptable way 
(Ebbinghaus, 2006).  
Informal early retirement schemes.•  There are numerous examples of incentives 
for early retirement that are embedded in elements of the social welfare system 
other than the pension system which entitle older unemployed or inactive persons to 
certain benefits and thus provide a smooth passage into the early retirement. Those 
are the incentives linked to long-term sickness programmes, disability insurance 
and special unemployment programmes (Gruber and Wise, 2005; OECD, 2006).
1 Here, an implicit tax on work is a loss in the present discounted value of pension benefits that occur in the case 
of remaining in the labour force. According to Gruber and Wise (2005), in many countries the implicit tax on work 
is 80 percent or more the first year after benefit eligibility.
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Push factors
Whereas the pull factors mainly refer to the characteristics of the institutional settings, 
push factors are characteristics of the older persons or companies that have a negative 
impact on the older workers’ chances of finding attractive job opportunities or to remain 
employed. 
Push factors on the side of employers.•  Employers may become reluctant 
to employ or retain older workers if they perceive older workers to be (i) more 
expensive than younger workers, (ii) less productive, (iii) more difficult to retrain, (iv) 
more appropriate targets for redundancy or (v) more difficult to fire without violating 
employment protection rules (Howse, 2006). 
Push factors on the side of the employees.•  Older workers become less employable 
because their skills become obsolete due to technological changes and other 
structural changes in labour demand, and, at the same time, they are not prepared 
for learning and training because they see too few benefits from investing in it. 
To the list of the factors pushing the workers out of the labour market, one should also add 
deteriorating health and disability, which proves to be the second most important reason 
why older workers leave their job before the official retirement age in EU (European 
Commission, 2004a). 
In addition to recognizing that there are pull and push factors and health status factors, 
numerous empirical analyses have tried to pinpoint more exactly the determinants 
affecting individual decisions to retire, and to explore the factors causing differences in 
companies’ inclination to offer an early retirement option to their employees. 
Many of the factors determining individual retirement decisions are, of course, closely 
connected to the preservation of financial security, such as income, wealth, level of 
education, employment in a specific economic sector, profession, work experience and 
tenure. As expected, people who have accumulated a sufficient level of wealth during 
their working life are more likely to go into early retirement (Bloemen, 2006; Dorn and 
Sousa-Poza, 2005). 
However, there are also other important factors determining the decision to retire which 
are not necessarily connected to the financial status of the person, but rather to her or 
his socio-demographic characteristics. Surveys have confirmed the existence of a strong 
relationship between early retirement and gender, a partner’s labour market status and 
the presence of caring responsibilities (Irving, Steels and Hall, 2005). Empirical studies 
also show that self-employed workers as well as workers who experienced a period of 
unemployment in the past rarely retire early (Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2005). Factors like 
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taste for leisure or job satisfaction as well as many other practical and personal factors 
are also found to have non-negligible influence on individual retirement decisions (Esser, 
2005; Irving, Steels and Hall, 2005).
Although financial considerations have the most important role in deciding on remaining 
or withdrawing from the labour market, they are usually re-enforced by other pull or push 
factors (Irving, Steels and Hall, 2005). The decision to retire is, in addition, reached 
much more easily if the companies themselves offer early retirement schemes to their 
employers. It is empirically proven that the companies that are more likely to offer the 
early retirement schemes are primarily large companies and companies within the 
service sector. The economic and employment situation which applies to a particular 
company can also influence the offer of early retirement, whereby such offer can be 
found more often in establishments where the employment trends in recent years have 
been declining and where there is a need for a reduction in personnel. Interestingly, a 
company’s assessment of the overall economic situation or its need for employees does 
not seem to correlate with the offer of early retirement (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007).
The effects of the factors that work in favour of early retirement are certainly very strong, 
and early retirement has become in many countries the second most important pathway 
into retirement, after retirement at the standard age (European Commission, 2007). Since 
the institutional framework facilitates retirement before the official retirement age, and 
both employers and employees consider this to be convenient, one can speak of the 
so-called “early retirement culture” that has developed all over Europe. Moreover, some 
surveys point to the development of an interesting pattern regarding policy preferences of 
the workers. They would like to retire even before their expected retirement age or, more 
precisely in 2003, the average preferred retirement age in the EU-12 was 58.2 for men and 
57.5 for women, which is for both sexes around 4 years lower than the effective retirement 
age and 6 years lower than the legislated standard retirement age (Esser, 2005). The 
situation in new member states (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) is quite similar, with a 
preferred retirement age of 56 years for both sexes, which is on average 3.4 years lower 
than the effective retirement age (European Commission, 2004b) (Figure 8.1).
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Figure 8.1: Preferred and effective retirement age in new EU countries, 2003
Source: European Commission (2004b).
With the rise in the share of elderly in the total population, it is clear that the ever-earlier 
retirement trend is not feasible and that the “early retirement culture” should be abolished. 
Presently, people in Europe spend approximately 20 percent of their entire life, or more 
than 30 percent of their adult life, in retirement (Leeson, 2006). When this fact is taken 
into account, it becomes obvious that the transition from work to retirement should be 
delayed for many reasons. Firstly, the increase in the effective retirement age could 
contribute to the preservation of the financial sustainability of public pension systems. 
Secondly, raising the participation of older workers in the labour force could mitigate the 
reduction of the growth potential of economies. Thirdly, an extended working life helps 
maintain the economic well-being of the elderly. Finally, delaying the transition from work 
to retirement helps promote active ageing, which is crucial for healthy and successful 
ageing (Howse, 2006). In other words, later retirement should be promoted both for the 
interest of nations and individuals. According to the available data for the EU, the average 
exit age corresponds to the expected healthy-life years, and it is argued that with the 
postponement of the average effective exit age, people could expect a longer life without 
physical and mental illnesses (see Figure 8.2.). 
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Figure 8.2: Life expectancy at birth, average exit age and healthy years at birth in selected 
EU countries, 2005*
Note: *Data on healthy years at birth for Italy refer to 2004. Data for average exit age for Germany refer to 
2004. 
Source: Eurostat.
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8.3  Reversing early retirement trends
In the two most recent decades, countries have undertaken actions aimed at stopping 
the trend towards early retirement and at raising the activity of older workers. The data 
imply that those actions have been rather successful – in the EU the activity rate of 
workers in the 55-64 age cohort increased to 47.3 percent in 2007 compared to 40.8 
percent in 2000. 
The policies and specific measures that are employed with the intention of promoting 
longer working lives vary greatly across countries, but they all fall within the four broad 
policy categories that should counteract the factors causing early retirement. Those 
policy categories are (i) pension reforms, (ii) policies changing non-pension incentives to 
remain in work, (iii) policies increasing the employability of older workers and (iv) policies 
changing employers’ attitudes and employment practices (OECD, 2006). 
Reform of a pension system.•  There are many different ways to reform a pension 
system and, thereby, to increase the incentive to work, but basically there are three 
typical measures available. These are (i) the reduction of pension entitlements, (ii) 
the delay of the age at which benefits can be drawn – accomplished by raising 
the official retirement age and restricting options for early retirement and (iii) the 
introduction of steeper penalties and rewards based on the time of retirement, i.e. 
the introduction of actuarial fairness of benefits adjustment2 (Casey et al., 2003, 
Howse, 2006; OECD, 2006). 
Policies changing non-pension incentives to remain in work.•  In order to be 
effective, reform of a pension system should be accompanied by restrictions in the 
methods to leave the labour market such as through sickness or disability pensions 
and long-term unemployment benefits for older persons. It is, however, to be expected 
that there are older persons that for some reason cannot or will not be employed full-
time and that their retainment in labour force can be preserved only if the institutional 
framework allows more flexible work options. Although often praised, flexible means 
to retirement should be carefully designed to avoid the negative net effects on older 
workers’ participation (Loretto, Vickerstaff and White, 2005).
Policies increasing the employability of older workers.•  Measures that tackle 
the supply side of the older workers’ labour market belong mainly to three groups: 
(i) measures promoting learning and the training of older age groups, (ii) measures 
aimed at providing better employment services for older people and (iii) measures 
promoting better working conditions and better health and safety standards. 
2 The “actuarial fairness” of benefits adjustment is achieved through the “actuarially equivalent” or “actuarially 
neutral” system in which an individual's pension wealth (the discounted stream of future pension payments) 
does not change when a worker retires earlier or later than a defined standard age.
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Policies changing employers’ attitudes and employment practices.•  Measures 
that fall into this group can be divided into (i) measures tackling age discrimination 
and changing negative employer attitudes towards older workers and (ii) measures 
affecting the objective factors reducing the demand for older people. Measures 
belonging to the first group can be based on two approaches: (i) the voluntary 
approach through public information campaigns and guidelines and (ii) the formal 
approach through the implementation of legislation preventing age discrimination 
in employment. The second group of measures is mainly concentrated on making 
the older workers more attractive to the employers by providing them with financial 
incentives to hire and retain the older workers. The rationale beyond such measures 
is that the standard seniority-based wages of older workers do not correspond with 
the productivity of the members of this age group, so that the government’s subsidy 
for employing older workers should bring the labour costs in line with the performance 
of the older individuals. Measures inducing changes in wage-setting policies are 
based on the same principle of matching costs to older workers’ productivity. 
Into the group of measures that raise the demand for older persons, one can also 
include legislative changes that increase the legal protection of older workers by 
penalizing firms in the case of their dismissal and measures intended to increase the 
productivity of older workers. The latter correspond to the measures that increase 
the employability of older workers.
There is no EU member country that has not implemented some or most of the policies, 
which have the intention to reduce the incentives for early retirement by changing the 
institutional framework or by affecting the behaviour of employers or older employees. 
The results of the implemented measures are generally positive, but there is a diversity of 
experiences both with respect to the country and with respect to the measures employed. 
The empirical evidence has shown that some measures have yielded only marginal 
results or have even had negative effects on the employment of older persons or on 
overall employment. The assessment of the measures is complicated by the fact that 
the countries that have introduced incentives to work longer have not, at the same time, 
completely abolished disincentives to continue working (European Commission, 2007). 
It is generally recognised that policy measures have a higher probability of being effective 
if they are part of a wider set of measures that raise the awareness of the importance 
of enhancing older workers’ participation in the labour market and change negative 
perception of older persons. It seems also that the measures aimed at fostering the 
participation of older people are more effective in cases where they are incorporated 
within the national ageing strategies providing a coherent and well-coordinated context 
for such measures (OECD, 2006). 
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The next section gives some examples of policy measures implemented in European 
countries that have the intention to enhance employer’s demand for older people.
8.4  Country practices in enhancing employers' demand
for older people
Public information campaigns
Government-sponsored information campaigns promoting the employment of older 
people and raising awareness of the importance of labour market participation of the 
elderly and of the labour market implications of demographic changes took place in a 
number of European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway (OECD, 2006). Although these campaigns 
have usually been accompanied by other more formal measures, they prove to be 
crucial in mobilizing the whole society and changing stereotypes of older persons and 
their working capacities. Many campaigns also stress age diversity as a productivity 
enhancing company practice as opposed to the perception of a negative relationship 
between age and productivity. It should be, however, noted that empirical studies do 
not verify the hypothesis of higher productivity of teams with greater diversity in age 
(Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2004), but this does not mean that younger workers 
are necessarily more productive than older ones. Contrary to expectations, one piece 
of empirical evidence shows that productivity does not decline with age (Börsch-Supan, 
Düzgün and Weiss, 2007).
Box 1  Public information campaigns in the UK, Finland and Norway
United Kingdom 
Since 1999, the UK government has supported the information campaign “Age Positive” 
which encourages employers to employ a mixed-age workforce, provides assistance 
in the case of age discrimination and helps employers to comply with legislation on 
age discrimination in employment. The campaign uses publications, research, the 
press, events and awards initiatives to reach the wider public. It has its own website 
providing a range of information and links to other sources of information on the best 
practices for employers and on labour market issues and pensions for individuals. 
Within the campaign, the government has also issued the Good Practice Standards 
that should help employers to recognise the benefits of an age-diverse workforce. 
The guidelines given in the Good Practice Standards cover six areas of employment: 
recruitment, selection, promotion, training and development, redundancy and 
retirement.
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Finland 
In Finland, the changes in early exit arrangements which took place at the beginning 
of the 1990s were associated with a number of nationwide programmes and 
campaigns. At the beginning, the campaigns attempted to change the attitudes and 
capabilities of ageing workers; and in the period 1998-2002, the focus of the National 
Programme on Ageing Workers was shifted to the workplaces. The main goal of the 
Programme was to promote the employability of people over 45 and to reduce their 
exclusion and premature retirement. The programme aims to build a wide consensus 
at the policy level, both to value the experience of the ageing workforce and to raise 
the actual age of retirement. One of the programme’s main targets was to influence 
general attitudes, so the programme adopted a slogan “experience as a national 
asset”. 
The programme was not very effective in prolonging working life or initiating deep 
cultural changes, and it was criticised since it reflected mainly the perspective of the 
state and not that of the individual. However, external evaluation recognised its role 
in raising the level of knowledge of the ageing process and information on the status 
of older people in the labour market.
Norway
Norway is not an example of an early exit culture but a country with a broadly 
accepted and institutionalised societal norm that older workers have a right and duty 
to participate in the labour market. Government efforts did not, therefore, have to 
deal with early retirement; but due to the labour shortage, their efforts had to be 
directed towards the promotion of the rights of older workers who wish to continue to 
work. This was done through the Action Programme for Senior Policy, which began 
in 2001 and ended in 2005 and was prepared by the semi-public Centre for Senior 
Planning. 
The Action Programme was active for six years: mobilizing working life organisations 
(social partners, ministries, employment authorities, personnel management 
consultants, research institutes, adult education units and social security 
administrators) and stimulating senior policy activities within them; raising awareness 
regarding the situation of ageing workers through a media campaign and information 
addressed to target groups in working life, initiating development programmes, 
research, education and competence improvement and raising funds to support 
changes at the workplace level.
Source: Gould and Saurama (2004), de Vroom (2004a), Fortuny, Nesporova and Popova (2003), Solem and 
Øverbye (2004), OECD (2006), http://www.agepositive.gov.uk.
152
Age discrimination legislation
The European Eurobarometer opinion survey showed that in the EU-15, age is the 
most often cited grounds for discrimination and that people over 50 years of age were 
thought to be the third most disadvantaged group (after those with learning difficulties 
and physical disabilities) in terms of getting a job, training or a promotion (European 
Commission, 2003). Similarly, research evidence confirms that the age dimension (at 
both ends of the age range) is a decisive element in recruitment policies, that there is 
a widespread employers’ practice of targeting older workers for job losses and that an 
increasing number of workers are obliged or persuaded to leave the workplace 5-15 
years before the official retirement age (Leeson, 2006). It is, therefore, understandable 
that the introduction of the age-discrimination or other related legislation is one of the 
main elements of policies that should affect employers’ attitudes towards older workers.
In 2000, the European Council adopted the Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Council of the 
European Union, 2000). This directive recognised the threat that discrimination based 
on religion or beliefs, age, sexual orientation or disability is opposed to the objectives of 
the EC Treaty and required from the member states to implement the national legislation 
banning age and disability discrimination by the end of 2006. Today, all the EU member 
states have adopted the age-discrimination legislation.
Box 2  Measures against age discrimination in the Netherlands and Estonia
The Netherlands
The Netherlands is characterised by a low labour force participation of older workers 
which, similar to Norway, in 1990s in the era of relatively high economic growth 
contributed to a labour shortage and posed a constraint to the further prosperity 
of the nation. The policy action that the Dutch government undertook was a 
combination of different initiatives and policies where anti-age discrimination played 
an important role. This was a response to the higher awareness of the presence 
of age discrimination in the mid-1990s. Soon after, the government published a 
document called the “Integral Programme of Action for Policy for the Elderly 1995-
1998”, where the issue of age discrimination was addressed and which initiated the 
government’s battle against it. Since 1997, the Government has submitted several 
versions of anti-age discrimination bills to parliament, but the bills were always heavily 
criticised because they have not covered all of the cases in which age discrimination 
can take place (work-related recruitment, selection, training, education, promotion, 
dismissals, etc.), or they have foreseen some exceptions or escape formulas. The 
bills were not implemented; and the Dutch policy-makers decided to wait for the final 
EU recommendation and eventually adopted the age-discrimination legislation in 
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2004. Even though the anti-age discrimination bill had not been put in place before, 
the preparation of the bill and the political debate that followed contributed to a 
change in public opinion and a rising consensus that decreasing participation of 
ageing workers is a negative and undesirable tendency.
Estonia
Following the International Year of Older Persons in 1999, the Estonian Government 
adopted the Policy for the Elderly in Estonia and established a Commission of 
Policies for the Elderly. The policy provided a starting point for raising awareness 
of age discrimination in Estonian society and was the first official acknowledgement 
that age discrimination is “unethical”. According to the policy, it is “unethical to 
discriminate against people on the basis of their age” and addresses, to some extent, 
discrimination in employment. 
Source: de Vroom (2004b), Fortuny, Nesporova and Popova (2003).
Croatia does not have a separate law on combating age discrimination or a national strategy 
dealing with the same issue, but the provisions to tackle discrimination are included in 
a number of laws, programmes and strategies. As an accession country, Croatia has to 
align with the EU Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation, and it is 
known that the national strategy on the prevention of all forms of discrimination is under 
preparation (European Commission, 2006b). Although there is some public discussion 
on particular topics that will be covered in that strategic document, it focuses mainly 
on discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, ethnic origin or disability. Age, as a 
ground for discrimination, is still not perceived as a policy issue.  
Wage subsidies to hire and retain older workers
Many countries have introduced various types of wage subsidies for older workers that 
should decrease the labour costs of older people and match the costs of employing 
persons beyond a certain age with their level of productivity. Such direct financial 
incentives for employers can be found in most of the old EU member countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden), 
but also in some new member states (e.g. Estonia and Slovenia) (Fortuny, Nesporova 
and Popova, 2003; OECD, 2006; Verša, 2004).
Wage subsidies are given either in the form of a hiring subsidy (where the subsidy is 
provided during a limited period of time), wage subsidy (subsidies are paid to employers for 
an indefinite period) or in the form of a reduction of social security benefits, unemployment 
insurance contributions or disability contributions. 
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On the basis of the results of the empirical studies on the effectiveness of wage subsidies, 
it could be concluded that these are not appropriate policy measures, since their 
effectiveness is low due to deadweight effects. In other words, the empirical evidence 
implies that an increase in subsidised hiring is accompanied by an almost equal decline 
in unsubsidised new employment (Boockmann et al., 2007; Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).
Box 3  Wage subsidies for older workers in Slovenia and Croatia
Croatia
In 1993, the Croatian Employment Office initiated a set of measures for improving 
employability, and 1994, it enhanced this set of measures by providing wage subsidies 
for persons older than 50. The measure consisted in a government subsidy covering 
up to 50 percent of the gross wage and meal and transportation costs for employees 
aged 50 or more in the first year of their employment, in the case of a permanent work 
contract. This measure, however, survived only for two years since it was perceived 
as inefficient. Only 328 persons were employed thanks to this measure.
The Active Labour Market Policy from the previous cycle, 2002-2005, did not have 
measures directly tailored for employment subsidies to older workers. The actual 
ALMP started in 2006 and is structured according to the National Employment Action 
Plan, which follows the European employment strategy. Among the ALMP measures, 
one employment subsidy is specifically tailored for older women above 45 and older 
men above 50 years, but other measures also include older workers such as subsidies 
for long-term unemployment and educational and training programmes for keeping 
jobs or for improving employability, public works and special handicap groups. 
Preliminary results for the number of active participants resulting from the ALMP 
measures from 2006 and 2007 show a slight increase in the share of participants 
between 50-54 years and a slight decline in the share of participants between 55-59 
years of age (HZZ, working document PHARE 2005 program “Evaluation, design 
of recommendations, capacity building and grant scheme management in the field 
of active employment measures in Croatia”). Overall, the share of persons aged 
between 50-59 years participating in the ALMP measures is 11 percent and the 
overall share of registered unemployed of the same cohort is close to 23 percent.
Slovenia
In 1998, Slovenia started to deal with the problem of unemployment among 
older workers and to formulate several active labour market policy measures 
targeted towards people above 40 (!) years of age. Measures included 
educational and training programmes, programmes of personal growth, 
public works, encouraging self-employment and the measure of reimbursing 
the employer’s contribution in the case of employment of persons older than 50
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who are receiving unemployment or social benefits. Reimbursement of contributions 
amounts to 50 percent of the contributions paid by employers for the first three years, 
and then it is reduced to 25 percent. In 2000, only 10 unemployed persons older than 
50 got jobs as a result of this measure. It is claimed that the measure was ineffective 
because promotional activities were insufficient and the active labour market policy 
measures were not coordinated with other measures created for the development of 
the older labour force.  
Source: Kerovec  (2001), Verša (2004).
Protecting older workers
Since older workers prove to be less employable than younger workers, many countries 
protect older workers by requiring longer notice periods in the case of dismissals or 
higher severance payments. Some governments have even introduced additional 
“penalties” for firms firing older workers in the form of additional taxes or higher social 
security contributions. However, measures that increase the costs of firing older workers 
often change the employers’ behaviour in a way that they become reluctant to employ 
older persons in order to avoid such costs. In that sense, protecting older workers instead 
of increasing employment of older workers may result in quite the opposite outcome 
(OECD, 2006). 
Box 4  Penalties for firing older workers in France
France is a country with a deep-rooted “early retirement culture”, and its employment 
rate of people aged 55 to 64 is very low compared to the other industrialised 
countries. Faced with both low activity of the elderly and a rapidly ageing labour 
force, and also with high unemployment, the French government realised that the 
situation in the pension system and the whole welfare system will soon become 
unbearable. Therefore, it set several policy objectives in the early 1990s. In addition 
to compensating older workers who left the labour market early and reforming the 
retirement system, the government introduced measures aimed at maintaining older 
wage-earners in employment and at helping them develop with new qualifications. 
One of these measures was the so-called Delalande Agreement, which penalises 
firms that dismiss workers over 50. The amount of the penalty is adjusted according 
to the age at which the dismissal took place. In 2005, it corresponded to a maximum 
of 12 months of salary for a worker aged 56-57 in enterprises with 50 or more workers 
and 6 months of salary in smaller firms. 
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According to the empirical evidence, this measure had a very low effect on retaining 
older workers, and it might even have had negative effects on labour mobility and on 
the hiring of older persons. French measures fighting unemployment and inactivity 
among older persons were rather unsuccessful since they were not embedded in a 
wider set of policies aimed towards older workers and active ageing. In addition, little 
was done to raise the awareness of companies on demographic ageing. Measures 
employed were mainly negative, in the sense that they tried to tighten controls over 
early exit or restrict it, and not positive, giving opportunities to firms and older persons 
to remain in the labour force. 
Source: Guillemard and Argoud (2004), OECD (2006).
8.5  Recommendations
Before giving any recommendations on appropriate policy measures to be introduced 
in Croatia and Slovenia in order to enhance the participation of older persons in the 
labour force and increase the demand for older workers, it is useful to mention that both 
countries share similar perceptions about early retirement. There is a high proportion of 
people in both countries (71 percent in Croatia, and 49 percent in Slovenia compared 
to 45 percent in EU-25 on average) who agree that people in their country retire too 
early (European Commission, 2006a). Based on this insight, one could conclude that 
the “early retirement culture” could be easily abolished in both countries, especially in 
Croatia, once the institutional disincentives to work beyond a certain age are lifted. Also, 
one can suppose that public opinion would not be very opposed to measures promoting 
the employment of older workers that act on the supply side of this segment of the labour 
market. Therefore, it seems crucial to append such measures with ones that make older 
workers more attractive and ones that tackle employers’ attitudes towards them.
The countries facing a labour force shrinkage due to the population ageing phenomenon 
apply a variety of different measures to raise the demand for older people so as to affect 
the employers’ decisions to employ or retain older workers in employment. Based on 
their experience, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
The same measures can generate different outcomes if applied in different • 
macroeconomic settings and in a different institutional environment. Therefore, 
it is highly advisable to evaluate policy measures in advance, and also to assess 
their effectiveness once they are introduced. It is also necessary to monitor the 
demographic trends and the trends in the labour market in order to be able to react 
in a timely and proper manner.
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Public information campaigns that raise employers’ awareness of the value of older • 
workers’ experience and change the “early retirement culture” in general are highly 
recommended. However, although necessary, they are often not sufficient for a 
policy intended to enhance older workers’ participation in the labour force. 
The introduction of age discrimination legislation also proves to be an indispensable • 
element of the policy mix.
Country practices show that NGOs can play an important role in carrying out the • 
necessary research and in raising the public awareness about issues like age 
discrimination and other barriers to the employment of older workers.
General active labour market policy measures promoting employability such as • 
life-long learning and training may have manifold positive effects. They enhance 
older workers self-esteem and encourage them to participate in the labour market, 
increase their productivity, bringing their wages in line with their performance and 
making them more attractive in the labour market.
Penalties for dismissals and wage subsidies are two measures that, although • 
frequently applied could have unwanted effects and should, therefore, either be 
omitted or designed very carefully.
It is important for governments to employ a wider set of measures focused on the • 
issues related to the older workers’ labour participation in the era of population 
ageing. It is even advisable to prepare and publicly discuss a national strategic 
document on ageing and to include a set of policy responses to the challenge of 
demographic change in the broad framework of such a document.
Governments should make the selected policy options visible and understandable • 
so as to insure their acceptance and support by older workers and employers. A full 
commitment of trade unions and employers’ associations is vital for the success of 
such measures.
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